1981

0 Jan 81

The Insurance Advocate published an article by Mr Lanzone of the New York Bar, which inter alia states ; "Insurers express dismay with a Tort system which seeks to impose unanticipated and unlimited liabilities on manufacturers who as insureds then proceed to transfer these liabilities to their insurers. Various insurers and reinsurers regardless of size and capacity must be deeply concerned with the potential consequences presented by the asbestos claims." And further on Under the heading "A Real Problem": "The problem is real. Legal commentators have fully discussed the exposure and the potential. All that remains for the industry to recognise the clear and present danger that has resulted from the delays in the disposition of these cases and the financial instability and uncertainty that will undoubtedly result should a solution not be promptly found and implemented." These warning bells about the possible consequences of asbestosis in relation to the solvency of the insurance industry itself came to be sounded more loudly, as Mr Lanzone further on stated: "In recent years I have heard various insurers throughout the world express their concern over the number of asbestos claims and the incalculable risk they presented to the insurance industry."

0 Jan 81

Lord, Bissell & Brook : Report number 2 from Attorneys to the interested reinsurers of the Home in respect of Johns-Manville and inter alia state:

We now attach as an Appendix to this report a copy of our report number ... which will provide some background information for the reinsurers through Sedgwick North America Limited ... We regret to advise the excess reinsurers that the situation has materially worsened since our last report. The number of claims against the insured has increased sharply and there have been several large settlements made and verdicts returned against the insured which portend purely for future litigations. (And they refer to the Forty-Eight decision in favour of the exposure theory, and request each reinsurer to carefully consider his own reserve on these claims)

In addition the United States Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit handed down its decision last October in the INA- v- Forty Eight insulations case holding that liability coverage for the asbestos-related bodily injury claims attaches on the date of exposure to the products rather than on the much later date of manifestation of disease....

In this connection, (and this is something which they generally remember to include hereafter on each occasion they report to the market) we should emphasise that the above recommended reserve does not attempt to include loss or expense reserves for future bodily injury claims that may subsequently be brought against the assured

Finally we must report that the primary insurer is now maintaining that aggregate limits on three of its annual periods have been exhausted and it cautions that the exhaustion of its limits for all other years is imminent. It thus appears that the Reinsured may become in effect a primary insurer with defence obligations in the very near future. For these reasons we are recommending herein a substantial reserve increase to the excess reinsurers.. The primary insurer maintained that an adverse relationship exists between itself and the reinsured and that therefore the reinsured is not entitled to review the individual bodily injury claims files. Hence the reinsured has not seen the primary insurers loss runs and does not know the precise number of claims or the current number of closed claims or average loss payments and expenses..

Recommendations for future handling: we request each reinsurer to carefully consider his own reserve on these claims. In this connection we should emphasise that the above recommended reserve does not attempt to include loss or expense reserves for future bodily injury claims that may subsequently be brought against the assured. Please refer to page 14 of our report number I where we set forth estimates of others indicating the possibility that a great number of claims maybe brought in the future.

(That is the Califano and Selikoff estimates, and from hereon the attorneys make it quite clear, quite rightly, that their loss reserves are simply predicted on the basis of claims about which they know).

Similarly, the indicated reserve does not take into account the indemnity or contribution claims that may have been brought by other asbestos manufacturers against the assured as a supplier of the asbestos which is alleged to be an inherently dangerous product.

0 Jan 81

LloydÆs UnderwritersÆ Non-Marine Claims Office (LUNCO) Circular no. l. Circulates reports of Attorneys asbestos related claim review correspondence.

2 Jan 81

R W Sturge & Co: Circular letter from D E Coleridge, chairman, to agency members

You will be receiving with your copy of the January issue of LloydÆs Log an invitation from the Steering Committee of the Association of External Members of LloydÆs to apply for membership of this Association which includes a subscription of ú50 for 1981 and, if you so wish, to contribute more by way of an interest free loan.

I feel it might be helpful to remind you of the Chairman of LloydÆs remarks at the General Meeting of Members held on November 19th, a full copy of which you will have already received from this Agency. An extract from the speech, which refers to the proposal for such an Association, is attached for your convenience.

This Agency fully supports the sentiments expressed by the Chairman in his speech. We strongly believe that an External Name should not be regarded as a mere "Sleeping Partner" but that it is primarily the responsibility of the Agent to keep his Names informed of all matters which may concern them. As you are well aware, this Agency has always given special attention to communications with our names in particular through our Annual Meeting of Names, held in the CaptainsÆ Room , the reports of which are circulated and also through the regular personal visits made to our many Overseas Names in the United States. The result of having a special Association for external Members could prove to be confusing; there could well be a conflict of views expressed by the Agent and the Association on matters where the Agent is better qualified to advise in LloydÆs terms and, in any case, the Agent should retain a traditional and privileged link with his own Names.

Moreover any Member has always had the right to call on the Chairman of LloydÆs or another Member of the Committee if he or she has had a problem to which their Agent was unable to give a satisfactory answer. This privilege will naturally extend to the proposed new Council on which there will be six External Members. The Corporation of LloydÆs also has specialist departments; of particular importance to Names is the Taxation Department where special arrangements on behalf of all LloydÆs Members are made with the United Kingdom Inland Revenue, the Internal Revenue Service of the United States and many other foreign Governments and it is, therefore, most important that any discussions with those Government bodies are only carried out through LloydÆs official channels.

I believe, therefore, that membership of this Association would not be in the best interest of our Names nor indeed of LloydÆs as a whole.

If you agree with the views expressed above, it would be helpful if you would write to the Association to say so; otherwise, there could be a danger of the views of what I believe to be the silent majority not being heard.

5 Jan 81

Letter from G M V Winn to Peter Green, chairman of LloydÆs

Thank you for your letter dated 22nd December, 1980. I shall of course be very interested to read the paper which you are having prepared for the Committee regarding Clause 11 of the Bill.

As I understand it, Clause 11 will effectively put LloydÆs offices and employees above the law. This is quite unthinkable as, at present, only the Monarch is in this happy position and so it should remain.

No other Society such as my own and the Stock Exchange finds it necessary to put their members above the law. I certainly would not wish to belong to one that did.

Clearly, if the present Bill is presented to Parliament with Clause 11 included, LloydÆs would put itself in a most invidious position and the Bill would almost certainly fail. I am most anxious for the Bill to proceed smoothly and it is for this reason that I must continue to ask you to remove this Clause from the Bill and at the same time, wish you a Happy New Year.

9 Jan 81

Lord Chief Justice of England: Letter to Major-General J M D Ward-Harrison

Thank you for your letter of the 7th January last.

I appreciate your concern about the extract from the Bill to establish a Council of LloydÆs, which you cite in your letter. I do not, however, share your concern about the immunity which it grants to the Council of LloydÆs. As I read the section, all it does is to give an immunity vis-à-vis other members of LloydÆs, or people working for them, and does not extend to any immunity outside that particular coterie. In those circumstances, I do not think it is necessary for me to take any action.

However, even if I were concerned, as you are, about the possible effects of the Bill, it would not be my province to intervene.

I suggest, if you are still bothered about the matter, you should get in touch with your own Member of Parliament, who would be the right person to raise any questions on the matter in the House during the progress of the Bill to the statute book.

In any event, it was good to hear from you after all these years.

23 Jan 81

House of Commons: Letter from Nicholas Lyell, QC., MP.

I enclose a note on the problem of exercising discipline over fraud at Lloyds. In a recent letter to Peter Brooke MP in relation to clause 11 (immunities) the Chairman speaks of Fisher recommending immunity "on the grounds that the Council and the Committee should, in the future, intervene to a greater extent in the workings of the market in laying down and enforcing rules on the conduct of insurance business and to maintain standards by control over admission and discipline".

This is what we want the Council to do. The question is has it the teeth under the current Bill?

In my note I suggest an obligation to disclose misconduct on members. Personally I do not think this unreasonable, though some feel that it is unreasonable to impose a duty which might involve an individual in incriminating himself. What I do consider essential is that the broker or other employee who may currently be hamstrung under the law of agency has a right under the rules to report such matter.

The Lloyds Bill - Fraud

The object of the Bill is to provide a new and effective framework within which Lloyds can regulate its own affairs in accordance with present day requirements and practice and the interests of its policy holders.

The underlying principle is one of self-regulation by a Council of Lloyds with disciplinary powers.

This paper is concerned with the ability of the Council adequately to investigate and control the incidence of fraud insofar as anyone entitled to do business at Lloyds may be involved.

The investigative and disciplinary structure ought to be able to bear on:

a) The knowing presentation of fraudulent claims; and

b) The fraudulent introduction of business or the connivance by those entitled to work at Lloyds in the introduction of or continuation of business in circumstances where they have reason to believe that the full facts surrounding the nature of the risk or the level of premium being charged to the insured (particularly overseas) is not being revealed to underwriters.

It is felt by myself and other Members that Lloyds must be astute to ensure that the provisions of the Bill and/or the bye-laws to be made under it must be such as to provide all the powers needed to combat the problem, and be couched in such terms as to demonstrate the will and duty of the Society to do so.

Fraud of both types is difficult to trace and to prove, particularly in a court of law. The Council will require extensive power to acquire disclosure by members, brokers and their employees; to investigate any matters reported; and will also require a wide ability to discipline anyone found to have transgressed. We wish to be satisfied that adequate powers exist or will be written into the Bill or bye-laws.

The Presentation of Fraudulent Claims

The need for disciplinary control of the kind exercised by similar bodies in other, professions - e.g. the Senate of the Bar or the General Medical Council - is clearly indicated by implication in paragraph 1333 of the Fisher Report which highlights the dilemma of a broker requested to process a claim which he knows or suspects to be fraudulent. The law of agency prevents him from informing the underwriter of his knowledge or suspicions.

There is therefore a need for a higher authority to whom the broker not merely can go but should be under an express duty to go if he has grounds to suspect fraud. Without this discipline a small but deeply troubling minority of market operators can only be encouraged to connive in or at least turn a blind eye to fraudulent practices, contrary to the long term interests of the market, and contrary in the end to the ability of Lloyds to continue to operate, as we would wish it to operate, as a self-regulating body.

The Introduction of Business Tainted with Fraud

It is fundamental that insurance is conducted on the basis of full disclosure and utmost good faith between the assured via his broker and the underwriter. If utmost good faith can be impeached the policy can be avoided. But anxiety for premium income has encouraged laxity and the connivance by some brokers, some company agents with authority to write business, and even perhaps some underwriters, in the introduction of business which ought to have been regarded with deep suspicion on account of the true nature of the risks being written or of the secret and untoward difference between the level of premium being charged to the insured and premium reaching the insurer or re-insurer.

It ought to be a clear rule of the Society that anyone who engaged in the market who knows of or has real grounds to suspect that fraudulent business of any kind is being conducted should be under an obligation to report his suspicions to the Council of Lloyds or an appropriate committee of the Council who shall take such steps as they think fit. It should be the policy and duty of the Council by such committee to investigate and by its disciplinary committee to discipline any offender; and anyone who it is subsequently proved has such knowledge of such conduct and failed to report it should also be subject to discipline. It ought in appropriate cases to be the policy of the Council to furnish the police of the United Kingdom or any other country involved with such information as it can provide to assist in the bringing to public justice of those engaged in criminal activity involving the market.

It is not clear that the present draft of the Bill itself, schedule 2 of which describes the nature of the bye-laws which can be passed, or the draft bye-laws annexed to the Fisher Report adequately meet the problem. Paragraphs (14) - satisfaction of the committee as to character and suitability of individuals; (21) - power to acquire information; and (22) - power of disciplinary enquiry provide a potential framework. This could be adapted to meet the need. What appears to be missing is any clear statement of a basic requirement that it shall be the duty of anyone engaged in the market to inform the committee of such matters. I have written to the Chairman with a copy of this memorandum and hope to receive clarification. û Nicholas Lyell û 20th January 1981.

26 Jan 81

R J Kiln & Co Ltd: Letter from C K Murray

I understand you invited me to lunch today in order to discuss why divestment should not be made mandatory in the proposed LloydÆs Bill, but that the nature of this meeting has been changed in that it will be used to draft a petition against the Bill and it would therefore not be appropriate for me to be present. If any of those present at the meeting would like to talk to me either before the meeting or after the meeting about divestment, or indeed any other matter on which you think I might have experience or knowledge, then I would certainly make myself available.

As you know this Company is a completely independent underwriting Agency, and I am personally responsible for the underwriting of one of the major Non-Marine Syndicates. I believe most strongly that it is in the interest of my Names and the future of the business that the Bill should go through as drafted. I believe also that this is the wish of the great majority of my Names. If a group of MPs wishes to change any part of the Bill (and this would apply to Clause 11 or anything else) then surely they must come up with a practical alternative to replace anything they wish to delete. In other words, if you wish to delete Clause 11 then I believe the onus is on you to recommend an alternative system under which the societyÆs Council and the society itself would have proper protection.

I should be grateful if you would give a copy of this letter to each individual attending your meeting.

Jan 81

U.S. Federal Government publications: "Compensation for Asbestos-Associated Diseases: A Survey of Asbestos Insulation Workers in the U.S. and Canada" by P Barth; unpublished study for the U.S. Department of Labor.

Table Fifteen: Claims Growth of Asbestos Insulators

 

Claims filed, percentage of asbestos-related deaths:

 

Year of Death

WorkersÆ Compensation

Third Party Lawsuits

1962-1968

24%

3%

1969-1970

35%

7%

1971-1972

40%

9%

1973-1974

37%

22%

1975-1976

41%

32%

P Barth found that only 16% of a sample of insulator fatalities resulted in asbestos liability suits over the period 1962-1976 (pp. 63 and 91). However, that figure conceals growth in the frequency of filings in recent years. Although only 3% filed in 1962-1968, 32% filed in 1975-1976, as is shown in Table 15. Moreover, since more suits filed have had an outcome favourable to the plaintiff, the frequency of filings can be expected to continue to grow.

The expectation is that eventually from 75 to 100% of eligible claims will be filed on cases involving manufacturing employees and other insulators. In addition, survivors of mesothelioma victims in industries are considered equally likely to bring suits. The experience of the insulators suggests that the probability of a suit increases by three or four percentage points per year. Four percentage points has been used here as the most likely claims growth rate in the liability projections. Lower and higher estimates, equal to two and six percent, have also been constructed for sensitivity analysis. For all other asbestos related mortality, the projections assume survivors are only half as likely to bring cases, since those individuals have not been subject to intensive publicity and investigation.

While the number of asbestos-caused lung cancers can be estimated statistically, in an individual case it can be nearly impossible to determine whether the disease would not have occurred in the absence of asbestos exposure. Therefore, many cases will be brought by the victims of non-asbestos-caused cancer. To allow for this, non-asbestos-related lung cancer deaths in the heavily exposed population are added to the asbestos-related deaths in the projections of liability. These factors are summarised in Table Sixteen, to provide a frequency rate of claims for 1975 and thereafter.

Table Sixteen: Probability of a case Emerging from an Asbestos-Related Death

   

Assumed Growth

 
 

Rates in

Proportion

 

Base Year

(1975) Assumed

Probability

of

Group

Probability

Per Year *

Deaths

Insulators and Manufacturing

     

Employees

.32

.04

17%

Mesothelioma deaths

     

(excluding Insulators and manufacturing

     

employees)

.32

04

23%

All other asbestos

     

mortality

.16

.04

60%

Weighted Average

.22

   

1975 data from P Barth shown in Table Fifteen, used for insulators and mesothelioma. All other mortality assumed half as likely to lead to lawsuit as insulator deaths. Another factor determining the projected magnitude of compensation is the payment resulting from a successful case or settlement. Two approaches can be taken in estimating compensation per case. One is to examine actual court awards and settlements, and the other is to estimate the economic costs on the assumption that victims will be awarded those economic losses. The Insurance Services office conducted a survey of Products Liability Closed Claims in the United States, which indicates that for the period July 1976 to 15 March 1977, the average payment in an asbestos case (for settlements and jury awards) was approximately U.S.$170,000.

Average payments by type of injury:

All deaths

$132,870

All cancer (mortality and morbidity)

$166,800

All asbestos claims

$169,960

In 1980 dollars, this estimate is $233,000 which is between the amounts suggested by the other sources.

30 Jan 81

Keene Corp. -v- I.N.A., (Case No. 667 F. 2d 1034 D.C. Cir. 1981). In a memorandum Opinion filed on 30 January 1981, the District Court concluded that application of pertinent state law to this contract required adoption of the exposure theory of insurer indemnification.

Keene Corp. -v- I.N.A, 513 F. Supp. 47, District of Columbia Circuit Court, 30 January 1981. Revised, 667 F.2d 1034, District of Columbia Circuit Court, 1 October 1981. Cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007, 8 March 1982. Rehearing denied, 456 U.S. 951, 26 April 1982. District Court applied exposure theory to trigger coverage. District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals applied the triple/continuous trigger of coverage and found a duty to defend and coverage for the over 6000 asbestos bodily injury suits against the insured. Court held that "INAÆs duty to defend Keene in underlying asbestos cases ceases upon the exhaustion of indemnity limits under the pre-1966 policies in question". Court found unambiguous policy language specifically limiting KeeneÆs duty to defend any suit "with respect to such insurance as is provided by the policy".

0 Feb 81

The largest ever oil rig insurance loss was confirmed at the beginning of last month when the Norwegian Oil Insurance Pool decided to pay out more than ú25m to the owners of the capsized accommodation rig Alexander L. Kielland. Some 62.4% of the total loss value is covered by reinsurance in the London market.

0 Feb 81

The Government has published the Insurance Companies Bill, designed to tighten up the regulations governing the industry and bring the UKÆs supervision arrangements into line with the rest of the EEC.

The legislation, which was given a formal first reading by MPs establishes the classification of insurance business in EEC terms and arrangements for authorising and supervising insurance undertakings. It also redesigns the conditions under which insurance firms have to operate.

1 Feb 81

The American Insurance Association stated that as of 1 February 1981, 25,000 individual plaintiffs have sued for asbestosis (with 500 additional suits each month); losses and adjustment expenses from these suits alone in 1980 are costing $1-35bn per year, compared with 6-35bn paid in liability premiums (excluding medical malpractice premiums), according to BestÆs Insurance Management Reports of 9 March 1981.

10 Feb 81

Letter from the Chairman of the Asbestos Working Party, EE Nelson, entitled "Asbestos", addressed to the Active Underwriter:

In August last you were advised that it was proposed that an inter-market Working Party should be formed to co-ordinate the handling of the steadily increasing involvement of the London Market in Asbestosis claims. Since its formation the Working Party has met frequently to consider the problems that arise and to determine, with the help of Counsel, how the Market should be recommended to deal with them.

The insurance industry, including the London Market, continue to be divided as to whether asbestosis claims are attributable to policies on an "exposure" or a "manifestation" basis. The exposure theory broadly argues that for determining when a loss arises under a policy injury occurs at each inhalation of asbestos fibres. The manifestation theory broadly argues that the injury occurs when the condition is diagnosed.

Application has been made for a ruling on this matter in more than a dozen Declaratory Relief Actions presently before the U.S. courts, some of which directly involve the London Market. The expenses being incurred in these actions is substantial.

A significant decision was given recently in the appeal in one of such actions Insurance Company of North America -v- Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit) which, in affirming the trial court judgement adopted the exposure theory by a majority of two to one. The dissenting opinion argued that the date of loss was when the condition was first discoverable. This could be considered as a "half-way house" between the exposure and manifestation arguments, a further complication of the issue.

LloydÆs has been actively involved in another Declaratory Relief Action, the Eagle Picher case, which was tried in Boston, Mass, towards the end of 1980. Judgement is expected at any time know, and whatever the decision the case will be appealed.

Declaratory Relief Action by Johns-Manville Corporation, who probably have the largest involvement in the asbestosis problem of any insured is now expected to be heard next year.

In all the circumstances it is reasonable to assume that the manifestation against exposure issue will not be resolved in the near future.

With the approach of the year-end attention has focused upon claims reserves particularly bearing in mind the following:-

  1. The rising trend of settlement figures and the effect upon them of inflation in the U.S.
  2. As underlying aggregates are exhausted some insurers may look to excess carriers to absorb defence costs: and
  3. During the past year the number of cases in suit has increased from about 5,500 to in excess of 8,000 and at this stage it is not possible to project how many more claims will be filed.

Your U.S. legal representatives are now engaged in calculating potential loss figures on known claims in light of latest information available. It is anticipated that reports of their calculations will be available in London no later than Monday 23 February so that you may take account of that in calculating reserves. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that you should make yourself aware of the contents of these reports

The Working Party has been advised that circulation of the lawyersÆ reports in the manner customary in the Market may jeopardise the legal privilege from production by which they are otherwise protected. The Working Party has accordingly arranged that the reports will be available for inspection by appointment at the offices of solicitors Elborne Mitchell at 40 Lime Street - 7th Floor - (telephone number 621-0160/61) in circumstances in which the legal privilege is preserved.

13 Feb 81

Mr Christopher Moran came to see the Chairman, Peter Green, and a Deputy Chairman, A W Higgins. He informed them that he had evidence that Oakley Vaughan & Co Ltd, LloydÆs Brokers, had been netting premiums and claims on business underwritten 100% by Syndicate 862, an Aviation Syndicate managed by Oakley Vaughan (Underwriting) Ltd. Mr Moran handed over copies of slips (CO 176 and CO 177), a schedule, certain working papers and L.P.S.O. premium advice forms. He said that these documents came from Mr C D Mountain, an ex Oakley Vaughan employee currently employed by Mr Moran.

81

Hammond -v- North American Asbestos Co (Case No. 80-L-52) Circuit Court of McLean County, Illinois. Punitive damages have been awarded in few cases to date. In this case, the jury awarded $375,000 in punitive damages in addition to damages in the amount of $125,000.

16 Feb 81

LloydÆs: Circular letter from Peter Green, Chairman of :LloydÆs to membership

In my address to the General Meeting of Members last November, a copy of which was sent to you, I was able to report on the successful outcome of the Extraordinary General Meeting earlier in the month and the completion of the preparation of the draft Bill. I am now writing to you with a request for your assistance (see Page 4).

The Bill has been presented to Parliament and it is therefore an appropriate moment to let you know the detailed facts of our Parliamentary progress to date, and our hopes for the future. It is particularly important that I should do so at this juncture since some Press reports may have misled you. A Member could be forgiven for concluding from such reports that the Bill, for which you voted in November by such an overwhelming majority, has by February been drastically revised or seriously delayed. Neither is in accordance with the facts.

It was always unlikely that Parliament would pass such an important Private Bill "on the nod" without a full debate. Common sense and our Parliamentary advisers both suggested that a second reading debate would be demanded and that is precisely what has happened. We expect that this debate will take place in the House of Commons in March, after which the Bill passes to its Committee stage for detailed examination and for consideration of the petition against the Bill which has been lodged by two Members of LloydÆs.

In a Bill of this complexity and importance there are bound to be some contentious issues; MPÆs understandably wish to discuss such issues in depth. Certain material objections have been raised on a few points and we would be guilty of inflexibility if we did not seek where possible to revise the text of the Bill to meet such objections. The Committee is, however, mindful of its mandate from Members and does not intend to compromise on the fundamental principles which you have approved.

Sir Graham Page, who is promoting the Bill for us, has been the Member of parliament for Crosby since 1953 and has a distinguished record of service in the House of Commons; he has been particularly successful in the promotion of various Private Bills.

We have held several discussions with Members of Parliament who have expressed concern on four main points.

(i) The Council

The basic purpose of the Bill is to provide for LloydÆs an effective system of self-regulation by means of an efficient and representative governing body. The Bill proposes as such a body a Council of 16 Working Members of the Society, 6 External Members and 3 Nominated Members. Representation of External Members is in effect an innovation but concern has been expressed as to whether the number, six, is adequate. This is the number recommended by the Fisher Working Party and the Committee believes it is about right, but if Parliament is persuaded to make a small adjustment of these figures, so be it. It is essential, however, that there should be a Committee consisting of the 16 Working Names to carry out such day-to-day work as the Council may delegate to them. The special resolution concept requiring separate majorities of Working Members of the Council on the one hand, and the External and Nominated Members of Council on the other, ensures that any matter of moment will receive proper consideration. It is well to remember in this connection that the interests of External and Working Names are indivisible; that without a properly regulated Society and Market, unchallengeable financial security for the policyholders, and the expectation of profit for its Members, LloydÆs cannot and will not prosper.

(ii) Immunity

If the Council is to be given - and to use - the powers effectively to operate a system of self-regulation for LloydÆs then there is a good argument for affording it, its members and the Society a measure of protection against legal liability. Clause 11 deals with the difficult problem of how far it is proper for the Society (which is all of us), and the Council or Corporation Staff, when acting in pursuance of LloydÆs Acts, to seek a limited immunity from suit by individual members of the LloydÆs community. Your Committee remains convinced that some form of immunity will be needed to secure effective self-regulation. I stress that only the community of LloydÆs is involved. The proposed immunity affects neither the public nor LloydÆs policyholders. Moreover, the suggested clause would not bar a Member or group of Members from seeking an injunction from the Courts to prevent the Council from taking an unreasonable course of action.

The Fisher Report in Chapter 6 recognised that the Council, Corporation staff and the Society as a whole when honestly carrying out their responsibilities towards Names should be protected from suit for damages, by, for example, a Member, smarting under an underwriting loss, alleging that the Council is responsible. The effect of this could be to transfer the losses of the individual to the membership as a whole. This would threaten one of the most fundamental principles of LloydÆs in that we accept individual liability each for our own part and not liability on a mutual basis. This is the premise upon which we individually accept unlimited liability.

Since this is a complicated matter we have suggested that the provision relating to immunity should be transferred from the main body of the Bill and be inserted in the Second Schedule under which Bye-laws can be made by the Council. The redrafting will mean that detailed discussion of the question will be deferred until the new LloydÆs Council with its External Members has been established. A procedure has been added so that approval by the Privy Council and Parliament will be necessary before any Bye-law on this subject can take effect.

(iii) Independence

The Bill presented to Parliament uses almost exactly the same words on this point as the Bill proposed by the Fisher Working Party, in that Clause 12 of Schedule 2 in the LloydÆs Bill repeats Clause 10 in Schedule 3 of the Fisher draft. If self-regulation is to mean anything surely it is eminently a matter for the Council to decide how the necessary independence and separation of management of Managing Agencies and Broking firms should be achieved. Divestment of ownership may, at the end of the day, be the method of achieving this. The present Committee has assured Sir Graham Page that, forming as it will the nucleus of the new Council, it is determined that the problem of the proper degree of separation between broking and underwriting will be one of the first matters to be dealt with by the Council. If this proves to be impossible without divestment of ownership the one of the other, then the Bill enables the Council to take that course.

(iv) Fraud

Certain MPÆs are concerned to ensure that LloydÆs will have the necessary power to deal effectively with "fraudulent" behaviour by those who work in the Market - an aim clearly shared by all. We have found a process that will greatly strengthen the hand of the future Council in dealing with this problem. The drafting of the appropriate paragraph is proceeding, dealing with the complicated legal points involved.

I am certain that common ground can be reached on all these points and that the result will be an improved Bill.

I now turn to the part which Members of LloydÆs resident in the United Kingdom can play. As I have said, a second reading debate will shortly take place in the House of Commons. It is important that a sufficient number of MPÆs are present to secure the second reading and ensure that the Bill moves into Committee where the various points at issue can be discussed in detail.

I would urge you, therefore, to contact your own M.P, and to request him to attend the debate and help to secure the passage of this important Bill.

LloydÆs has contributed to the well-being of this country over many years, not only through our outstanding contribution to the Balance of Payments, but also through the taxation paid to the State on MembersÆ profits and by the employment provided for thousands of citizens. Our record deserves the concern of MPÆs to assist the passage of a Bill which means so much to LloydÆs and which has the overwhelming support of the Members of our Society. If any Member of Parliament requires information which you are unable to provide, I shall be delighted to hear from him and will do my best to help.

I intend to keep you informed of our progress towards the new Council by means of letters such as this or more general news letters in LloydÆs Log.

17 Feb 81

Financial Times: LloydÆs members urged to lobby MPs on new Bill

17 Feb 81

LloydÆs List: LloydÆs Bill - chairman urges ælobby MPsÆ

AN APPEAL has gone out to all British members of LloydÆs to lobby their MPs to attend the second reading debate on the LloydÆs reform Bill and help get it through Parliament.

The call comes in a four-page letter on the progress of the Bill from the chairman of LloydÆs Mr. Peter Green. It has been sent to each of the 19,000 plus members of whom about three-quarters come from the UK.

Mr. Green says the debate is expected to take place next month. To ensure that enough MPs are present to see that the Bill gets a second reading and moves into committee stage where it can be discussed in detail., he stresses the importance of lobbying the MPs.

Mr. Green has previously expressed concern over LloydÆs members approaching MPs directly - as he feels the community should speak with one voice - but it is now admitted within LloydÆs that MPs could have been more widely consulted.

Mr. GreenÆs letter does not go into detail about subsequent negotiations. There were bound to be contentious issues, he writes in a Bill of the complexity and importance of this one.

"Certain material objections have been raised on a few points, and we would be guilty of inflexibility if we did not seek where possible to revise the text of the bill to meet such objections.

But, he emphasised, the Committee of LloydÆs will not compromise on the fundamental principles in the Bill, as it was approved by the members at a special meeting in November. The Bill has neither been drastically revised nor seriously delayed.

Most of the alterations have already been disclosed or widely predicted but Mr. Green reveals that a paragraph dealing with fraudulent behaviour is now being drafted.

17 Feb 81

Daily Telegraph: LloydÆs compromises on reform Bill issues

LLOYDÆS of London last night presented to MPs the changes it proposes to make in the Bill which would reform its self-regulation, to meet the objections delaying its passage A compromise has been suggested on all the points at issue, but MPs are considering their response.

Sir Graham Page, Cons MP for Crosby, who is steering the Bill through Parliament for LloydÆs, gave the MPs four assurances. The much disliked legal immunity of LloydÆs Council is to be removed into a schedule to he activated by order in Council and affirmative order by Parliament.

Separation of the broking and underwriting activities will be forced through. though LloydÆs makes it clear this may not involve brokers selling their underwriting agencies. But Sir Graham explained to the MPs that it was not necessary to include the matter in the Bill since LloydÆs already had power to enforce its will.

Similarly, agreement has been reached between lawyer MPs and LloydÆs legal department not to include in the Bill a requirement for all members of LloydÆs to reveal to the council suspicions of fraud.

Instead there is to he a requirement for the council to keep information confidential, since that was reckoned the easiest way to encourage members to volunteer suspicions.

LloydÆs said it was open to persuasion on the number of eternal names to sit on the new council. Sir Graham gave assurances that all these matters would he discussed and introduced when the Bill is considered by a committee of the house.

In a letter to all LloydÆs members Peter Green, chairman, is unrepentant on the desire for total legal immunity for staff operating the insurance marketÆs self-regulation.

He argues that all members losing money might claim the council was responsible. leading to the council paying for membersÆ losses. But Mr. Green concedes its removal from the main body of the Bill.

17 Feb 81

Guardian: LloydÆs chief lobbies members

LloydÆs is prepared to accept limited changes in the Parliamentary Bill designed to modernise its procedures but the commitment cannot be open ended. That was the message from the chairman of LloydÆs, Mr. Peter Green in a letter sent out to the 16,000 members of the vast insurance market yesterday. Mr. Green said he thought it only fair that they should know the state of play on the bill as it now stood.

He sets out the LloydÆs position under four headings.- Immunity from Legal Liability: Mr. Green claims that LloydÆs still needs protection against legal action by any members of LloydÆs - but recommends that the immunity should not be part of the main bill. Instead, he says, it should be transferred to one of the schedules - so that it would be up to the new Council to bring it in. The Council could not do so, willy nilly. LloydÆs recognises that there are doubts about it and the immunity can only come in if both Parliament and the Privy Council accept the idea immediately before implementation.

Council Membership: The chairman claims that LloydÆs can accept more than the six "external names" to sit on the new Council though he is careful to limit himself to accepting "a small adjustment" only. The external names are the people who put up capital for LloydÆs but do not take a day to day part in its operations. Some of them have called for higher membership on the committee - but Mr Green is unlikely to accept more than eight external names. The rest of the Council would consist of 16 people in daily touch with LloydÆs - working names in the jargon - and three members chosen by the Governor of the Bank of England.

Divestment: Mr Green shows no signs of bending on the present LloydÆs position. The Fisher Report recommended that the giant brokers which own, or partly own, the management agencies - which in turn employ the u n d t r w r it e r s assessing each risk - should have to sell off their shares in these groups within five years. Brokers, who have to collect the best possible insurance terms for their clients, should not be in a position where they could bring pressure in the underwriters, said the report.

Fraud: Here the Committee looks as though it is changing its line. Originally it was completely opposed to the idea that brokers suspecting fraud should report it to the LloydÆs authorities. The Law of Agency, which made the broker responsible only to his client. made it impossible it said.

17 Feb 81

The tour of æ81

For the first time since he became Chairman of LloydÆs, Mr. Peter Green has undertaken a major overseas tour. His three-week itinerary covered 14,000 miles and included visits to New York, Washington DC, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Houston. He met most of the leading figures in American insurance and 200 or more senior executives from a broad cross-section of US industry and commerce, and delivered three major speeches including one to 800 members of the ExecutivesÆ Club of Chicago.

After his triumph last November at the Royal Albert Hall it seemed likely that the ChairmanÆs name might one day go up in lights. That the venue would be the Houston Astrodome and the occasion the 1981 World Rodeo Championships was not, however, seen as a serious possibility. But ChairmenÆsÆ tours are seldom short of surprises and Peter GreenÆs recent visit to the United States was certainly no exception.

Fortunately for the party which, in addition to Mr. and Mrs Green, comprised Murray Lawrence, a member of the Committee of LloydÆs and Mrs Lawrence, Joe Hodges, Secretary General to the Corporation and Mrs Hodges, Penelope Wyatt, the ChairmanÆs Personal Assistant and David Larner, LloydÆs Chief Press Officer, they were all pleasant ones, a fact remarkable in itself bearing in mind an itinerary which in three weeks covered seven cities and over 14,000 miles. It also says a great deal for the planning which had been done on both sides of the Atlantic that at no time was a plane missed, a bag lost or an appointment unkept. Even the weather which in some states in the middle of February can be decidedly inclement was exceptionally warm and remained so throughout reflecting the welcome that was extended at every port of call.

New York - February 17

The tour commenced with a meeting on arrival in New York with Ed Palmer and Tom Hitchcock of Citibank, custodian of LloydÆs American Trust Fund. Only two months before, this had passed the $3bn mark giving a clear indication of the enormous growth which has taken place in LloydÆs US dollar business since the fund was set up in 1939 with an initial capital of $40m.

February 18

A visit to Bob Tisdall of Toplis & Harding, LloydÆs Agents, New York, was to evoke headlines of nearly 30 years ago. There to meet the Chairman was the master of the Flying Enterprise Captain Kurt Carlsen who, in 1952, had been awarded LloydÆs Silver Medal for Meritorious Services "for his tenacity in remaining on board for twelve days in an attempt to save. his ship". Captain Carlsen remembered with pleasure receiving his medal from the then Chairman of LloydÆs, Sir Matthew Drysdale, and Mr. Green observed that no-one who was present in the Room on that occasion would ever forget it.

The ChairmanÆs next engagement, and the first of a number involving the so-called alphabet brokers was to address the board of Johnson & Higgins with their president, Bob Hatcher, Jr. That evening Mr. Green spoke at a reception at the British American Chamber of Commerce hosted by the president, Theodore Mander and was later guest of honour at a dinner given for the LloydÆs party by the British Consul-General and Mrs Hugh Overton.

February 19

Having visited the offices of Citibank Mr. Green had a meeting with Ken Soubry, chairman of Alexander & Alexander. Then, following a press interview at his hotel he went to a reception and dinner given in his honour by the president of Marsh & McLennan Inc. Robert Clements and by the chairman of the parent company Jack Regan.

February 20

After a breakfast press interview, Mr. Green accepted an invitation to tour the New York Insurance Exchange before giving lunch to representatives of the major reinsurance brokers. After a further press interview the Chairman attended a dinner given by Al Tahmoush, chairman and president of Frank B Hall, the firm which in 1978 led the field in gaining direct access to the LloydÆs market by buying an interest in Leslie 8 Godwin.

February 23

Returning from a brief respite in Connecticut, the Chairman began the second week of his tour by visiting the offices of LloydÆs General Counsel, LeBoeuf. Lamb, Leiby and MacRae. This preceded a well attended press briefing at which, in addition to questions about insurance and on the progress of the LloydÆs Bill, Mr. Green was asked for LloydÆs reaction to the Thatcher government, more particularly since President Reagan had announced his intention of pursuing a similar economic policy.

At midday he was the guest of Charles OÆMalley, chairman of the executive committee of Fred S James and in the evening he and Mrs Green together with Mr. and Mrs Lawrence welcomed more than 350 guests at a LloydÆs reception at the Wall Street Club.

Repairing to the Union Club the LloydÆs party again became the guests, this time at a function hosted by Robert Corroon, chairman of another of AmericaÆs leading broking houses, Corroon & Black.

February 24

Having spent a week in New York the travelling now began in earnest. Catching the 8am shuttle from La Guardia to Washington DC, the Chairman accompanied by Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Hodges, paid a courtesy call on Roland de Kergorlay, head of delegation of the Commission of the European Communities thence to a luncheon given for the Chairman of LloydÆs by John Fretwell, minister at the British Embassy, and attended by many distinguished guests.

Before returning to New York for a dinner arranged for the LloydÆs party at the "Windows on the WorldÆÆ by Taylor Briggs and Donald Greene together with other partners of LeBoeufÆs, the Chairman held a press briefing at which he was again questioned about BritainÆs economic outlook ahead of the Prime MinisterÆs own visit to the American capital which was scheduled for the following day.

Chicago - February 25

From the Big Apple to the Windy City. On arrival at OÆHare International Airport the LloydÆs party was taken by helicopter to Meigs Field in the downtown area. The flight, made on a perfect day. gave magnificent views of Lake Michigan and Chicago high-rise buildings as well as McCormick Place which, after a fire in 1967 LloydÆs underwriters had helped to rebuild.

On landing, a full and varied programme at once got under way starting with a LloydÆs reception which was attended by over 250 guests representing a broad spectrum of the Chicago business community. Included were members of the Association of LloydÆs Brokers whose executive committee hosted a dinner for the Chairman and his party at the Carlton Club.

February 26

The day began with a visit to the Chicago Board of Trade, perhaps the worldÆs most frenetic exchange, where Mr. Green was welcomed by the president, Robert Wilmouth and the chairman, Leslie Rosenthal. The morning ended with calls on William Coakley and Walter Remdt of Toplis & Harding, LloydÆs Agents, Chicago.

After lunch with a group of insurance leaders, Mr. Green visited the Illinois Insurance Exchange where he was greeted by the chairman Donald Montgomery. That evening the LloydÆs party divided its forces with the Chairman and Mrs Green and Mr. and Mrs Lawrence attending a dinner given by the British Consul-General and Mrs George Chalmers, while Mr. and Mrs Hodges were hosts to Mr. and Mrs Larry Kochan and the staff of the Attorney-in-FactÆs office.

February 27

Came the dawn and Mr. Green arrived at the studio of Channel 26 to be interviewed by Ben Larson for the television programme Business Newsmakers following which he paid a courtesy call on the Director of Insurance, Philip OÆConnor. The ChairmanÆs next engagement was to attend an informal gathering of business students at the Bismarck Hotel prior to addressing an audience of some 800 at a lunch-time meeting of the ExecutivesÆ Club. his subject being "A view from London of the international insurance scene". A press briefing. a visit to the offices of Lord, Bissell 8 Brook. LloydÆs Attorney-in-Fact in Illinois and a reception given by the partners accounted for the afternoon.

San Francisco - February 28

With the tour at the halfway mark, the LloydÆs party flew to San Francisco where the following evening, they were guests at a dinner given by Hartley Cravens, chairman of the Surplus Line Association of California and of the Executive Committee of the Northern Division.

March 2

Another busy schedule began with a series of calls first on Alan Rees, LloydÆs agent and Salvage Association representative, then on the offices of the Surplus Line Association of California where the Chairman was greeted by Ben Herrick and Mr. A. Freeman. A lunch-time meeting led by Hartley Cravens afforded Mr. Green, Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Hodges an opportunity to meet local industrial leaders before resuming their programme which, in the afternoon, included a courtesy call on Mr. Armacost, president-designate of the Bank of America and a visit to the offices of Cravens & Co. The day ended with a dinner given in Mr. GreenÆs honour by the chairman and president of the FiremanÆs Fund, Myron F. Du Bain.

March 3

At 2am San Francisco experienced a tremor which registered 4 on the Richter scale, an event which went unnoticed by the London contingent though not by the media which gave it considerable coverage. Earthquake insurance was, therefore, high on the agenda at a press Interview given by the Chairman before he left for a tour of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART) organised by Bob Nevins. During a luncheon given for the LloydÆs party by the president. John Glenn and the board of directors, reference was made to the links which have long-existed between LloydÆs and his undertaking and at a subsequent press briefing Mr. Green cited BART as an example of the type of risk which LloydÆs is proud to be associated. Having hosted a reception for 250 guests in the ballroom of the Stanford Court Hotel, the Chairman and his party flew to Los Angeles where they arrived shortly before midnight.

Los Angeles - March 4

Following a press interview at 9.30am. Mr. Green attended a luncheon given by Lew Wasserman, senior executive of MCA at Universal City Studios. He later toured the sets and watched a film being shot before giving a reception for over 300 guests at the Wiltshire Country Club. That evening the LloydÆs party were the guests at dinner of the executive & stamping committees of the California Surplus Line Association. southern division.

March 5

What was, perhaps, the most concentrated day of the tour commenced with a visit to LloydÆs agent, Don Maxson of Toplis and Harding and continued with a press interview. This was followed by a reception and luncheon hosted by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce at which the Chairman spoke pointing out, among other things, the need for insurers world-wide to reduce their reliance on investment income. After lunch the Chairman visited the offices of the Los Angeles Times for a meeting with the editor, Bob Erburu and his financial staff followed by a drive across town to the Los Angeles Herald Examiner for an interview and meeting with the publisher, Francis Dale. Next there was a reception at the California Club given by Mr. Dale and Mr. Erburu for the Retail Brokers and their clients and finally a farewell dinner given by the Chairman for the California Surplus Line Association at which he presented the association with an Armada dish engraved with LloydÆs coat-of-arms.

New Orleans - March 6

Heading south on the last leg of the tour, the Chairman and his party left for New Orleans where, on arrival, their motorcade was escorted into the city by police outriders complete with sirens and flashing lights. Fear of arrest soon turned to gratitude as without their assistance it is doubtful if the hosts would have been on time for a LloydÆs receptioned from Turin by the Italian State Prosecutor.

So Savonita has resurfaced only to coincide with the troubled passage through Parliament of the private Bill aimed at improving LloydÆs self regulation.

Widespread criticism over LloydÆs handling of the Savonita row between insurance brokers Willis, Faber and Pearson, Webb, Springbett, dealt a shattering blow to LloydÆs reputation.

Then came the Sasse affair, in which the 110 members, facing losses of ú21.5 million, had to be rescued by LloydÆs, alone with a spate of disastrous losses on computer leasing insurance.

It was against this background that LloydÆs commissioned the " Fisher " report which found Lime Street wanting in many aspects of self-regulations and formed the basis of the Bill.

But Savonita set the seeds. The row centred around the refusal of Malcolm Pearson, chairman of Pearson, Webb, Springbett to pursue a $711,000 claim against LloydÆs over 301 fire damaged Fiat cars bound for the United States aboard the cargo ship Savonita.

Pearson, WebbÆs allegations that the claim might be fraudulent was based on loss adjuster Bob BishopÆs report that the cars had been sold to a Fiat dealer in Naples at 15 per cent of their new value and subsequently resold at 80 per cent of that value.

The primary insurer was SIAT (then, but no longer a Fiat subsidiary) which transferred its account from Pearson, Webb to the much larger firm of Willis, Faber, which collected 96 per cent of the claim in 1978.

The decision by Jonathan Aitken MP to air events in the House of Commons led to wide-spread publicity which forced LloydÆs to produce its own report. This inconclusive document referred to "unsatisfactory aspects " of the claim.

But, despite the crucial questions raised by the Savonita affair over the responsibilities of a member of LloydÆs who suspects the possibility of a claim being fraudulent there was, amazingly, no reference to fraud in the proposed Bill which signals the most important legislative change at LloydÆs for more than a century.

This is one of several major criticisms levelled against the Bill by a number of Conservative MPs with pressure also being exerted by the newly formed Association of External Members of LloydÆs, led by Lady Middleton, a magistrate and one-time member of the ill-fated Sasse syndicate.

The emergence of Lady MiddletonÆs 200-strong association (two members of which have petitioned against the Bill) reflects the new-found muscle of the 16,000 individual members of LloydÆs (80 per cent of total membership) who, although not actually employed in the market, accept Lime StreetÆs traditional principle of unlimited liability.

Controversy has raged over the structure of LloydÆs new ruling council (dominated by " working " members); the councilÆs proposed legal immunity; the conflicts of interest brought about by brokers owning underwriting agencies and the need for positive guidelines concerning fraud.

Sir Graham Page, who .is steering the Bill through the Common, claims to be close to compromise agreements on these counts with the MPs but, last week, Green was anxiously urging members to seek their own MPsÆ support for the Bill, which could yet be " talked out " of Parliament.

The ghost of Savonita haunts the subject of whether doubtful or suspect claims should be notified to LloydÆs new council and, if so, whether confidentiality will be observed regarding information provided by a broker or underwriter which might be passed to the police.

Any developments on the Savonita front in Turin will clearly intrigue MPs who are now bracing themselves for next monthÆs debate.

The Italian authorities, as we reported last week, have seized the passport ofÆ Sig. Walter Fenoglio, a former senior executive of Fiat, who has been informed that be may face questioning.

Various parties who have been briefed by Green on LloydÆs agreement to help the Italian authorities are understood to include Pearson, Bishop, Willis Faber and Roy Hill, the lead underwriter on the Savonita slip.

23 Feb 81

The Times: LloydÆs of London

Sir Graham Page, Conservative MP for Crosby, Merseyside, and noted promoter of private parliamentary Bills succeeded in getting a Lloyds Bill through "on the nod" last week.

That news, however, will not lead to scenes of wild jubilation in the committee room at that elite underwriting club in LondonÆs Lime Street known as LloydÆs. For the Bill concerned that other unappostrophied Lloyds - the clearing bank - and was little more than the rubber-stamping of a minor take-over.

The other LloydÆs Bill, which Sir Graham is handling is proving an infinitely more daunting task to steer through the House. Sir Graham, whose past successes as a promoter include the 1957 Cheques Act and the 1960 Pawnbrokers Act has found himself having to negotiate through a minefield of Tory criticism about different aspects of the Bill.

Ironically most of the critics are in favour of the Bill in essence. Designed to improve self-regulation in the market, it represents a bold action by LloydÆs to tighten its rules in the wake of a series of scandals and disputes.

But the rebels are hotly opposed to several aspects, not least clause 11, which would give the new ruling council envisaged under the Bill an indemnity against legal action.

Debate over the LloydÆs Bill is many-sided but at its centre is the question of just who holds the control of one of the worldÆs most famous institutions - an insurance market handling insurance premiums of almost ú2,000m.

Almost 20,000 individuals now put up their belongings "down to the last gold cufflink " as security against the risks LloydÆs underwriters take. But 16,000 of this total have virtually no involvement in the market.

This " dormant " body of underwriting " names", who have one possession in common - wealth, have been sharply awakened in recent years by a series of disputes, scandals and worse still losses, culminating in the notorious Sasse syndicate affair

These members snag have been soothed by the news that Lloyd s was to put its house in order through an independent inquiry headed by Sir Henry Fisher and following from that a draft parliamentary Bill. This would keep the professionals who used the market in check.

But, who an increasingly vociferous minority of names has been asking, will keep the rule makers in check? The problem is that LloydÆs has become increasingly dominated by big insurance brokers. They produce the business and their employees hold sway in the committee room. To outsiders there seems an obvious conflict of interest between the duties of these employees to the underwriting names and the companies they work for.

So far the debate has brought an interesting cross-section of establishment figures into the public glare. There is for example Lady Janet Middleton, wife of the 12th Baron Middleton of North Yorkshire, and a generalÆs daughter and magistrate. Stung into action possibly by an expensive experience as one of the names on the hapless Sasse syndicate she now heads an Association of External Names which is campaigning vigorously against various Aspects of the Bill.

Secretary of this new association, David Watkins-Cronin, an Irish barrister and architect, became a LloydÆs name only last year but has become sufficiently alarmed about what he has learned since then to campaign for a redrafting of - or, at least, to see substantial changes inù - what he regards as a " thoroughly bad Bill "

In the House of Common the debate has drawn a fairly spectacular cross-section of Tory thinking to one common purpose. From the right in the shape of Archie Hamilton (Epsom & Ewell) to the near left in the form of Richard Needham (Chippenham) eschewer of his inherited title Earl of Kilmorey, well over 20 MPs have become loosely enjoined to thrash out the issues with sir Graham

Many like Needham, Alastair Goodland (Northwich), Peter Lloyd (Fareham), John Watson (Skipton) and Richard Body (Holland with Boston) have an obvious interest in that they are among the 55 Conservative MPs who provide security at LloydÆs.

Others like the quixotic Jonathan Aitken (Thanet East) would claim perhaps to have a more distant interest, viewing LloydÆs as an important British institution in danger of careering out of control

Aitken, of course, has already had one tilt at the windmills of LloydÆs when he brought to the attention of the House and the press the now famous " Savonita" affair,

Meanwhile, the debate among LloydÆs names is becoming increasingly fiery with signs of a split even within Lady MiddletonÆs committee between those who would like to see the Bill go through after important surgery and those who would like it to be withdrawn altogether and rewritten at a more leisurely pace.

And a great many other LloydÆs names cannot see what all the fuss is about anyway. One of them, Colin Baillieu, fired off a letter to the Times only last month to declare " Lady Middleton and her associates want protection but if that is what they want they should not be in LloydÆs in the first place".

The existing committee of LloydÆs is fairly confident that this represents the majority view.

23 Feb 81

Financial Times: New association at LloydÆs split over policy

A SERIOUS rift has opened up between members of the committee of a new association at LloydÆs of London which has been formed to represent the interests of the 16,000 members who do not work at LloydÆs.

The committee has called a meeting for March 11 of the 270 or so members of the new association - called the Association of External Members of LloydÆs - at which a new committee is likely to be elected.

The committee, chaired by Lady Janet Middleton, a former member of the ill-fated Sasse underwriting syndicate, has split into two camps. The three executive officers, including Lady Middleton, face opposition from a group of co-opted members.

The row is essentially over policy matters. T here has been some argument over whether the emerging association should associate itself with a petition lodged with Parliament by two underwriting members of LloydÆs for amending LloydÆs new Bill improving self regulation within its market.

Although Lady Middleton can muster the support of three of her committee, her camp is outnumbered by five to four.

The LloydÆs establishment is violently opposed to the new association, which seeks to represent the interests of the 80 per cent of the total 20.000 membership which does not work at LloydÆs.

LloydÆs feels that the new association could usurp the function of managing underwriting agents, who look after the affairs of all LloydÆs members in the market.

But the new association argues that it wants to represent the collective interests of the members, not just the individual interests, which are attended to, by the agents. Some underwriting agents have warned overseas members who may be seeking to join the new association that if they are unhappy with. the services they are getting and are considering joining the association they should change their underwriting agent.

Overseas members account for over 10 per cent of the membership of the external members association.

23 Feb 81

Financial Times: CMG names Names at LloydÆs of London

OFFERED BY CMG (City of London) is a real time inter-active package to run on an IBM System 34 computer that quill provide Names Agents and Managing Agents at Lloyds with instant up-to-date informal on Names and Syndicates.

At Lloyds, "Names " are individuals in a position to bear risk financially in insurance while "Names Agents" are those who look after the affairs of such individuals and place them on syndicates,

" Managing Agents " are responsible for appointing the active syndicate underwriter and managing the affairs of the syndicate.

Each of these agents needs up-to-date information about Names and Syndicates with which he is connected and this is the data that is held in store and provided by the new CMG system.

Called NAMIS (names agents and management information system), it is the result of some 18 months of studies and discussion with presentations to many of the 270 Agents at Lloyds.

NAMIS will assist the Agents to monitor Names and Syndicate business and dramatically reduce the task of correlating Names data.

In addition to containing personal financial data on each Name, the system will record details such as the NameÆs interest in each syndicate, information on his syndicateÆs underwriting figures and results for the past 11 years, and his historical limits. CMG is on 01-481-3881.

26 Feb 81

An Unlimited xs $2,500,000 run-off reinsurance placed for the General & European Insurance Company to incept at 1 April 1980 covering the years 1978 - 1980. Outhwaite 317/661 wrote 100%.

Feb 81

The Asbestos Working Party contacted Elborne Mitchell, Solicitors, requesting them to act on their behalf and to set up an asbestosis documentation database within their offices on the 7th Floor, 40 Lime Street as a central focal point for underwriters to inspect the U.S. AttorneysÆ commissioned market reports on the serious impact of asbestosis and the eventual asbestos -related property damage claims. Mr Robert E M Elborne, solicitor, was an external Council Member of LloydÆs throughout 1983 to 1987

4 Mar 81

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entertained oral arguments in Eagle-Picher Industries -v- Liberty Mutual. Attorney Malcolm Roscow of Standard, Weisberg, Heckerling & Roscow presented the position of the exposure Underwriters and believe that we were able to raise a question as to KeeneÆs applicability to Eagle-Picher. While Eagle-Picher had urged the manifestation construction, it now has urged adoption of the broader approach as enunciated in Keene -v- INA.

5 Mar 81

Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 6th Circuit Michigan, October 21, 1980. Opinion clarified, 657 F.2d 814, 5 March 1981. Cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 7 December 1981. Rehearing denied, 455 U.S. 1009, 8 March 1982. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied exposure theory and concluded insurers have duty to defend asbestos bodily injury claims brought against the manufacturers of asbestos. Court held that insurance liability would be prorated among all insurers on risk during exposure period.

6 Mar 81

Letter from Mr EE Nelson, Chairman of the Asbestosis Working Party to participants on the Johns Manville risk. (stressing the absolute necessity of reviewing certain papers at Elborne Mitchell). Reports and recommendations have been deposited at the offices of Elborne Mitchell. Will you please arrange for a representative who has overall authority to make a commitment to review the documents at the earliest opportunity.

6 Mar 81

Lord, Bissell & Brook: Report to the Interested Reinsurers C/- of Ellinger Heath Western.

Report No. 1

RE: Reinsurance Agreements Nos: 721/0002,003,0329 Casualty Excess of Loss Reinsurance

Reinsured: North Star Reinsurance Corporation

Assureds: Various Asbestos Producers and Manufacturers

Claims: Various Asbestos-Related products Liability Bodily Injury Claims

ReinsuredÆs Coverages: Various Products Liability Coverages between 1966 - 1979.

ReinsurersÆ Coverages:

I. Contract No: 721-0002

  1. Excess of Loss Treaty for five periods between July 1, 1966 and July 1, 1971 with limits of $750,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident excess of $250,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident;
  2. Excess of Loss Treaty for the period July 1, 1971 to July 1972 with limits of $700,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident excess of $300,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident;
  3. Excess of Loss Treaty for three periods between July 1, 1972, and July 1, 1975 with limits of $750,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and ever accident excess of $500,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and ever accident
  4. Excess of Loss Treaty for three periods between July 1, 1975 and July 1, 1979 with limits of $500,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident excess of $750,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident.

II. Contract No: 72l-0003

  1. Excess Loss of Treaty for six periods between July 1, 1966 and July 1, 1972 with limits of $2,000,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident excess of $1,000,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident.
  2. Excess of Loss Treaty for six periods between July 1, 1972 and July 1, 1978 with limits of $2,000,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident excess of $1,250,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident.
  1. Contract No. 721-0329
  1. Excess at Loss Treaty for two periods between July 1, 1970 and July 1, 1972 with limits of $2,000,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident excess of $3,000,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident
  2. Excess of Loss Treaty for three periods between July 1, 1972 and July 1, 1975 with limits of $2,000,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident excess of $3,250,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident.
  3. Excess of Loss Treaty for three periods between July 1, 1975 and July 1, 1978 with limits of $3,000,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident excess of $3,250,000 Ultimate Net Loss each and every accident.

London Broker: Ellinger, Heath, Western & Company

Their Reference No: AH0002/0003/0329

Our File No: 66103-011

We wish to submit our first report to the London Reinsurers of the North Star Reinsurance Company concerning the asbestos -related bodily injury claims brought against nineteen of its assureds companies in multiple jurisdictions throughout the United States.

We have reviewed all of the ReinsuredÆs Home Office files and we have undertaken a substantial independent investigation in an attempt to gather sufficient information to enable us to evaluate the ReinsuredÆs exposure in these matters.

It is our present opinion that several of the assureds involved here present potential exposure to the excess reinsurers on each of the reinsurance contracts covering the periods l966 - 1978. We are recommending loss and expense reserves in this report.

We are certain the excess Reinsurers are aware of the continuing controversy between insurers and insureds in the United States as to whether products liability insurance applies to asbestos related claims during each year of the insured party's exposure to asbestos fibres or upon the manifestation of the resultant asbestos-related disease many years later. Therefore, our recommendations in this report are predicated upon both the manifestation and exposure theories of coverage.

NOTICE TO REINSURED:

The Reinsured has received formal notice of asbestos claims against nine of its assureds. These include; Celotex Corporation; Dana Corporation; Flintkote Corporation; GAF Corporation; General Dynamics Corporation; Owens-Corning; PPG Industries; Shook & Fletcher Insulation Company and Studebaker-Worthington.

The Reinsured, in addition, advises that it is on risk with ten other companies which have been sued as either producers or manufacturers of asbestos products. These are: Armstrong Cork, Atlas Chemical, Combustion Engineering, Hooker Chemical, Mundet Cork, Porter Hayden, Raybestos Manhattan, Ryder Industries, J.P. Stevens and Uniroyal.

General Review of the Asbestos Problem:

We believe it might be useful here to review the magnitude of the asbestos claims situation in the United States in order to provide the excess Reinsurers with a framework within which to evaluate the particular assuredÆs individual situation. It is generally accepted that asbestos liability will be the most significant legal and loss cost issue in the history of the insurance industry. This is due to the pervasive industrial and commercial use of the mineral with its unique combination of heat resistant and tensile strength characteristics. There are perhaps as many as 3,000 different products in daily use throughout the world which contain asbestos. Despite recent efforts by manufacturers to develop substitutes for the mineral, apparently there is no reasonably priced material which can presently outperform asbestos. Although it is perhaps the largest single occupational health problem of our time, its use as of yet has not been totally banned by the United States Government.

The number of potential future asbestos claims is alarming. In April 1978, the secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare estimated that eight to eleven million American workers have been exposed to asbestos since the beginning of World War 2. A study by three agencies of the United States Government projected in 1978 that over the next 30 years, 13% to 18% of all cancer deaths would be asbestos related. In April 1980, the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) concluded that tens of thousands of asbestos related deaths occur annually upon a six month study of asbestos fibre exposure in the workplace.

It would appear reasonable to expect hundreds if not thousands of new asbestos claims at least into the 1990Æs. This is because it does not appear that any strict safety precautions were taken in the insulation of shipbuilding trades or asbestos manufacturing industries prior to the late 1960Æs and early 1970Æs. We believe this generation is applicable to the assureds here.

Our evaluation of asbestos--related claims nation-wide indicates that the typical lawsuit is brought by a construction or shipyard worker employed for several years installing products containing asbestos against all manufacturers whose asbestos products were allegedly used at any of the job sites where he was employed. The amount of asbestos dust from each manufacturerÆs product to which the worker was allegedly exposed or the amount of asbestos dust inhaled during any period of exposure cannot be determined with any precision. Asbestos exposures range from a few years to as many as forty or fifty years.

THE ASBESTOS DISEASES:

The inhalation of asbestos fibres can cause at least three diseases: asbestosis, mesothelioma or bronchogenic carcinoma (also known as lung cancer). Asbestosis is a non-malignant disease acquired from inhaling asbestos fibres of a certain length over a long period of time. Normal body defence mechanisms cannot expel asbestos fibres of a certain length and the fibres become imbedded in lung tissue. The body's reaction therefore is to wall off the fibres by a proliferation of fibrous cells that eventual produce dense scar-like tissue in functional areas of the lungs. This process takes approximately six months and is irreversible. Asbestos increasingly impedes the transfer of gases in and cut of the blood in the lungs which eventually become inadequate to support normal activities, Asbestosis symptoms only become noticeably after many years of scar-like tissue build-up; this is typically twenty years or more after exposure. The symptoms can be manifested many years later even after very limited inhalation with no additional exposure.

Mesothelioma is a malignant condition of the cells lining the chest wall which eventually produces a tumour. The incidence of mesothelioma is almost exclusively among people exposed to asbestos. Tumour growth follows a latent period of more than twenty years of no additional exposure. Death generally follows within two years of diagnosis.

The third asbestos-related disease, bronchogenic carcinoma is a malignancy associated with people exposed to asbestos who also inhale smoke into their lungs. Its latency period before manifestation is between fifteen and twenty years following initial inhalation

ALLEGATIONS AGAINS ASSUREDS AND DEFENCES RAISED:

The great majority of the bodily injury claimants in the cases filed against the various assureds allege they were exposed to asbestos products primarily in the course of their work in the construction of industrial buildings or in the shipbuilding industry. The work allegedly involved the use of the assuredsÆ asbestos insulating materials which had to be fabricated to match the configuration of the object to be insulated. The fabrication frequently involved cutting of new or the removal of old asbestos-containing materials which caused the liberation of asbestos dust particles and fibres into the air.

The theories of liability asserted against the assureds usually lie in negligence and strict products liability. The assuredsÆ defence has been that it was not aware that illness or disease was caused to non-employee users by exposure to asbestos insulation products until the mid 1960Æs. The defence continues that when the assureds learned that asbestos dust from insulation products could cause injury they immediately put warnings on the labels of their products. We note, however, that some courts have suggested that the mild warning that inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over a long period of time could cause injuries conveyed no idea of the true extent of the danger.

In addition to state of the art defences, the assureds frequently argue that smoking habits of claimants and their failure to observe safety precautions contributed to their disease. Further, the assureds are appealing adverse decisions from arguments that the united States Government itself should be held primarily responsible particularly in the naval shipyards cases where the Government specified the asbestos products used and in fact did not change its regulations as to the safe use of asbestos for 31 years until 1969.

Finally, the assureds defend their cases on the causation issue and make the argument that as most asbestos insulation looks and is alike, it would be very unusual for an insulation worker to readily know which product he had used at any given time. This is particularly true in the light of the claims that the claimant was exposed to the assuredsÆ asbestos products 35 to 40 years ago. The assureds further stress that virtually no records of products were maintained by asbestos insulation contractors. Therefore, the assureds claim that testimony as to the use of products many years ago is based upon surmise and not fact.

However, the courts normally have permitted recoveries for asbestos-related claims if claimants have offered testimony to demonstrate exposure to a particular asbestos manufacturer or producerÆs asbestos products and the existence of disease. The claimantÆs inability to fix the exact time of exposure to particular asbestos products will ordinarily not bar recovery. That inability as well as the considerable time lapse between exposure to asbestos fibres and the resultant manifestation of illness have created two theories of insurance coverage: the exposure theory as to date of loss which is based on the idea that a separate injury occurs each time an asbestos fibre is taken into the lungs and the manifestation theory which is based upon the concept that coverage attaches only on the one date many years later when the disease manifests itself.

There are currently no less than twenty Declaratory Judgement actions being litigated between insurers and insureds on this issue in various jurisdictions throughout the United States.

CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL ASUREDS:

We now submit a summary of our review of claims brought against each of the nineteen individual assureds at risk with the reinsured together with a description of the pertinent coverage and our evaluation as to loss and costs reserves.

1. Armstrong Cork and Insulation Company:

This assured is a major defendant in the asbestos litigation. It is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal office in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. It had 1980 sales of $1,244,000. Its 23,100 employees are variously engaged in the manufacture of interior furnishings including floor coverings and insulations and speciality products for the building, automotive and textile industries.

The ReinsuredÆs involvement stems from its three facultative reinsurance agreements with the Home Insurance Company. Under contract NSF 7498 the reinsured carried a $3,000,000 p/o $l5,000,000 p/o $30,000,000 excess of $10,000,000 excess of a $1,000,000 aggregate carried by the Aetna in the January 1, 1969 to January 1, 1972 period. We are advised that for the period between April 1, 1972 to April 1, 1974 the ReinsuredÆs contract NSF 10436 carried $3,000,000 p/o $30,000,000 excess of $10,000,000 carried by the I.N.A. excess of a $1,000,000 products aggregate carried by Liberty Mutual. Finally, the assuredÆs contract NSF 12047 carried $3,000,000 p/o the HomeÆs $15,000,000 p/o $30,000,000 excess of $10,000,000 carried by Liberty Mutual in the April 4, 1974 to January 1, 1977 period.

Our review of this assuredÆs situation indicates that as of present there have been 4,600 claims brought against this assured by individual claimants for alleged asbestos-related bodily injuries. We have also ascertained that this assuredÆs average loss payments and costs to date for each claim amounts approximately to $10,000 per claim.

This assuredÆs substantial involvement is corroborated by the results of several cases that have received publicity in the past few months. Thus we note that the assured has contributed with several other asbestos products manufacturers to several large settlements in various jurisdictions. In March, 1980, it contributed toward a $215,000 settlement in an action brought by a 52 year old insulator in Beaumont, Texas. It also contributed toward a $141,750 settlement with an Oklahoma insulation installer. The assuredÆs contribution was between $8,000 and $18,750. The only non-settling defendant in that case sustained an adverse jury verdict of $450,000.

In November, 1980, the assured contributed with five other asbestos manufacturers toward a $230,000 settlement with a former insulator and it also was a participant with thirteen other asbestos manufacturers in settling six actions recently in Dade County, Florida for a total of $1,200,000. Finally, the assured contributed $12,500 toward a $1,470,570 settlement reached by fifteen asbestos manufacturers with 42 asbestos plaintiffs in Cleveland, Ohio. That settlement included a single claim settlement of $477,250 to the widow of a 46 year old pipe covering insulator of 29 years who died of pleural mesothelioma.

Reserve on Exposure Basis:

Our review of several thousand asbestos-related bodily injury cases indicates that the following percentages of these cases involve allegations of asbestos fibre exposure during the indicated years; 1969: 3.15%; 1970: 3.15%; 1971: 3.01%; 1972: 2.95%; 1973:2.90%; and 1974: 2.69%.

Therefore our per year ground up toss and costs reserve recommendation on an exposure basis for the 4,600 claims filed thus far would be predicated upon 4,600 times the $10,000 approximate average cost per claim equals $46,000,000 times the percentage of cases involving an alleged exposure for that given year. Our per year ground up loss and costs exposure reserves for this assured are thus the following: 1969: $1,449,000, 1970: $1,449,000; 1971: $1,384,600; 1972: $1,357,000; 1973: $1,334,000 and 1974: $l,237,000.

These reserve estimates calculated on an exposure basis are grossly less than the $11 million underlying aggregate product limits beneath the ReinsuredÆs layer here and we therefore do not recommend an exposure reserve for the cases filed thus far against the assured

Reserve on Manifestation Basis:

In the event that the date of loss in the asbestos cases is ultimately determined to be triggered by the date when the disease first manifested itself, please be advised that our study of several thousand asbestos-related bodily injury cases indicates that the following percentages of these cases involve allegations of manifestation within the indicated years: 1969: 0.21%%; 1970: 0.45%; 1971: 0.36%; 1972: 1.51%; 1973: 2.91%; 1974: 3.90%; 1975: 6.00% and 1976: 9.18%.

Thus our per year ground up loss and costs reserve recommendation on a manifestation basis for the 4 ,600 claims filed thus far is based upon 4,600 times the $10,000 approximate average cost per claim equal $46,000,000 times the percentage of cases involving an alleged manifestation for that given year. Our per year ground up loss and costs manifestation reserves for this assured are thus as follows: 1969: $96,600; 1970: $197,800; 1971: $395,600; 1972: $694,600; 1973: $1,292,600; 1974: $1,794,000; 1975: $2,760,000 and 1976: $4,406,400.

Each of these ground up reserve recommendations on a manifestation basis would therefore fall within the $11,000,000 underlying products aggregate beneath the ReinsuredÆs layer here and we therefore do not recommend a manifestation reserve for the cases filed thus far against this assured

2. Atlas Chemical Industries. Inc.:

The Reinsured has no specific knowledge of this assured involvement with asbestos products and our own review of the asbestos litigation does not reflect that this assured is a frequent or major defendant. We do know that it is a Delaware corporation and a subsidiary of the United States Corporation Company, which in turn, is a subsidiary of Core Laboratories, Inc. of Dallas, Texas. Core LaboratoriesÆ 1979 revenues totalled $61,135,000 with net income of $3,146,000.

The Reinsured is attempting to acquire information as to this assuredÆs asbestos claims and has also requested this assured to advise as to its other insurers. Meanwhile we can advise that under its policy NSF 9102, the Reinsured carried 95% part of $2,000,000 part of $10,000,000 excess of $10,000,000 primary coverage on this assured from January 29, 1971 through January 1, 1972.

Reserve:

Because of the minor involvement in asbestos claims and the extent of the underlying coverage we are not recommending a loss payment reserve on this assured.

3. Celotex Corporation:

Celotex Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Jim Walter Corporation which is one of the 200 largest industrial companies in the United States. Jim Walter Corporation is primarily involved in residential and non-residential construction renovation, remodelling and building materials production. Its annual revenues for fiscal 1980 were $1,984,235,000 with net earnings of $84,202,000. Its products include gypsum wallboard, asphalt roofing, hardboard materials, asbestos pipe, insulation and cements as well as asbestos block and corrugated asbestos paper for insulation purposes.

It appears that Jim WalterÆs asbestos-related interests derive from its 1962 acquisition of majority control of Celotex, which is now a wholly owned subsidiary. In 1972, Celotex purchased a controlling interest in the Panacon Corporation previously know in succession as the Philip Carey Manufacturing Company and the Philip Carey Corporation. The purchase likely included liabilities as well as assets. Between 1906 and 1960, Philip Carey Corporation fabricated asbestos corrugated paper and between 1930 and 1960 it produced several asbestos product lines including asbestos sponges. asbestos cement and block, asbestos tank jackets, asbestos felts and asbestos rope. By 1969, however, the Philip Carey Company had removed asbestos-related products from its main product line but continued to use the mineral asbestos in other products. The 1972 purchase of Panacon Corporation by Celotex also included Carey-Canadian Mines, Ltd., a producer of raw asbestos.

The ReinsuredÆs coverage of Celotex Corporation under Policy NSX-12752 was effective March 1, 1975 through October 1, 1977 with limits of $5,000,000 part of $15,000,000 per occurrence and in annual aggregate in excess of $10,500,000 per occurrence and in annual aggregate carried by Kemper in excess of a $500,000 occurrence/aggregate policy issued by Aetna, which was the Primary insurer of this assured between 1972 and October 1, 1977. While Kemper is an exposure carrier, the Aetna has adopted a manifestation view of coverage and apparently has been allocating its loss payment on this basis. We understand the Aetna maintains that it has expended more than $300,000 on a manifestation basis in the 1976-1977 period.

Because of these differences in Views as to coverage, Celotex as a wholly owned subsidiary filed a Declaratory Judgment Action in 1979 against the Aetna and all of its insurers in Hillsborough County, Florida seeking judicial determination that the exposure interpretation of coverage should govern the policies issued to Celotex, Philip Carey, etc. From this suit we understand that Celotex has been self-insured since October 1, 1977. We also understand that this assured does not have any rds from the 1940s, 1950s or early 1960s regarding its insurance coverage.

Reserve on Exposure Basis:

Our investigation of Celotex indicates that it is a major defendant in the asbestos-related bodily injury litigation. A recent review of the assuredÆs files indicate that there are presently 9,800 claims in suit against this assured. While the assured and its counsel maintain a very aggressive defence approach, we note that the assured has now concluded 458 settlements at an average loss payment of $9,000 per claim. Most of these settlements have occurred in the past two years, In addition, it appears that the average expense factor per closed claim equals, $1,000 and thus we believe the approximate average cost per claim has been $10,000. We therefore believe it proper to assume that the assured will be able to continue to dispose of cases at this average $10,000 figure.

Finally, our review of several thousand asbestos-related bodily injury cases reveals that 2.5% of all the cases involve allegations of exposure in 1975 and 2.3% of all cases involve allegations of exposure in 1976. Therefore our ground up reserve recommendation on an exposure basis for the claims filed thus far would be based on 9,800 claims times $10,000 average cost per claim equals $98,000,000 times 2,5% for the March 1, 1975 - March 1, 1976 year equals $2,450,000. Our ground up loss and costs reserve on an exposure basis for the March 1, 1976 to March 1, 1977 year equals $2,254,000 for the claims filed thus far. And our exposure ground-up reserve for the seven month March 1, 1977 to October 1, 1977 period would be based on $98,000,000 times 2.08% (the percentage of asbestos-related cases involving allegations of exposure in 1977) equals $2,038,400 divided by seven-twelfths of a year equals $1,189,066.

These figures calculated on an exposure basis are substantially less than the underlying aggregate limits carried by Kemper and Aetna and we therefore are not recommending an exposure reserve at this time for the cases tiled thus far.

Reserve on Manifestation Basis:

In the event that the date of loss in the asbestos litigation is ultimately determined to be calculated on the manifestation of disease basis, please be advised that our review of several thousand asbestos-related bodily injury cases reveals that 1975 is set forth as the year of manifestation in 6% of all cases where dates of manifestation are alleged. Similarly, 1976 is set forth as the year of manifestation in 9.18% of the cases and 1977 is alleged in 20.39% of the cases.

Therefore our ground up reserve recommendation on a manifestation basis for claims filed thus far is predicated on 9,800 claims times $10,000 average cost per claim equals $98,000,000 times 6.0% for illnesses manifested in the March 1, 1975 to March 1, 1976 year equals $5,880,000. Our manifestation reserve for the March 1, 1976 to March 1, 1977 year is based on $98,000,000 times 9.18% equals $8,996,400. Finally our manifestation reserve for the seven month March 1, 1977 to October 1, 1977 period would be predicated on $98,000,000 times 20.39% times seven-twelfths equals $11,656,282.

Each of these ground up reserve recommendations on an manifestation basis would therefore fall within either the underlying aggregate limits carried by Kemper and Aetna or, as in the 1977 period, within the ReinsuredÆs retention under Contract No. 721-0002. We therefore are not recommending a reserve to Reinsurers at this time but we do caution that these reserves are predicated only on claims that have been made as of this time. In this connection we can advise that the primary carrier Aetna has established a $9,000,000 manifestation reserve on the 1976-1977 year.

4. Combustion Engineering, Inc.:

This assured as incorporated in Delaware in 1912 and maintains its general offices in Stamford, Connecticut. It is a large corporate conglomerate with 26 subsidiaries which had 1979 net sales of $2,757,504,000 with net income of $97,641,000. The business of Combustion Engineering, Inc. is widely varied but includes the design, engineering and production of screening equipment for general industrial applications and the mining and processing of industrial minerals. It manufactures heavy insulation products and has used asbestos in the manufacture of cements, mastics, boards and blocks.

The ReinsuredÆs involvement with this assured stems from three facultative reinsurance agreements with the Home Insurance Company. Under NSF-5482 from January 1, 1966 to January 1, 1969, the Reinsured carried $2,000,000 part of The HomeÆs $10,000,000 in excess of $5.000,000 carried by Travelers excess of primary products aggregate of $500,000 carried by Travelers. Our information is that the Reinsured came off this risk for a period but then between January 1, 1972 to January 1, 1975 it had under NSF-9969 a facultative reinsurance agreement with the Home Insurance Company carrying a $3,000,000 part of HomeÆs $10,000,000 excess of TravelersÆ $5,000,000 excess of TravelersÆ primary $500,000 products aggregate. Finally, from January 1, 1975-1978 under NSF-12552, the Reinsured carried a $3,000,000 part of HomeÆs $10,000,000 in excess of the TravelersÆ $5,000,000 excess of TravelersÆ primary $500,000 aggregate.

This assured has a substantial involvement in the asbestos-related bodily injury litigation. We note that it participated in the recent $1,470,570 settlement with 42 claimants in Cleveland, Ohio. It is most frequently a named defendant in the insulation cases.

Our information is that there have been 4,800 claims to date brought against this assured which are all being defended by the Travelers. We are advised that approximately a thousand claims have been concluded by this assured but we do not have reliable information as to the average loss payment being incurred in the resolution of its claims. From our review of the overall asbestos litigation it is our estimate that this assured is expending approximately $10,000 in average loss payment and defence costs per claim.

Reserve on Exposure Basis:

Our study of several thousand asbestos related bodily injury shows the following percentages of all filed cases to date involve allegations of exposure within the indicated years: 1966: 3.22%; 1967: 3.20%; 1968: 3.16%; 1972; 2.95%; 1973: 2.90%; 1974: 2.69%; 1975: 2.5%; 1976: 2.3% and 1977: 2.08%.

Therefore our ground up reserve recommendation on an exposure basis for the claims filed thus far would be based on 4,600 claims times $10,000 average cost per claim equals $43,000,000 times 3.21% for the 1966 policy year equals $1,545,600. On this basis our ground up exposure reserve recommendation for the known claims to date for the remaining years when the Reinsured was at risk would be as follows: 1967: $1,536,000; 1969: $l,516,800; 1972: $1,416,000; 1973:$l,392,000; 1974: $1,291,200; 1975:$l,200,000; 1976: $1,104,000 and 1977: $998,400.

These reserve estimates calculated on an exposure basis for claims filed thus far are substantially less than the underlying limits carried by the Travelers and we therefore are not recommending an exposure reserve to the excess Reinsurers at this time.

Reserve on Manifestation Basis:

In the event that the date of loss in the asbestos cases is finally determined to be triggered by the date of manifestation of disease then our reserve recommendation would be based on the following considerations. We have reviewed several thousand asbestos related bodily injury cases which show that the following percentages of all the cases filed to date allege dates of manifestation within the indicated years: 1966: 0.07%; 1967: 0.28%; 1968: 0.28%; 1972: 1.50%; 1973: 2.80%; 1974: 3.90%; 1975: 6.00%; 1976: 9.18%; 1977: 20.39%.

Therefore our ground up reserve recommendation on a manifestation basis for the cases filed thus far is based on 4,800 claims times $10,000 average cost per claim equals $49,000,000 times 0.07% for the 1966 policy year equals $33,600. Using this same basis our ground up manifestation reserve suggestion for known claims thus far for the remaining years when the Reinsured was on risk is as follows: 1967: $134,400; 1968: $134,400; 1972: $720,000; 1973: $1,344,000; 1974: $1,872,000; 1975: $2,880,000; 1976: $4,406,400, and 1977: $9,787,200.

Therefore on a manifestation basis for claims filed thus far we would not recommend a reserve for the 1966-1976 years because of the $5,500,000 underlying products coverage carried by the Travelers. However, we do recommend to the excess Reinsurers a manifestation reserve for claims filed to date for the 1977 policy year predicated upon $9,787,200 less $5,500,000 underlying carried by Travelers equals $4,287,200 times the ReinsuredÆs 30% share of the HomeÆs $10,000,000 layer equals $1,286,160 less $750,000 retained by the Reinsured equals a net reserve to the Excess Reinsurer of $536,160 indicating a Full loss under Contract No. 721-0002 and a $36,160 loss under No. 721-0003.

  1. Dana Corporation:
  2. This large corporate conglomerate was incorporated in 1916 and today has 25 wholly owned subsidiaries. It had 1979 net sales of $2,761,135,000 with net income of $164,177,000. Its general office is located in Tolado, Ohio and its business is generally divided into two segments: vehicular and industrial. The vehicular segment includes the manufacturing and marketing of a wide variety of engine and vehicle parts including clutches. The industrial segment is involved in the manufacture and marketing of a broad range of products for industrial markets.

    The Reinsured has both direct and reinsurance involvement with this assured. Under its direct policy NSX-7864 the Reinsured provided coverage of $5,000,000 p/o $20,000,000 excess of $10,000,000 excess of $1,000,000 products aggregate in the March 23, 1969 to May 23, 1972 policy period. We understand that the Reinsured in turn facultated out $2,000,000 of its limits on this placement.

    The Reinsured also carried facultative reinsurance with the Home Insurance Company under NSF-11249 from March 6, 1973 to June 1, 1976 carrying $3,000,000 p/o $25,000,000 p/o $50,000,000 in excess of a $50,000,000 primary coverage. The Reinsured also carried this risk from June 1, 1976 to June 1, 1977 under NSF-1399 for $3,000,000 p/o $15,000,000 (The Home) p/o $50,000,000 excess of $50,000,000 primary coverage.

    The Reinsured is unaware of the total number of asbestos claims presently pending against this assured. However, Dana has put the Reinsured on notice of at least one claim for asbestos-related products liability coverage. Our review of pending asbestos actions nation-wide fails to disclose the assured as an prominent defendant in the asbestos litigation.

    Reserve:

    While we do not know the status of this assured in regard to other products liability claims, from the information at hand we do not believe a reserve is required for its asbestos exposure.

  3. Flintkote:

The Reinsured wrote this assured on a direct excess basis and also had two facultative reinsurance contracts with the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation (ELAC). In the December 31, 1964 to December 31, 1967 period the Reinsured under direct excess Policies NSX 5187 and 5232 wrote $4,000,000 limits excess of $3,000,000 for both United States and Canadian operations. It is our understanding that during this period the assured carried a $25,000 per occurrence deductible but also maintained a $100,000 limit in annual aggregate products liability.

In a subsequent period between December 31, 1967 and December 31, 1973 the Reinsured under agreements NSF 6785 and 9178 facultatively reinsured ELAC for $3,000,000 p/o $14,000,000 excess of $1,000,000 which we believe was carried by American Mutual Liability Insurance Company.

This assured is a Massachusetts corporation with its general offices in Stamford, Connecticut. It owns eight subsidiaries and its 1978 net sales totalled $730,175,000 with net profits of $37,721,000. It is engaged in the manufacturing, distribution and marketing of various building and construction materials. We understand that the assured does not now mine or produce asbestos but that it did have a wholly owned Canadian subsidiary corporation that operated an asbestos mine in Quebec from 1946 to 1971. This subsidiary provided mineral asbestos to the assured and, to a lesser extent, to unaffiliated customers.

We know of no case to date where the assured has been sued because of its mining operations. The assured manufactured no less than 40 different products containing asbestos including cement pipe, shingle and roofing materials, floor tiles and mastic pastes, liquids and solvents used in insulation work. The assured maintains that none of its products can be employed so as to liberate asbestos dusts or fibres into the air.

We know of no case against the assured that has gone to trial as of yet. This assured does not appear to be one of the major producers of insulation materials but it has persistently been named as a defendant in cases involving members of the International Union of Heat, Frost, and Insulating Workers who work in the building trades.

Reserve on Exposure Basis:

Our investigation reflects that to date there have been 2,078 lawsuits brought against the assured involving 3,724 individual claimants. Our information is that the assured has settled or closed several hundred claims and has been averaging a loss and cost payment of approximately $3,000 per claim.

At the time our study of several thousand asbestos claims to date reveal that the following percentages of all filed cases to date involve allegations of exposure during the indicated years; 1965: 3.24%; 1966:3.22%; 1967: 3.20%; 1968:3.16%; 1969:3.15%; 1970: 3.15%; 1971: 3.01%; 1972: 2.95%; and 1973: 2.90%.

Therefore our ground up reserve recommendation on an exposure basis for the claims filed thus far would be based on 3,724 claimants times $3,000 average cost per claimant equals $11,172,000 times 3.24% for the 1965 policy year equals $361,972. On this basis our ground up exposure reserve recommendation for known claims to date for the remaining years when the Reinsured was on risk would be as follows: 1966: $359,738; 1967. $357,504; 1968: $353,000; 1969: $351,918; 1970: $351,9l8; 1971: $336,277; 1972: $329,574 and 1973; $323,998.

Because of the underlying insurance in existence here we would not recommend a reserve for the excess Reinsurers for the claims filed thus far on an exposure basis.

Reserve on Manifestation Basis:

No reserve would be required for the excess Reinsurers on a manifestation basis for the 1965-1973 years.

7. GAF (Formerly Ruberoid Company):

This assured was incorporated in 1929 in Delaware ant maintains its principal office in New York City. Its asbestos-related operations derive from its May, 1967 merger with the Ruberoid Company which manufacturers asbestos products at two New Jersey locations as well as in Pennsylvania and Vermont. The Ruberoid Company of New Jersey had manufactured industrial thermal insulation products containing asbestos since the late 1920s and early 1930s. However, by early 1966 Ruberoid began labelling its industrial thermal insulation products with a warning of the dangers of asbestos fibre inhalation.

The assured in 1979 terminated its asbestos cement and mineral fibre operations at its Missouri and New Jersey locations. The assured continues to manufacture building materials and this product line includes roofing insulation, flooring for residential construction, re-modelling and built-up roofing for commercial and institutional buildings. In 1979 the assured had gross sales of $1,213,243,000 with income of $57,555,000. It currently owns 52 subsidiaries world-wide.

The Reinsured provided direct excess coverage on this risk for the period between May 1, 1977-1978 under policy no. NSX-15154. The Reinsured carried $2,000,000 part of $5,000,000 excess of $46,000,000 underlying coverage.

This assured is one of the major defendants in the asbestos related bodily injury litigation. Our investigation shows that there currently are 5,500 individual claims brought against the assured. However, we are advised that this assured has been settling its asbestos cases on an average of approximately $5,000 per claim.

Reserve:

Because of the protection of the $46,000,000 underlying coverage provided to this assured during the 1977 policy period, we do not believe an exposure or a manifestation reserve is required by the Excess Reinsurers on the basis of the claims filed to date against the assured.

8. General Dynamics (Electric BoatÆ Division and Asbestos Corporation, Ltd.) :

The reinsured wrote this direct excess liability coverage from November 29, 1966 through July 1, 1972 under three policies. NSX-5933 effective November 29, 1966-1969 provided $3,000,000 part of $20,000,000 excess of $80,000,000 coverage. During the period between September 1, 1967 and July 1, 1970 under NSX-6546 the reinsured provided $4,000,000 p/o $8,000,000 excess of $15,250,000 excess of $17,000,000 primary coverage. Finally, under NSX-8558 from July 1, 1979 through July 1, 1972, the reinsured provided $3,000,000 p/o $25,000,000 excess of $25,000,000 primary coverage. The assuredÆs primary carriers during these periods of coverage included Maryland Casualty, the Insurance Company of North America, Aetna and the Chubb Insurance Company.

This assured is, a Delaware Corporation which maintains its executive offices in St. Louis, Missouri, Its involvement in asbestos began with its merger in 1952 with the Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut and with its acquisition of part of the Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. of Quebec, Canada in April, 1973. General Dynamics is engaged in the design and manufacture of various products for the aerospace and shipbuilding industries as well as asbestos mining and milling operations. In 1979 net sales totalled $4,059,576,000 with a net income of $186,156,000. Its Electric Boat Division employs over 24,000 workers alone. It appears that this Division is the principal manufacturer of submarines in the free world. During World War II alone, over 100,000 of its workers were possibly exposed to asbestos products during the fabrication of ships for the war effort. We note that a 1975-1976 study which was undertaken by the purported leading medical researcher in the asbestos related disease field, reported that of 1,000 Electric float workers tested under x-ray that 46% were found to have some lung abnormality. We further note that the assuredÆs Electric Boat division is still unable to specifically identify all of the asbestos which was used in its submarines during the past 40 years.

There have been approximately 350 lawsuits filed by shipyard employees of the Electric Boat Division in the United States District Court in Hartford, Connecticut against fourteen asbestos manufacturers and distributors. A package of fifty of the lawsuits has been settled for a total loss payment of approximately $6,000,000. Although there were attempts to involve the assured in these settlements, as it was a third party defendant, it is our understanding that the assured did not contribute to any of the settlements. All of these claimants have filed WorkmanÆs Compensation claims against the assured but this liability would not involve the ReinsuredÆs coverage.

We are advised that the assured owns 54.6% of Asbestos Corporation, Ltd, which has supplied raw asbestos fibres to various asbestos product manufacturers in the United States since at least 1931. This company has been sued by Forty Eight Insulations, Inc., an asbestos insulation manufacturer seeking indemnity for all the loss payments it has made in connection with bodily injury claims. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. has also been named as a defendant with eleven other suppliers in bodily injury actions brought by Johns Manville employees in Illinois and by CertainTeed employees in Pennsylvania alleging a failure to warn of the dangers of raw asbestos and a failure to properly package the raw asbestos.

For similar reasons this assured was sued with four other asbestos suppliers by 623 employees of the Raybestos Manhattan plant in Passaic, New Jersey. We are advised that a total settlement of $16,000,000 was achieved in these suits and that Asbestos Corporation LtdÆs share was $1,825,000.

Reserve:

We do not believe this assuredÆs insurers would be liable on an exposure basis for claims against Asbestos Corp., Ltd. for injuries sustained prior to the assuredÆs acquisition of Asbestos Corp. Ltd. in 1973. Further, we do not believe the assured in the 1966-1972 period covered here could be found liable on a manifestation basis. Therefore we believe the only potential liability to the Reinsured here could come from the liability of the Electric Boat Division on an exposure basis in the 1966-l972 years.

Because there have been only 350 claims filed to date by Electric Boat Division employees and because of the limits of the underlying Coverage beneath the ReinsuredÆs layers, we do not believe a loss reserve should be established by the excess Reinsurers on this risk.

9. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Company:

This company has been a wholly owned subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation since 1968. However, it carried its own products insurance coverage until March 1, 1973 when it was insured under Occidental PetroleumÆs coverages.

The Reinsured had numerous reinsurance involvements with this assured. Under facultative Agreement NST-6271 with the Monte Insurance Company it wrote 60% p/o $5,000,000 p/o $20,000,000 excess of $5,000,000 products aggregate excess of $10,000,000 primary carried by the Hartford in the May 12, 1967 to December 1, 1970 period. Under facultative agreements NSF 8919 and 8930 with the Home it wrote respectively $1,000,000 p/o $4,000,000 excess of $1,000,000 products aggregate excess of $10,000,000 primary carried by the Hartford and also 40% of $5,000,000 p/o $20,000,000 excess of $5,000,000 products aggregate excess of the Hartford $10,000,000 primary in the December 1, 1970 to March 1, 1973 period.

Following March 1, 1973 the Reinsured had facultative agreements with the Unigard Insurance company on Occidental Petroleum which included Hooker Chemical Company. These included policies (1) NSF 11256 and (2) NSF 11257 and (3) NSF 11258 in the March 1, 1973 to March 1, 1976 period with respective limits of (1) $1,000,000 p/o $7,000,000 p/o $15,000,000 excess of $10,000,000 including $1,000,000 primary by Hartford as well as (2) $1,000,000 p/o $13,000,000 excess of $25,000,000 including primary and (3) $1,000,000 p/o $10,000,000 p/o $25,000,000 excess of $50,000,000 including primary.

Following March 1, 1976 for one year until March 1, 1977 the Reinsured had direct excess cover NSX-13822 on Occidental which would include Hooker with limits of $2,000,000 p/o $25,000,000 excess of $75,000,000.

Hooker Chemical is involved in the manufacture of a broad line of chemical and plastics products with its Home offices near Buffalo, New York. We are not familiar with this assuredÆs use of or involvement with asbestos, however. The Reinsured has received no notice from its ceding Companies as to any asbestos claims against this assured and our own review of the asbestos litigation indicates that this assured should not be heavily involved. Hence we have no information as to number of claims or whether any loss payments have been made. The only litigation that we have independently noted involves a group of asbestos related bodily injury actions filed in Chicago by 51 employees of the Johns-Manville Corporation in Waukegan, Illinois. The action names 34 defendants, including the assured, However, the Chicago litigation is in its very early stages and we are unable to report on the nature of the evidence, if any, against this assured.

We recommend no reserves in connection with this assuredÆs asbestos involvement. Nevertheless we should mention here this assuredÆs serious exposure arising out of the notorious bodily injury and property damage claims allegedly caused by its deposit of toxic chemical wastes at the "Love Canal" and other sites near Niagara, New York in the 1942-1953 years. The Reinsured seemingly could be involved in substantial loss payments because of this exposure.

10. Mundet Cork Company:

The Reinsured provided coverage to this assured from July 15, 1962 through January 1, 1964 under two contracts. Under NSX-3275, the Reinsured provided $2,000,000 excess of a $25,000 self-insured retention per accident for excess WorkmenÆs Compensation and EmployerÆs Liability. The Reinsured reinsured 50% of its exposure under this contract.

Then from July 15. 1963 through January 1, 1964, the reinsured under NSX-3275 provided $2,000,000 excess of a $25,000 self-insured retention per accident for excess WorkmenÆs Compensation. and EmployerÆs Liability. The reinsured advises that it has no information regarding any asbestos claims filed against this assured and our independent investigation does not disclose that this assured had a substantial involvement.

Reserve:

From the information available we cannot recommend a reserve. We will attempt to encourage the Reinsured to obtain additional facts.

11. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corporation:

The ReinsuredÆs involvement with this risk stems from its facultative reinsurance agreement with the North River Insurance Company. Its coverage was for a policy period from January 18, 1974 through October 24, 1976 under Contract No, NSF-12263 with limits of $3,000,000 part of $25,000,000 part of $50,000,000 per occurrence/aggregate in excess of $25,000,000 per occurrence/aggregate excess of the primary $1,000,000 occurrence/aggregate carried by Aetna Life and Casualty Company.

This assured was incorporated in Delaware in 1938 and maintains its general offices in Toledo, Ohio. Owens-Corning and its 37 subsidiaries realised 1979 net sales of $2,245,l64,000 with net income of $109,266,000. Most of the companyÆs revenue is derived from its glass fibre business and activities incidental thereto. Its insulation and construction products include thermal and acoustical insulation for residential and commercial construction, automobile and rooting materials.

This assured is a substantial defendant in the asbestos litigation. We note that in December, 1979 a jury returned a verdict against the assured and other defendants in favour of two plaintiffs in the amount of $435,000 each. That verdict was subsequently set aside as excessive. However, Owens-Corning discharged itself from potential liability in 40 other pending law suits in Cleveland in January, 1981 for a total loss payment of $500,000. In one Ohio case this assured contributed $65,000 to a single person settlement of $477,250.

Our general review of this assuredÆs situation reflects that as of September, 1980 there had been approximately 4,000 claims brought. We expect that this number has increased dramatically since that time. The assured had concluded 416 cases with total loss payments of $4,181,313 or an average loss of $10,051 for each closed file.

Reserve:

In view of the underlying $26,000,000 aggregate limits we do not believe a reserve is required by the excess Reinsurer for the claims brought thus far against assured.

12. PPG industries, Inc. (Pittsburgh Corning Corp.)

The Reinsured had separate involvements with this assured in the 1966 to 1978 periods. First of all in the October 1, 1966 to July 24, 1970 period it provided facultative reinsurance to the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation (ELAC) under Policy NSF-5915 for $500,000 part of the first $2,000,000 part of $10,000,000 excess of $1,000,000 carried by primary insurers, During the same period under the same policy the Reinsured also carried $l,000,000 part of $5,000,000 (ELAC) excess of $5,000,000 excess of underlying $1,000,000 primary.

The Reinsured also had facultative agreements with the Home Insurance Company. Under policies NSF-5893 and NSF-8717 and NSF-11082 the Reinsured during the periods between October 18, 1966 through July 1, 1976 carried 15% of $1,500,000 of the HomeÆs excess layer of $10,000,000 excess of $31,000,000 underlying.

The Reinsured also wrote this risk on a direct excess basis. Under NSX-10945, effective December 1, 1972 through July 1, 1976, the reinsured carried $1,500,000 of a $4,000,000 layer excess of an underlying $46,000,000. And, under NSX-15358, the reinsured carried $1,000,000 part of $25,000,000 excess over $50,000,000 underlying from July 1, 1977 through July 1, 1978.

Finally, the reinsured had a facultative agreement with ISLIC in the July 1, 1976 to 1977 period with limits of $3,000,000 p/o $5,000,000 p/o $10,000,000 excess of $30,000,000 excess of primary $1,000,000 aggregate products carried by the Hartford.

General Background:

PPG Industries, Inc. was incorporated in Pennsylvania in 1883 and subsequently reincorporated there in 1920. It was the first commercial plate glass company in the United States. In 1979, the assured enjoyed net sales of $3,091,800,000 and net income of $213,900,000. The assuredÆs principal businesses include the manufacture and distribution of automotive glass, paint and finishes as well as industrial paints, resins and glasses. In May, 1962, the assured acquired the Rubber and Asbestos Corporation of Bloomfield, New Jersey to add adhesive products to its paint and brush division. In 1973, PPC sold its fibre glass insulation assets to CertainTeed Products Corporation and a major portion of its cement assets to the Filtro Corporation. We note from our review of the asbestos litigation nation-wide that CertainTeed Products Corporation is frequently named a defendant in these matters.

Our review of PPG industries led us to conclude that this company was not a major manufacturer asbestos products. PPG currently has been sued by approximately 1,200 claimants but thus far it has no history of making substantial loss payments in the asbestos related bodily injury claims. Travelers as its primary insurer did pay $2,250,000 in the $20,000,000 Tyler, Texas settlement but this loss was paid as an operations loss and not as a products loss.

We believe the ReinsurersÆ exposure here is more likely to come through the Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, 50% of which apparently is owned by PPG. It is our understanding that Pittsburgh Corning had its own primary insurers with $1,000,000 aggregate products limits but that in the periods involved here the excess policies issued to PPG covered Pittsburgh Corning as well.

The primary carrier of Pittsburgh Corning during the 1966 to 1970 period was the Travelers and INA was the primary carrier until July 1, 1973. Kemper provided $1,000,000 products aggregate coverage on Pittsburgh Corning in the 1973-1975 period but we are advised that there was a $5,000 per claim deductible at that time. It appears that Pittsburgh Corning was uninsured on a primary basis in the 1975 to 1976 years and that it is claiming that the Home Insurance Company, which wrote an umbrella $2,000,000 cover over $1,000,000, is its primary carrier during that period.

In any event because of the underlying limits it would appear that the ReinsuredÆs most obvious vulnerability would fall under its facultative agreements with ELAC in the 1966-1970 periods. The primary insurer at that time was the Travelers, which as an "exposure" carrier, claims to have been tracking its loss payments over all of the years of alleged exposure for each individual claimant to whom a loss is paid. As of December, 1979 the Travelers claimed it had impaired its annual products aggregate by $180,057, $193,939, $200,762 and $263,722 respectively during the 1956 through 1969 policy years. We have not been able to obtain the current position of TravelersÆ underlying aggregate.

Nevertheless, our review reflects that Pittsburgh Corning is substantially involved in the asbestos litigation. We note that in 1979 a Virginia jury returned a verdict on behalf of a former insulator at the Newport News shipyard against Pittsburgh-Corning and two other asbestos producers for $435,000.

While this verdict was later set aside it does reflect this assuredÆs involvement. Similarly in January, 1980, Pittsburgh Corning and four other defendants settled a single asbestos action for $113,500. It also recently settled 22 separate actions filed in Maine and Massachusetts by former construction or shipyard workers in the total amount of $192,000.

Reserve on Exposure Basis:

Our review of the Pittsburgh Corning risk reflects that currently 5,400 claims have been brought and that this assured has been averaging approximately $10,000 in loss and cost expenses for all claims concluded thus far. At the same time our survey of several thousand asbestos-related bodily injury cases indicates that the following percentage of these cases involve allegations of exposure during the years when the Reinsured carried facultative reinsurance on ELAC: 1967: 3.20%; 1968: 3.16%; 1969: 3.15%; 1970: 3.15%.

Therefore our per year ground up loss and Costs reserve recommendation on an exposure basis for the 5,400 claims filed thus far would be based on 5,400 claims times $10,000 approximate average cost per claim equals $54,000,000 times the percentage of cases involving an alleged exposure for that given year. Therefore our per year ground up exposure reserve for this assured are as follows: 1967, $1,728,000; 1968: $1,706,400; 1969: $1,701,000; 1970: $1,701,000.

The net exposure reserve to the Reinsured would be the above ground up reserves less the TravelersÆ $1,000,000 aggregate times the ReinsuredÆs 25% share of ELACÆs first excess layer. The ReinsuredÆs net exposure reserves on this basis would be 1967: $182,000; 1968: $176,600; l969: $175,250 and 1970: $175,250. These reserves would all fall within the ReinsuredÆs retention under Contract No. 721-0002 and thus no reserve is recommended to the excess Reinsurers at this time.

Reserve on a Manifestation Basis:

We do not believe a manifestation reserve would be required for this assured.

13. Porter-Hayden Company:

This assured is a Baltimore, Maryland Corporation which had 1980 sales of $19,000,000. Its 150 workers produce certain products containing asbestos including friction materials, glass insulations and packings.

The Reinsured provided coverage to this assured under policy NSX-14130 from June 28, 1976 through May 26, 1977 with limits of $2,000,000 excess of $7,000,000 excess of $1,000,000 products aggregate darned by the Hartford.

Despite its obvious involvement with asbestos products, this relatively small assured does not appear to be a major defendant in the asbestos litigation. The Reinsured has received no notice of any pending claims against the assured. We will press the Reinsured to obtain additional information.

Reserve:

Under the present circumstances we do not recommend a loss reserve to the Reinsurers on this risk.

14. Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation:

This assured was incorporated in 1923 and its principal offices are located at Trumbull, Connecticut. Its business is the manufacturing and marketing of energy absorption and transmission products, fastening systems arid custom engineered materials. Raybestos-Manhattan operate 10 manufacturing plants and five brake products manufacturing centres throughout the United States. Its 1979 net sales were $294,872,000 with net income of $5,180,000. This assured is a major producer of friction products and, until very recently, a substantial portion of its product line contained asbestos.

The Reinsured here provided coverage under Policy NSX-9672 from September 1, 1971 through September 5, 1972 for $1,000,000 excess of a $35,000 self-insured retention [or WorkmanÆs Compensation and EmployerÆs Liability. Our review of the ReinsuredÆs policy reveals that under Exclusion (e) Employers Liability under Section 1(b) for bodily injury caused by disease would be excluded unless prior to 36 months after the end of the contract period a written claim is made or a suit brought because of such injury or death. We believe this exclusion should protect the Reinsured from common law indemnity claims brought against it by other manufacturers or producers of asbestos products who have been sued by the assuredÆs employees.

Nevertheless the Reinsured must be deemed to face substantial potential exposure here. Even though the assured to date has not put the Reinsured on notice of any claims, we must advise that the recent California Supreme Court decision in the Rudkin case held that an employee of an asbestos product manufacturer can sue his employer directly for fraud or misrepresentation in concealing the dangers of working with asbestos. Clearly, this decision could portend grave potential exposure to asbestos manufacturers and their EmployerÆ Liability insurers. Formerly, employees have been limited to WorkmanÆs Compensation scaled benefits and could not sue their employers directly.

In this regard we note that Raybestos-Manhattan also has been named a defendant in a $66,000,000 law suit filed in Pennsylvania on behalf of named and an unknown number of unnamed present and former employees at its Manheim, Pennsylvania plant seeking damages for alleged injuries resulting from asbestos exposure. The assuredÆs defence as above recited is that under Pennsylvania law, WorkmenÆs Compensation is the exclusive remedy for employees allegedly injured on the job.

This particular assured must be deemed to be vulnerable to these types of suits because of the availability of several letters written by its President in the 1930Æs, Sumner Simpson, which tend to indicate that this assured was aware of the danger of inhaling asbestos fibres at that time and may even suggest that there was an attempt to conceal this information.

We can advise that more than 600 of this assuredÆs employees at a New Jersey Manufacturing plant recently obtained a $16,000,000 settlement against various suppliers of asbestos to the assured.

Reserve:

The Reinsured has not been put on notice of any claims by this assured and it does not carry a loss reserve at this time. Under these circumstances we do not recommend a reserve to the excess Reinsurers but we do believe this situation should be closely monitored.

I5. Ryder Industries:

The RainsuredÆs involvement with this risk stems from its treaty no. NS-1196 with Surplus Underwriters wherein during the period between July 1, 1978 through June 6, 1980 it provided reinsurance of $1,000,000 in excess of $15,000 each occurrence. Surplus LinesÆ coverage on this assured, however, is only $300,000 per occurrence and in products aggregate and thus the ReinsuredÆs exposure is $285,000 excess of $15,000 on an aggregate basis.

We have been able to obtain very little information regarding this assured but can advise that it manufactured cement which it sold for constriction uses. Ryder reports that it discontinued the use at asbestos in its cement in 1966. Prior to that time its cement product purportedly contained less than 1% asbestos.

The reinsured is aware of only four or five law units filed against this assured nation-wide. Because the assured produced such a small amount of asbestos-containing cement, the Reinsured believes its exposure is minimal. The Reinsured has established no loss reserve on this assured.

We can further advise the excess Reinsurers that our own review of asbestos litigation fails to disclose Ryder Industries as frequent defendant in the asbestos cases.

Reserve:

No reserve is recommended because it appears that the captioned treaties had expired prior to the effective date of ReinsuredÆs coverage on this risk.

16. Shook and Fetcher Company:

The Reinsured provided direct excess coverage on this risk under Policy No: NSX-13815 from March 12, 1976 through March 12, 1977 with limits of $1,000,000 per occurrence/aggregate in excess of $300,000 per occurrence/aggregate carried by the Aetna Life & Casualty Company.

The assuredÆs main office is in Birmingham. Alabama. It had 1980 sales of approximately $30,000,000. It has 550 employees and is engaged in the shipping of insulation materials including contracting, commercial, industrial and marine insulation. Some of the products shipped by this assured contain asbestos.

The ReinsuredÆs files reflect that only nine Suits are pending against the assured and that all of them are in Alabama. The Reinsured advises that the primary insurer Aetna has undertaken the defence of this assured and has specifically reserved its right to seek indemnity against any and all manufacturers of asbestos products which the assured claims to have merely passed along in the chain of distribution in the event that it is not dismissed from the asbestos actions.

Reserve:

Under the facts as known this assured does not appear to have substantial exposure in the asbestos litigation and we are not recommending a reserve to the excess Reinsurers.

17. J.P. Stevens a Company, Inc.:

This assured was incorporated in Delaware in 1923 and maintains its principal office in New York City. The assured and its fifteen wholly owned subsidiaries had 1979 net sales of $1,833,076,000 with net income of $47,665,000. This assured is engaged primarily in the apparel, home furnishings, industrial products and commercial printing businesses. Its industrial product include filtration products, insect screening, fabrics tar headliner for automobiles and moulded floor carpeting for autos.

The Reinsured carried direct excess coverage on this assured under policy NSX-14007 with limits at $3,000,000 part of $30,000,000 second layer excess of $60,000,000 first layer excess coverage over an unknown primary between June 1, 1976 and November 1, 1977.

The Reinsured has no information regarding the claims status of this assured or the current underlying aggregate position. Our own review of asbestos litigation throughout the United States discloses that the assured has been named as a defendant in several cases including some cases in Hawaii involving clutch and brake mechanics and shipyard workers. However, this assured does not appear to be substantially involved in the asbestos litigation.

Reserve:

Because of the underlying Coverage we are not recommending a loss reserve on this risk.

18. Studebaker Worthington:

The Reinsured covered this assured by virtue of three separate facultative agreements from January 1, 1968 through January 1, 1973 and from January 1, 1974 to January 1, 1977. Under NSF 6817 from January 1, 1968 - 1971 the Reinsured had a facultative agreement with the Continental Insurance Company with limits at $3,000,000 p/o $4,000,000 p/o $10,000,000 excess of $1,000,000 primary coverage carried by LloydÆs Underwriters and the Insurance Company of North America. Under WSX-8963 from January 1, 1971 through January 1, 1973, the reinsured carried $2,000,000 p/o $4,000,000 in excess of $1,000,000 primary coverage. We are advised that the reinsured is on notice for claims for that policy period. Finally, under NSF-12052 effective January 1, 1974 - 1977, the reinsured had a facultative agreement with the Unigard with limits of $3,000,0 part of $40,000,000 in excess of $40,000,000 million underlying coverage û

This assured is a Delaware Corporation engaged in the production of auto brakes and lighting product,. In September, l979, it was purchased by the McGraw-Edison company.

Our investigation into this assuredÆs involvement in the asbestos litigation field reveals only three lawsuits filed against it in Sucks County, Pennsylvania. It is alleged that the assured sold to claimantsÆ employer asbestos products including industrial brake blocks and brake linings, They claim to have used the assuredÆs products between 1953 and 1976.

Reserve:

Because of the assuredÆs seemingly minimal involvement we are not recommending a loss reserve to the excess Reinsurers on this risk.

on this risk.

19. Uniroyal. Inc.

The ReinsuredÆs involvement with this assured stems from both direct excess underwriting arid contracts of facultative reinsurance with the Home Insurance Company. Under Policies Nos. NSF 5199 and 5206 the Reinsured carried $100,000 p/o the HomeÆs $300,000 and $l,000,000 p/o the HomeÆs $4,000,000 excess of $2,000,000 excess of the assuredÆs $100,000 self insured retention for products in the February 1. 1963 and May 1, 1967 policy periods. Then in the May 1, 1967 to September 8, 1972 period the Reinsured under policy NSF 6431 carried $250,000 p/o the HomeÆs $750,000 excess of $250,000 and $2,000,000 p/o the HomeÆs $4,000,000 excess of $1,000,000 and $750,000 p/o $5,000,000 excess of $5,000,000 all of which coverages being excess of the assuredÆs $100,000 self insured retention for products.

The ReinsuredÆs direct excess coverage was provided under policy NSX 6191 in the May 1, 1967 to May 1, 1970 policy periods with limits of $5,000,000 p/o $35,000,000 excess of $50,000,000 excess of $100,000 self insured retention. Under policy NSX 10884 in the November 1, 1972 to January 1, 1973 period the Reinsured wrote $500,000 p/o $30,000,000 excess of $20,000,000 and in the January 1, 1973 to September 9, 1975 period it wrote $1,500,000 p/o $30,000,000 excess of $20,000,000.

In addition, under NSX 11369 in the May 1, 1973 to September 8, 1975 period the Reinsured carried $1,000,000 p/o $25,000,000 excess of $50,000,000 and under NSX 13259 in the September 8, 1975 to 1976 period it carried $l,000,000 p/o $25,000,000 excess of $50,000,000.

Uniroyal, Inc. was incorporated in New Jersey in 1892 as the United States Rubber Company. Its present name was adopted in February, 1967. With its 39 subsidiaries world-wide, Uniroyal enjoyed 1979 net sales of ú $2,574,588,000 with a net income of $120,000,000. The assuredÆs chief business interests consist in the manufacture of tyres, chemicals and plastic products including industrial adhesives.

This assured does not appear to us to be one of the major defendants in the asbestos cases. Nevertheless. it was involved in the production of certain asbestos products and it has been charged with forwarding these products to the United States Navy which sent them to certain shipyards where the various claimants worked. The claimants thus far, however, have had difficulty in tracing the identity of the assuredÆs products because the assured apparently dealt mainly with the United States Navy and there have been no records discovered thus far indicating the sale by the Navy to the shipyards where the claimants were employed.

Our investigation reflects that to date there have been approximately 400 asbestos lawsuits filed against this assured involving about 800 individual claimants. Most of the claims are in Philadelphia courts. This assured has settled seven claims thus far for an approximate average cost per claim of $2,500. This average may shortly be reduced, however, because the assured has a tentative agreement with a Philadelphia claimantÆs attorney to settle 82 additional claims for $1,000 apiece upon the agreement that the assured will not be named in future suits by that attorney.

This assured has also been named as a defendant in five polyvinyl chloride (PVC) cases and ten styrene butadiene rubber (SBR) cases in Texas as well as in at least 21 "Agent Orange" cases involving a herbicide or defoliant containing a toxic synthetic organic chemical known as 2,3,7,8 - tetrachloro dibenzo P-dioxin or TCDD or "dioxin". several of these lawsuits involve purported class actions.

Reserve:

It is our understanding that the assuredÆs $100,000 self insured retention prior to September 8, 1972 was not on an aggregate basis and that therefore this retention would apply to each occurrence. Under these circumstances we do not believe a reserve is required by the excess Reinsurers for their liability exposures prior to September, 1972. It does not appear to us that this assured has any remaining cases in the 1965 - 1972 period that might involve the reinsurersÆ layer.

The coverage written subsequent to September 8, 1972 appears to us not to involve exposure at the present time because of the quantum of the underlying aggregate layers. Therefore even though the assuredÆs self insured retention was on an aggregate basis after September 8, 1972 we do not believe a reserve is required at this time. This situation conceivably could change, however, in the event that this assured became a major defendant in the "exposure" products cases mentioned above.

Conclusion:

We wish to emphasise to the excess Reinsurers that the reserve calculations herein have been made only on the basis of the claims that have been brought to date against the various assureds. Thus while we are recommending only one manifestation or exposure reserve (Combustion Engineering) in this report, it should be clear that substantial reserves on other assureds will be required if additional asbestos-related bodily injury cases are filed. We refer particularly to Celotex and Pittsburgh Corning where the excess ReinsurersÆ involvement would appear imminent and other risks such as Armstrong Cork and Flintkote where the Reinsured could be exposed in the not too distant future.

There are other risks such as Raybestos Manhattan and General Dynamics which could prove dangerous depending upon the development of the law of employersÆ liability. And there are other assureds like Hooker Chemical and Uniroyal which could result in loss payments by the excess Reinsurers in the event liability is found for other "exposure" type situations such as Love Canal and Agent Orange, etc.

We will continue to monitor all of these various assureds and situations and will remain in close contact with the Reinsured. Meanwhile, we would suggest an expense reserve of $60,000 be established for the cost of this firm to be allocated over the twelve years at risk".

Mar 81

Dr. Irving G. Selikoff, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, noted at a recent conference on asbestos that over 13.2 million workers were exposed to asbestos between 1940 and 1980. Of this number, he noted that 9 million are still alive. He further estimated that there are presently 5,000 excess deaths from asbestos related lung cancer which will increase to 10,000 a year by the end of the century. At the same conference, the assistant corporation counsel for estimated that the average total costs, taking into account the contribution by all defendants, for each case disposed of in 1981 was approximately $70,000. In a recently released report, the New York Academy of Sciences has estimated that the social cost of death and disability from asbestos disease will range between 39 billion and 74 billion dollars over the next 25 years.

Mar 81

LloydÆs Newsletter No 1 detailing the Committee and Corporation of LloydÆs and the work of its Departments.

9 Mar 81

A Member of the House of Lords writes to an external Member of LloydÆs and states, inter alia, in relation to the formation of the Association of External Members of Lloyd (AEML):- "I thought, however, it might be useful if I put on paper my own views so far as I understand the issues. It seems to me there are two prime ones. Firstly, I donÆt think that LloydÆs should seek to protect themselves, not as individuals but as a corporation, from suits for damage for ineffective policing of their Rules, Company Law, or behaviour contrary to that stipulated in the Bill if it is ever enacted. Secondly, on the divorce of underwriting and broking firms, I donÆt think the ordinary layman has enough knowledge of the pros and cons to make a judgement and I am content to leave that judgement to knowledgeable outsiders such as Sir Henry Fisher".

9 Mar 81

Letter from LloydÆs UnderwritersÆ Non-Maine Association. Re: USA Hazardous Wastes, Pollution and Environmental Impairment Legislation. Underwriters should be aware of current and proposed legislation and regulations which will create liabilities to onshore facilities. These may impose new liabilities on, or increase existing liabilities of, a broad range of insureds or potential insureds and thereby may effect underwritersÆ existing direct and reinsurance exposures and future underwriting decisions....

In addition to liability for sudden and accidental pollution, emerging requirements to cover non-sudden and accidental i.e. gradual and unexpected, liabilities could affect Underwriters writing such environmental impairment cover on a direct basis by way of reinsurance ....

Statutory sources of liability: The Hazardous Waste Superfund Act: Underwriters interest in providing direct insurance or reinsurance or who may already through existing treaty arrangements provide coverage should be aware that the recently issued Superfund legislation will affect the liabilities to which a facility owner or operator may face and may affect the limits of liability facing an insurer under RCRA.

The Hazardous Waste Superfund Act may also completely alter the liabilities facing those managing the risks of hazardous wastes ... Briefly the ActÆs basic provisions are as follows:

  1. Retroactive liability (potentially strict, joint and several).
  2. The Act has only limited defences to liability available.
  3. Liability may be limited under certain conditions to ... (c) $50,000,000 plus removal costs for any other facility.
  4. Due to the direct action provisions of this Act insurers will need to assess their liabilities since they may not assert their policy defences when they become guarantors, and by providing evidence of financial responsibility may face unlimited liability under the terms of the Act.

Mar 81

Hammond -v- North American Asbestos Company, case No. 80-L-52. A Philadelphia jury awarded punitive damages in 14 cases, with the punitive damages typically around a third of the compensatory level.

81

Peter Chandler, Underwriter, of the Sedgwick Forbes (LloydÆs Underwriting Agents) managed Marine Syndicate 483 (115, 117)/INM 755 (116) states "in the 1978 account closing we made the first reinsurance provision and continued to develop reserves in respect of Asbestosis and Pollution in subsequent years."

Mar 81

LloydÆs Bill receives its 2nd reading in the House of Commons.

Mar 81

The major two day conference, arranged by City Financial Conference Services Ltd, discussed and reviewed the changes occurring in the London Market, the reasons behind them, and their effect upon the international scene, particular attention being paid to the subject of the future for LloydÆs. Mr R J Kiln, Committee Member of LloydÆs and Chairman of LloydÆs Audit (Solvency) Committee, gave a speech of which the theme was "Changing World Insurance Markets - London at Risk" and stated inter alia:

Until around 1976 all looked well in LloydÆs, we weathered the difficult times of 1974 better than many of our rivals. Most LloydÆs syndicates were well reserved for their outstanding liabilities, foreign Names were giving us an international capacity and many Names were coming forward to increase the marketÆs capacity. We were, therefore, in a position after 1974 to take advantage of the increase in business which developed and LloydÆs profits on the 1975, 1976 and 1977 accounts were at record levels. However, since 1976 two things have happened. Firstly, LloydÆs itself has suffered a number of set-backs which tended to be highlighted by the media out of all proportion to LloydÆs own achievements. I will not bore you with even mentioning the various problems we have had;

A free market cannot be regulated to the point that all loopholes are closed because if this were to be so it would cease to be free:

The second major change since 1975 has taken place in the capacity of the insurance market, not just in LloydÆs but world -wide. This increased capacity arises from the good underwriting results of the years 1975 and 1978 and it also arises from a period of high interest rates, allowing considerable investment and capital gain to be obtained from insurance funds. The result, as we all know, is that there is an over-capacity throughout the world in almost all insurance and reinsurance markets at the present time. In this situation there is obviously intense competition for business. The high interest rates are masking the technical underwriting losses which certainly are beginning to appear on the 1979 and 1980 accounts. Lastly, the effect of this competitive market is that both brokers and underwriters have spent considerable time in re-cycling existing business by way of retrocession upon retrocession. A false increase in the amount of business in reinsurance markets has been created solely by this re-cycling process;

Looking forward to 1981 and onwards, the picture is still one of over-capacity and increasing competition, with little prospect of a real growth in Premium Income to the market. This trend is likely to continue until either there is an upswing in the worldÆs economy, with an increase in business, or a contraction in world insurance markets, which will only happen when underwriting losses exceed investment gain. This is beginning to happen to certain companies and certain insurers throughout the world but so far only to a limited extent and it is masked by new premiums and long delays in loss advices and settlements. In trying to predict the future for the 1980Æs, one has to consider whether the present cycle is any different from past cycles. Our business is cyclical - lows follow highs, the cycles vary in length and we are clearly into a trough and not yet , in my judgement, at the bottom of it. This trough is different from past troughs in these respects:-.* the present world reinsurance market is more substantial financially than in past troughs. A lot of major Life Companies, Governments, Industrial Giants and so on are backing Insurance and Reinsurance Companies. * there is still a lot of spare capacity in LloydÆs and elsewhere. These factors would seem to indicate that even if the crunch comes a substantial market will be waiting to pick up the pieces. However, there is a very serious contra position and that is the enormous increase in retrocession and retrosurance to which I referred earlier.

When a market depends upon collection of reinsurance recoveries to the third, fourth and fifth degree, not only are those reinsurance recoveries delayed in collection but they are subject to solvency risks en route. By this I mean that when the world-wide market becomes unprofitable some people will inevitably go to the wall, which will have a chain reaction. Secondly, the cash flow problem will create delays in payment of claims. In addition, in bad times the brokers themselves are very often subject to those same pressures; particularly so, as brokers today do hold substantial sums of clientsÆ money. Therefore, any insurance operation which is heavily dependent upon this retrosurance chain is likely to have a difficult time in the early 1980Æs. To turn to LloydÆs position in all this, there is no doubt in my mind that most LloydÆs syndicates do have very substantial technical reserves or, as we call them, audit reserves, and that the calculation and realisation of the dangers of long tail business are better understood in LloydÆs than in many Companies, particularly as we have run-off statistics of all types of business going back over a generation. Also, because of the large number of new Names, who joined in the late 1970Æs, most syndicates at LloydÆs are not writing to their capacity, so there is an in-built additional solvency margin. My fear is for those LloydÆs syndicates which may be unable to collect outwards reinsurance recoveries from reinsurers who are in difficulties, or who will have delays and difficulties in trying to so collect. Looking beyond the short term, the success of LloydÆs in a competitive world market, depends on the following factors:-

  1. The ability to keep people of high quality and integrity in the underwriting and broking field.
  2. The ability to remain innovative and creative.
  3. The freedom to trade with the minimum of regulation.
  4. Efficient administration and service.
  5. A low expense or cost ratio.
  6. A somewhat indefinable asset of a "market" image which leads to co-operation and;
  7. The passing of information and know-how for the common good of the whole market.

These seven factors have always been the strength and, in my opinion, the future of this market as well as the future of the London Market as a whole, depends upon them. Taking these points individually:-

  1. The quality and integrity of people is absolutely vital and there is no doubt that LloydÆs has seen a deterioration in integrity during recent years.
  2. The market has always produced a sufficient number of leaders in both the underwriting and broking fields who are innovators and creators of business. We must remain a place where the creative underwriter can make his fortune and we must find methods to reward those syndicates which take the time and effort to create new classes of business as opposed to others who sit on their bottoms and follow others.
  3. I quarrel with some aspects of Sir Henry FisherÆs report. I quote from the covering letter addressed to the Chairman of LloydÆs which starts the Fisher Report ... "Finally, all Members of the Working Party would wish to record two convictions. The first is that recent problems at LloydÆs should not be allowed to obscure the very great success which LloydÆs despite its antiquated constitution and the restricted powers of regulation over its community, has achieved over so many years and the high reputation in which it is held world-wide, particularly by members of the insurance industry", ... It is my belief that there is profound misconception that LloydÆs has achieved its success despite restricted powers of regulation over its community. On the contrary, LloydÆs has achieved its success over 300 years, and over the past 30 years, because of the lack of powers of regulation over its community. There is a very grave danger that if the new Council takes unto itself too much regulation to satisfy the consumer lobby, the MPÆs lobby, the external Names lobby or any other lobby, that this market will be regulated out of business. Freedom is essential for innovation and progress. The market must not accept control over underwriting from its new Council except where such control is necessary to protect the policyholder and, in rare instances, the market as a whole.
  4. If we are to prosper in the 1980Æs, the LloydÆs market has got to improve its administration and services. Repeated remarks have been made by the Chairman of LloydÆs over the need to improve the quality of claims handling; we need to review the whole area of producing policies and the passage of money. In the long term I do not believe that we have really looked at the effect of the micro-chip on our business and this a vital necessity for the next few years. A market place of relatively small units can be at a disadvantage in administration and such matters as claims collection, compared to one single large insurer. One of the most disquieting trends in LloydÆs is the delay caused by a large number of syndicates on one policy with each syndicate exercising its right to agree everything, particularly on the claims side. Niggling over claims or delays in making settlements can do untold harm to a market and could turn business away from LloydÆs. Of course, it is very vital to the future of LloydÆs that all syndicates in all markets agree claims reasonably and settle quickly, having the staff of quality to do so and the liquid cash resources to do so before waiting for their own reinsurance collections.
  5. One of the most disquieting aspects from the marketÆs point of view is the increasing costs which the syndicates and the Names are having to bear. In many areas of large volume, small profit business, LloydÆs are now non-competitive compared to some of our competitors. Costs have risen due to increases in syndicate costs, to agency charges and to the escalation of charges on the market, both from the Corporation and other services. The new building at LloydÆs is going to add significantly to these costs in the 1980Æs. It is up to the market to keep its own costs down and to complain constantly if the authorities increase theirs. The need may arise when part of the new building costs are funded other than by a direct charge on the market and we may have to look at the way charges are levied which, at the moment are calculated very much on the basis of premium income or premium limits. This means that the large volume, small profit, short tail business is discouraged and the long tail, large premium gambles are encouraged.
  6. During the early 1970Æs the security of LloydÆs was significantly weakened by the recommendations of the Cromer Committee and the necessity to increase the marketÆs capacity. However, during the late 1970Æs many steps were taken to increase the security of LloydÆs, including a significant enhancement of technical and audit reserves, particularly on long tail business, a revision of the ratio of deposits to premium income and of assets to premium income. Various other technical improvements have been made by successive Audit Committees and it is my belief that these steps have very much improved LloydÆs security. Of course, with difficult times ahead, I have no doubt that these improvements are necessary and will need continual improvement. As I said earlier, I am much more concerned regarding the technical reserving and thus the security of some parts of the world insurance and reinsurance markets outside LloydÆs.
  7. Before I finish, I think I must refer to some aspects of the Fisher Report. I have already referred to the dangers of over-regulation; in addition, in implementing the Fisher proposals, the market must bear in mind constantly the cost of these proposals, which were not mentioned by Fisher, but must be given serious consideration - they are already very considerable. We need to reach conclusions as quickly as possible on the Fisher recommendations and, in doing so, to bear in mind the dangers of over-regulation and the cost factors. The market, therefore, looks to the new Council to settle Fisher quickly without interfering in the marketÆs freedom to trade and underwrite as it sees fit for the benefit of the public and the Names.
  8. To sum up, provided LloydÆs recovers its verve, I see no reason why the prospects for LloydÆs and London during the 1980Æs should be any less successful than our achievements in the past. I may not be here to see it but LloydÆs in the 1990Æs could have 50,000 Members (of which nearly half would be overseas Members) and an income of ú5,000m plus, and our profits could go to a new high of ú250m in the mid 1980Æs. Other speakers included

Peter Miller

Former Member

Committee of LloydÆs

David Palmer

Chief Executive

Willis Faber Ltd

David Rowland

Deputy Chairman

Stewart Wrightson

(LloydÆs had 28,770 Members by 1990, couldnÆt tempt 50,000).

81

At least one lawsuit has been filed on behalf of school-children. That case seeks to order the Philadelphia School District to establish a trust fund to pay potential claims brought by students who may develop an asbestos-related lung disease during the next 45 years as a result of exposure to asbestos in the cityÆs schools. Steigelman -v- School Districts of Philadelphia, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, case No. 80-4729.

12 Mar 81

The Asbestos Litigation Reporter reported on the oral argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Eagle Picher -v- Liberty Mutual et al.

13 Mar 81

The Asbestos Litigation Reporter published an article where it stated that a report mailed to stockholders of Johns-Manville, the principal defendant in most asbestosis suits, is running out of primary insurance for the period 1947 to 1976, resulting in qualified financial statements by J-MÆs auditors for 1979 and 1980 because the ultimate cost of asbestos litigation to J-M is unknown. The Asbestos Litigation Reporter also published the findings of Dr Irving SelikoffÆs recent study showing that asbestosis does not peak until 40 to 45 years after exposure.

13 Mar 81

Hardy -v- John-Manville Sales Corp., (Case No M-79-145-CA), filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The court granted a motion permitting defendants in an asbestos case to file cross-complaints against their co-defendants alleging contribution of damages according to a concept of market-share apportionment, and granted a further motion permitting discovery to commence thereon.

16 Mar 81

Wall Street Journal: published an article stating that Raybestos-Manhattan will have a loss for 1980, which year includes asbestos-related claims going back to 1951. Raybestos-Manhattan would also have qualified statements for the 1978-1980 period for the same reason as Johns-Manville.

20 Mar 81

The motion of TravelerÆs Insurance Company seeking co-ordination of the four California Asbestos insurance coverage cases, supported by Underwriters, was granted.

24 Mar 81

Johns-Manville file their 1980 year-end accounts with the SEC.

Note 5 to the accounts is therefore reproduced in full below:

"The Company is a defendant or co-defendant in a substantial number of lawsuits brought by present or former insulation workers, shipyard workers, factory workers and other persons alleging damage to their health from exposure to dust from asbestos fibber or asbestos-containing products manufactured or sold by the Company and, in most cases, by certain other defendants. The majority of these claims allege that the Company and other defendants failed in their duty to warn of the hazards of inhalation of asbestos fibber and dust originating from asbestos-containing products. In the opinion of Management, the Company has substantial defences to these legal actions, resulting in part from prompt warnings of the possible hazards of exposure to asbestos fibber emitted from asbestos-containing insulation products following the 1964 publication of scientific studies linking pulmonary disease in insulation workers to asbestos exposure.

Also included in these legal actions are a number of cases brought by some of the CompanyÆs own employees and by employees of other manufacturing companies which use asbestos fibber in their operations. These suits typically allege that the Company and other defendants failed to warn of the hazards associated with the use of such fibber. In the opinion of Management, the Company has substantial defences to these legal actions including the fact that, with respect to employees of other manufacturing companies, it had no special knowledge not in the possession of the plaintiffsÆ employers which would give rise to a special duty on the part of the Company, and, with respect to the employees of the Company, that applicable workers compensation statutes provide appropriate defences to most such claims.

It is the CompanyÆs belief that the claims and lawsuits pending and which may arise in the future relate to events and conditions existing in prior years. More specifically, it is the CompanyÆs belief, based on the following factors and assumptions, that since at least prior to the period covered by these financial statements, no significant new potential liabilities have been created for the Company with respect to diseases known to be related to asbestos and arising from asbestos fibber and/or asbestos-containing products manufactured or sold by the Company.

  • That since the mid 1970Æs, the Company has sold asbestos fibber in the United States only in pressure pack, block form or other similar condition and not in a loose form;
  • That by 1973, the Company had ceased domestic manufacture of thermal insulation products containing asbestos which are the products principally involved in disease claims made against the Company;
  • That the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) established a maximum exposure standard for asbestos fibber of five fibres per cubic centimetre in 1972 and lowered that standard to two fibres per cubic centimetre in 1976. It is assumed that compliance with such standards in the work place was achieved within a reasonable time following such promulgation and is continuing to date; and
  • With respect to any use not complying with the OSHA asbestos standards, the CompanyÆs defensive posture with respect to claims arising out of such environments will be significantly enhanced.

As of December 31, 1980, the Company was a defendant or co-defendant in 5,087 asbestos health suits brought by approximately 9,300 individual plaintiffs. This represents a substantial increase from the 31 December 1979 level of 2,707 cases (brought by approximately 4,100 plaintiffs) and the 31 December 1978 level of 1,181 cases brought by approximately 1,500 plaintiffs). During 1979, the Company was named as a defendant in an average of 141 cases per month (brought by an average of 196 plaintiffs) as compared with an average of 65 cases per month (brought by an average of 83 plaintiffs) in 1978. During the first three quarters of 1980, the Company was named as a defendant in an average of 194 cases per month (brought by an average of 382 plaintiffs); this rate increased to an average of 304 cases per month (brought by an average of 403 plaintiffs) in the fourth quarter of 1980. During 1980, the Company disposed of 402 claims at an average disposition cost (excluding legal expenses) of $23,300, substantially all of which was paid by applicable insurance. This level of disposition cost represents a significant growth from the pre-1980 level of approximately $13,000 per claim. The growth in these two areas has significantly increased the uncertainties as to the future number of similar claims which the Company may receive, and the future disposition costs of the pending and future claims. Also during 1980, to resolve uncertainties as to the correct interpretation of a number of provisions in the various policies of insurance maintained by the Company and applicable to these claims, it was necessary for the Company to bring a declaratory judgement action to have such issues resolved by a court of law. While it continues to be the CompanyÆs opinion that its position with respect to these issues is sound and in accord with the weight of judicial precedents, any litigation involves uncertainties to some degree.

Because of the uncertainties associated with the asbestos/health litigation, and in spite of the substantial defences the Company believes it has with respect to these claims, the eventual outcome of the asbestos/health litigation cannot be predicted at this time and the ultimate liability of the Company after application of available insurance cannot be estimated with any degree of reliability. No reasonable estimate of loss can be made and no liability has been recorded in the financial statements. Liabilities, if any, relating to asbestos/health litigation will be recorded in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles when such amounts can be reasonably estimated. Depending on how and when these uncertainties are resolved, the cost to the Company could be substantial." Coopers & Lybrand, auditors of Johns Manville qualified their audit opinion on the companyÆs 1980 accounts, and specifically drew attention in their report to the change in circumstances which lead them to qualify their opinion; the audit report stated inter alia:

"As discussed in Note 5 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company is a defendant in a substantial and increased number of asbestos health legal actions. The ultimate liability resulting from these matters cannot presently be reasonably estimated. In our report dated 1 February 1980, our opinion on the CompanyÆs consolidated financial position as of 31 December 1979 was unqualified. However, because of the increased uncertainties that developed during 1980 with respect to these matters, our present opinion on the consolidated financial position as of 31 December 1979, as presented herein, is different from that expressed in our previous report."

24 Mar 81

London Market Circular issued by the Joint Carriers Liability Committee entitled "Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), the Hazardous Waste Superfund Act".

Paragraph 2 states:

"The Act creates liability, which may be retrospective, for compensation, clean up, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment and the clean up of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. It does not cover oil spills".

Paragraph 5 states:

"A copy of a notice by LloydÆs UnderwritersÆ Non-Marine Association on the 9 March 1981 is attached for the information".

Paragraph 7 states:

"Underwriters will note that the retroactive effect of the legislation may lead to claims on policies current at the time of manifestation of the pollution, though the cause thereof originated prior to the attachment of the risk. Especially when only a small primary policy exists, excess and excess of loss underwriters could be heavily exposed and there could be aggregation of claims with general liability coverage".

26 Mar 81

The Asbestos Litigation Reporter reported on the oral argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Eagle Picher -v- Liberty Mutual et al.

26 Mar 81

Meeting of the Asbestos Working Party: Notes taken by Elborne Mitchell when discussing certain matters with their clients Present, inter alia, CJ Ayliffe, RAG Jackson. 73 underwriters have attended Elborne MitchellÆs office in response to the chairmanÆs letter dated 10th February 1981. Working party objectives: ....

(i)

the working party will endeavour to provide the market with appropriate information. ...

(j)

the leading underwriters, with the assistance of Elborne Mitchell acting for the working party, shall seek to create a data bank of all relevant information.

Mar 81

A ú40,000 xs ú10,000 run-off reinsurance placed for S R Merrett, Underwriter of the Merrett Marine Syndicate 418, 422/417 and R A G Jackson, Underwriter of the Merrett Non-Marine Syndicate 799, 772/1, 943. Outhwaite wrote a line. This was originally defined as a run-off reinsurance, but has since been redefined as a casualty excess of loss.

Mar 81

In Cleveland, punitive damages of $500,000 were awarded in addition to $350,000 in compensatory damages, in the death of a 61 year old insulation worker.

Mar 81

Johns-Manville has commenced an action in San Francisco Superior Court against Marsh MacLennan alleging that, Marsh MacLennan, as its broker, breached the fiduciary obligations by refusing to help Johns-Manville secure full insurance coverage without gaps or inconsistencies. The action is based upon the allegations of various Johns-Manville insurers in the Johns-Manville -v- Home litigation, including UnderwritersÆ contentions that the London policies for certain years were written on a per occurrence basis without any aggregate, and the affirmative defences of concealment and nondisclosure of the risks of asbestos.

Malcolm Roscow recently met in San Francisco with the claim committee of the asbestos working party, i.e. Messrs. Tayler, Ayliffe and Rayment and their claims attorney in connection with the preparation of a complaint in intervention which will be filed in the action of Johns-Manville -v- Marsh MacLennan. It was agreed that the claims attorney would represent the market since there was no declaratory judgement action involved, and no dispute within the market on that issue.

Mar 81

At a recent conference on asbestos, Dr. Irving G Selikoff, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, noted that over 13.2 million workers were exposed to asbestos between 1940 and 1980. Of that number, he noted that 9 million are still alive. He further estimated that there are presently 5,000 excess deaths from asbestos related lung cancer which will increase to 10,000 a year by the end of the century. At the same conference, the assistant corporation counsel for Johns-Manville estimated that the average costs, taking into account the contribution by all defendants, for each case disposed of in 1981 was approximately $70,000. In a recently released report, the New York Academy of Sciences has estimated that the social cost of death and disability from asbestos disease will range between 39 billion and 74 billion dollars over the next 25 years.

Apr 81

LloydÆs Newsletter No 2 entitled "The Corporation of LloydÆs Part Two", detailing the Market Associations, Underwriting AgentsÆ and BrokersÆ Associations, and subsidiary companies; and the work of the various market associations and subsidiary companies concluded from LloydÆs Newsletter No. 1.

Apr 81

The Defence Research Institute is presenting a -three day seminar on the insurance and claims aspects of the asbestos problem. Attorney Malcolm Roscow of Standard, Weisberg, Heckerling & Roscow has been invited and will share the platform with the attorneys for Keene and Liberty Mutual insofar as the insurance problem is concerned. The claims aspects will be handled by many attorneys and doctors from all over the United States. Standard, Weisberg, Heckerling & Roscow recommend that London be represented at the meetings.

5 Apr 81

Porter -v- American Optical Corp., affirmed and revised in part, 641 F.2d 1128 , 5th Circuit, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (December 7, 1981), rehearing denied, 455 U.S. 1009 (March 8, 1982): Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed District CourtÆs application of the manifestation trigger of coverage and applied the exposure trigger for asbestos bodily injury claims. Court expressly concurred with the 6th Circuit Forty-Eight Insulations decision and held that insurance liability would be prorated among all insurers on risk during exposure period. The insured was held strictly liable under Louisiana products liability law for the manufacture of a respirator that did not protect worker from asbestos. The manufacturer had supplied such respirators to the company since 1953.

8 Apr 81

Porter -v- American Optical Corp., Case No. 78-1953 U.S. District Court Eastern District of Los Angeles. Affirmed and revised in part, 641 F.2d 1128, 5th Circuit 8 April 1981. Cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 7 December 1981. Rehearing denied, 455 U.S. 1009, 8 March 1982. Judgement given that the insured should collect on an Exposure basis. The insured firm basically had cover only during the period in which they had marketed the harmful asbestos products. Their insurers pleaded the manifestation theory, i.e. they took the view that they were not affected. The courts decided against the insurer and defined the term "occurrence" according to the exposure theory. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed District CourtÆs application of the manifestation trigger of coverage and applied the exposure trigger for asbestos bodily injury claims. Court expressly concurred with the 6th Circuit Forty-Eight Insulations decision and held that insurance liability would be prorated among all insurers on risk during exposure period. The insured was held strictly liable under Louisiana products liability law for the manufacture of a respirator that did not protect worker from asbestos. The manufacturer had supplied such respirators to the company since 1953.

Apr 81

Johns-Manville Litigation. The LloydÆs syndicates for which H R Rokeby-Johnson spoke. Syndicates Subscribing Certain Policies issued to Plaintiffs and which Subscribe either to the "Exposure Position" or the "Manifestation Theory". [This examples the "muddled approach" involving opposing factions within the LloydÆs Market, see Appendix 1].

13 Apr 81

Meeting of the Asbestos Working Party: Notes taken by Elborne Mitchell. Present, inter alia, CJ Ayliffe, RAG Jackson.

  1. Elborne Mitchell notes on meeting 30 March 1981 were accepted as being a fair reflection of the meeting....

Pittsburgh-Corning is being sued by 9,000 claimants and is a larger problem than previously realised. First layer insurances are now exhausted - above them is the Home and above the Home are London Underwriters.

(Then a reference to the data bank which was to be set up).

Total estimates to set up [the data bank] is $280,000 but the running costs are presently unknown.

Alexander Grant have been told that the system must be working by October 1981 to supply information to underwriters on which to base their reserves......

The 5th Circuit of U.S. Court of Appeals has reversed the Judgment in Porter -v- American Optical and applied the exposure theory of assigning liability. The Court agreed with the reasoning of the 6th Circuit in INA -v- Forty Eighty Insulations.

81

Moran -v- Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Case No. C-79-345) United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Punitive damages were awarded in the amount of $500,000.

81

Johns-Manville Products Corp. -v- Superior Court of the State of California, County of Contra Costa, sub. nom. Rebe Rudkin -v- Johns-Manville Products Corp. (Case No. 27 Cal. 3d 465 1980). In addition to punitive damage awards, the court permitted a cause of action for the alleged fraudulent concealment of known dangers.

Apr 81

Hammond decisions: In the first award, an Illinois jury in Bloomington added $375,000 in punitive damages to a $125,000 compensatory damage award against UNARCO Industries, to the spouse of an asbestos worker in a law suit based on loss of consortium. This appears to be the first award of punitive damages in an asbestos suit and, if indicative of a trend, greatly increases potential liabilities of companies and their insurers.

Apr 81

Letter from Attorneys to the insurers at interest. This will supplement our report of ... Recapitulation of Evidex Project - Celotex claims review ... Our second step was to review individual claims files at the assureds corporate headquarters in Tampa. This was a project of extreme difficulty, as the assured had no internal system or records that we could utilise ... This hurdle overcome, we assembled a team of paralegals who under our supervision reviewed the 4,500 individual claims files of the assured, some of which contained hundreds of claimants. We have always realised that to manage this mass of data would require technical support services in the form of a data processing company. With this in mind, we consulted with and ultimately retained the services of the Evidex Corporation.... We understand that the entire London market is considering a consolidated claims review process which would encompass all London Insureds. We have discussed this desire with Evidex. Recommended reserves: We understand that underwriters generally desire that a value of $125,000 be assigned to each pending asbestos claim, and that a proportion of 8%, or $10,000, be generally assigned to as the Celotex portion thereof ... We recommend that underwriters periodically consider the adequacy of the $125,000 figure. $125,000 may well be a reasonable figure to assign to the predicted average settlement in calendar year 1981 it is probably not an accurate prediction as to the ultimate settlement value of all presently pending asbestos claims as it does not reflect inflation or the increasing settlement value borne out by experience.... Our recommended reserves have been tentative and based on our belief that the sheer volume of claims makes it very possible that underwriters may face liability, no matter what the specific terms of policies are and no matter what theory of coverage is eventually opted for by the Courts. Our belief in this regard was strengthened by the fact that the terms, conditions, and even the existence of underlying policies is at issue in the Celotex Declaratory Action... As with the manifestation analysis it should be remembered that these calculations do not allow for new claims, for the possibility of underlying exhaustion by a single claim, for the fact that underwriters may desire a reserve based upon a $10,000 rather than a $9,048 Celotex contribution for each case, or for underlying impairment by non-asbestos claims. Again, we believe that precautionary reserves should be set for all families, notwithstanding that statistically it is possible to demonstrate "no expense" for every policy period. Keene decision: As underwriters are no doubt aware, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has recently issued its ruling in the Keene litigation. Basically, the Court followed the Forty Eight InsulationÆs decision and decided in favour of the exposure position.... Importantly, the Court in Keene extended this finding and its decision to Mesothelioma and Bronchial Carcinoma as well as to asbestosis. The Court went on to find that a pro rata obligation to defend and indemnify exists for each insurer on risk during the exposure period. For those periods during which Keene was uninsured, it stands in the same position as do its insurers... Appeals are presently underway

Related developments:

  1. Asbestos in public schools. The Environmental Protection Agency has recently found that asbestos poses an "Unreasonable risk of injury" to school children and school employees. This creates of course an additional potential Plaintiff pool of many millions. Possibly more important are the potential property damage claims by school districts based upon the necessity for retrofitting non-asbestos products in order to make school buildings once again "safe".
  2. Forty Eight Insulations Appeal. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals has denied a request for an open hearing on its decision in the Forty Eight Insulations case and has also extended its prior ruling to encompass Mesothelioma and bronchogenic Carcinoma. As initially announced the ruling affected only asbestosis claims.
  3. Van Buskirk litigation: One of the Defendants in this Philadelphia litigation is the assured, notwithstanding that some, if not all of the Plaintiffs where former Philip Carey employees. The Court has held that since Carey was an asbestos manufacturer, as well as the Plaintiffs employer, it is not entitled to workmenÆs compensation immunity. Should this ruling become law elsewhere, there could be a significant impact on the coverage provided by underwriters, as employersÆ liability provisions of insurance policies would then take on a much more significant involvement than has heretofore been the case.
  4. New Jersey Asbestos Workers Settlement. Underwriters are aware that the claims of 890 asbestos workers in New Jersey were recently settled by the establishment of a $9.4 million fund. The average per claimant settlement was $13,500, far below the current national average. It remains to be seen whether "fund" settlement at low levels will become a trend, or whether this is an isolated incident.
  5. Hammond decisions. An Illinois jury has recently awarded $500,000, $375,000 of that punitive, to the spouse of an asbestos worker in a law suit based on loss of consortium. This appears to be the first award of punitive damages in an asbestos suit and, if indicative of a trend, greatly increases potential liabilities of companies and their insurers.

Apr 81

Dayton Independent School District -v- National Gypsum Co., No. B-81-293-CA, Eastern .District of Texas, April 1981. Suit filed on behalf of eighty-three Texas school districts seeking recovery of the cost of removing asbestos from some 600 schools. Suit filed by the various Texas school districts was dismissed after the parties settled. However, District Court decided the liability of the manufacturerÆs insurer. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the finding of liability on the insurer, holding that there was no basis of jurisdiction. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the District Court applied general rules of construction favouring the insured without first applying the substantive decisional law of any specific jurisdiction. District CourtÆs decision was reversed.

17 Apr 81

Letter from Anthony M. Lanzone to KF Alder (Underwriting Agency). Attention Ted Nelson. Encloses a copy of the recent proposal authored by the American Re. considering the asbestos claims handling procedures. The enclosure headed "asbestos claims handling procedure" sets as its objective: formulation of a procedure for the unified control of evaluation, negotiation and litigation management by the insurance industry. It envisages "form a national asbestos litigation committee."... "Why is such an elaborate and unprecedented organisation required"

  1. Asbestos litigation is the largest phenomena that has ever hit the casualty insurance industry. The present mechanism is not capable of handling it effectively.
  2. Asbestos litigation is going to get much worse. No one knows how bad the problem will ultimately become.
  3. Even some prominent members of the bar have stated the waste in defence cost because of the lack of uniform Co-ordinated approach is scandalous. This problem will only get worse as time goes by.

Apr 81

As at April 1981 an attorneyÆs report referred to asbestos in public schools and added that this creates an additional potential plaintiff pool of many millions. Possibly more important are the potential property damage claims by school districts in order to make school buildings once again "safe". The same report stated that an Illinois jury has recently awarded $500,000, $375,000 of that punitive, to the spouse of an asbestos worker in a law suit based on loss of consortium. This appears to be the first award of punitive damages in an asbestos suit and, if indicative of a trend, greatly increases the potential liabilities of companies and their insurers.

Apr 81

Letter from Attorneys to the interested insurers. Report No .... Assured: ...

This report will concern not only the asbestos, PVC, SBR and Pesticide cases but will also report on the Agent Orange claims and a new unspecified chemical exposure claim which have been filed since our last report. Because of new coverage information we are now recommending a substantial reduction in the exposure reserves previously suggested.... It thus appears at thus point that the exposure theory as opposed to the "manifestation" theory will probably prevail in the American Court system in the asbestos cases. This resolution could turn out to be unfavourable to the excess underwriters at risk here in the 1952-196? years. Nevertheless, it would still appear evident that the adoption of the "exposure" theory would not negate application of the assureds per occurrence self-insured retention (SIR)... American Courts to our knowledge have not as yet been presented with the issue of interpreting a per occurrence SIR under "exposure" theory of coverage.... The rule that ultimately will prevail in the American Court system cannot now be predicted and therefore we recommend herein a conservative approach which accepts the applicability of one SIR for the first year of alleged exposure....

  1. Agent Orange claims: We are led to believe that Excess Insurers here, through their interests in other assureds, are generally familiar with the nature of the claims arising from usage by the United States armed forces in Vietnam of the chemical defoliant designated as "Agent Orange"... Claimants here are the service men who were exposed to Agent Orange and their children. They allege that exposure to this herbicide caused cancer or so damaged the veterans reproductive system that they fathered children suffering from birth defects... At the present time over 150 law suits involving in excess of 3,400 individual claimants have been consolidated before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on Long Island.

20 Apr 81

Lord, Bissell & Brook report to Underwriters at Interest. Re: ...

There have been hundreds of new cases. Underwriters involvement may be greater than initially believed.

24 Apr 81

Johns Manville litigation

Johns-Manville ("J-M") were manufacturers of asbestos products and in 1980 when the litigation commenced faced over 1,000 lawsuits with more expected. There was no attempt in the pleadings to put a figure on the sum claimed, but it was said that in 1980 in San Francisco alone the liability was several million dollars and. that they had already paid out over $800,000 in excess of settlement by their current insurers. Lloyds had insured J-M from 1947 to 1963 and again in 1978 and 1979. There were two lists of affected Lloyds Syndicates, one of those which subscribed to the æexposureÆ theory, and one of those which subscribed to the æmanifestationÆ theory.

Rokeby-Johnson was the Underwriter through whom the Lawyers of the æexposureÆ Syndicates obtained their instructions on behalf of the Lloyds market. Documents were filed by him on behalf of Underwriters on 9 December 1980, 22 December 1980 and 24 April 1981.

28 Apr 81

Victor B Levitt, Managing Partner of Long & Levitt of California and Chairman of the Professional Liability Committee of the General Practice Section of the American Bar Association, gives a talk at the invitation of LloydÆs Under 30Æs Non-Marine Claims Committee entitled: " Recent Developments in Insurance Coverage of Asbestosis, Agent Orange, D.E.S., Radiation Hazards and similar Catastrophic Product Liability Developments".

Recently the American Insurance Association stated that as of 1 February 1981, 25,000 individual Plaintiffs have sued for asbestosis (with 500 additional suits each month); losses and adjustment expenses from these suits alone in 1980 are costing $1.35 billion per year compared with $6.35 billion paid in liability premiums (excluding medical malpractice premiums).

A recent article stated that Johns-Manville, the principal Defendant in most asbestosis suits, is running out of primary insurance for the period 1947- 1976, resulting in qualified financial statements by JMÆs auditors for 1979 and 1980 because the ultimate cost of asbestos litigation to JM is unknown.

And this phenomenon is not peculiar to JM. The Wall Street Journal states that Raybestos-Manhattan would also have qualified financial statements for the 1978 - 1980 period for the same reason. .... And I suspect this may only be the tip of the iceberg. Reputable insurance brokers are saying that the staggering size of toxic latent disease claims, of which asbestosis is only the first, could threaten the solvency of some insurance companies.

Latency 15-45 years.

Another problem, inherent in this entire discussion, is that there are absolutely no reliable cost estimates because often it can take from 15 to 45 years after initial exposure to a toxic substance for manifestation of injury to occur. For example, a recent scientific study by Dr Irving Selikoff, considered the dean of medical knowledge as far as asbestosis claims are concerned, stated that the incidence of asbestosis peaked in workers exposed to asbestos 40 to 45 years after first exposure.

(145c) SelikoffÆs study 40-45 years peak, putting a very great financial burden on many insurers if the exposure theory is accepted. A recent California case indicates that Insurance Company of North America alone has potential exposure of $20 billion.

(145d) This same case states that the Court is bound to broadly construe the insurance policies to promote coverage in favour of the insured and against the insurer.

(145g) Two recent cases where the employee and his family not confined to claims for WorkerÆs Compensation. The recent New Jersey settlements.

It has been reported that a recent settlement in the New Jersey Federal District Court of a consolidated action against a number of defendants, including Johns-Manville, involving 680 workers at a Raybestos - Manhattan Inc. plant in New Jersey involved establishment of a $4.9 million fund with respect to asbestos claims. The trial judge estimated this settlement could save 10 years of trial and that the settlement may set a pattern in toxic substance mass litigation.

Reference is also made to a 1978 settlement in Tyler, Texas, of a $20 million fund for 445 asbestos workers.

A contrary opinion has also been expressed on these recent settlements that such settlements may encourage more suits....

I predict that there will be many more claims than we can possibly anticipate from toxic substances, that such claims will often take many years to manifest themselves, and that the dollars involved will be far greater than we can possibly imagine.

0 May 81

LloydÆs Log: International Reinsurance: a post "Betsy" review û E E Nelson

Extracts from a paper deiivered to a recent international reinsurance seminar in Edinburgh. Mr Nelson is a leading non-marine underwriter and his comments therefore reflect the substantial amount of foreign business written in London, particularly emanating from the United States and Canadian markets.

Nineteen sixty-eight reflected the aftermath of the 1965 disasters, which included Hurricane Betsy. A substantial re-think of underwriting attitudes prevailed throughout the insurance industry, and we embarked on five years of successful underwriting. Many company markets had withdrawn their support and the ability of LloydÆs underwriters to participate in the more attractive business offered was restricted by a reduction in the number of underwriting members overall, and a reluctance on the part of existing Names to increase their limits. In some cases, company competitors were obliged to substantially reduce their premium capacity by security restrictions imposed by Government solvency margin requirements. The inevitable reaction followed and by 1974, competition was again apparent, and a race for new business became the order of the day.

The collapse of the international stock markets in 1974 and 1975, and the demise of the property boom coinciding as they did, with a level of inflation never before seen in many countries of the world, was a recipe for disaster. The reinsurance industry shared the problems with the direct writers. Restriction in capacity, coupled with the demand for insurance on inflated values, and the necessity to finance premium income at the higher rate levels for solvency margin purposes, began the "happy time" for insurers and reinsurers alike.

The recovery in 1 976 was rapid, with rates increasing sharply on most classes of business. An adjustment to the new level of oil prices allowed industry to return to its normal level. As a direct result, 1977 and 1978 produced two of the best underwriting years for a long time, with a recovery of the stock markets, and a sharply increased return on investment income. Again, the cycle turned in 1979 and we are back to the era of intense competition, which in many cases, is both unjustifiable and unwarranted.

The development of the international reinsurance market

It would not be an exaggeration to describe the growth of the reinsurance market over the last decade as "explosive". The more attractive terms on offer in the late 1960s encouraged new reinsurance markets to develop and existing markets to expand in all parts of the world. Many companies for the first time created reinsurance departments or further developed those which had hitherto operated on a small scale. The captive insurance market in Bermuda began to make progress, and following the tax rulings given by the American Inland Revenue Service, were attracted to writing additional business on an "arms length" basis, for which reinsurance contracts, with their large block premiums, were particularly suitable and then of course the New York Insurance Exchange opened its doors in 1980. LloydÆs underwriters embarked on one of their fastest periods of growth during the second half of the 1970s, which continued unchecked until the end of the decade. A rash of new syndicates appeared on the scene, seeking opportunities in all sections of the market.

Today we have a market of truly international character, including the Eastern Bloc countries. and extending into uncharted territory in the Middle East and China. Sophisticated communications have made it possible for exchanges of information, documentation and accounting to be virtually instantaneous. From the point of view of a LloydÆs underwriter, this has made a wider market available to both write and place reinsurance business. The political barriers are gradually being reduced and we now have freedom of reinsurance within the EEC and the removal of exchange controls as far as the UK is concerned.

The picture today

The picture we see today is one of substantial and increasing underwriting losses being reported by companies almost without exception, subsidised by what is an historically high level of investment earnings. Underwriting results which on their own could only be described as appalling, are accepted by management because the "bottom line" provides them with the profit for the shareholders and the contribution to surplus. which enables them to finance their growth. Claims costs are rising steadily with the impact of high levels of inflation. Expense costs incurred by the industry are worrying, since they are often increasing at a time when premium income is static, due to competition and the international recession freely acknowledged by the Western world. There is no lack of opportunity to identify some of the problems which will face the reinsurance industry over the next 10 years.

The impact of inflation

For insurers and reinsurers alike, inflation is of vital interest from two points of view. Financial inflation which is of a political nature, and outside the control of the industry, is the most important. the Western economies have been grappling with this problem, most unsuccessfully, for the last 10 years, and appear to be almost powerless to bring it down to the single figure level, which they consider to be acceptable. The second aspect of inflation for insurance purposes, is imposed by changing social conditions, and the subsequent attitude of the courts or other adjudicators to insured or injured third parties. This is painfully obvious in an area such as productsÆ liability where "privity of contract" and "onus of proof" by the plaintiff has been virtually replaced by "warranty of fitnessÆ and "duty to warn" obligation. The responsibility to show he was not negligent has now devolved principally upon the manufacturer or distributor. In those countries where unlimited free medical treatment and compensation for loss of income as a legal right is not available to everybody, there is little doubt that the injured party will recover regardless of negligence. Case law built up over a century or more of court decisions, has been swept aside in favour of the injured parties. The activity of consumer organisations and the PlaintiffsÆ Bar in the USA have changed the rules of the game, and insurers must respond to the new environment.

In the property area, the "insurance to value" requirements and the introduction of average clauses in all classes of business, including personal lines, has gone a long way to keeping sums insured in line with inflation. Reinsurers, particularly on an excess of loss basis, must always be aware of the limitations of a fixed deductible, and this is plainly apparent in catastrophe reinsurance. The value of a fixed deductible is eroded by a factor between 10% and 15% per annum and anybody renewing "as expiring" because of a clean loss record, must realise he is effectively reducing the rate by over 10%.

An example of the impact of social inflation in the property account is adequately illustrated by the "Coastal Pools" legislation introduced in the early 1970s by the US Federal Government. This legislation requires all licensed insurers to participate in beach front and coastal substandard insurances in proportion to their share of standard business. These pools are now operational in a number of the south-eastern states of the USA. The Florida and Texas pools have total sums insured of $2,000m each. The small Alabama pool suffered a 70% loss in hurricane Frederic in 1979 and begs the question as to how much it would cost in Texas and Florida from this source alone? We must await the event before finding the answer, but one thing is certain, namely, the majority of the additional loss will fall on excess loss reinsurers.

We might have been tempted 10 years ago to suggest that the UK and Europe were not areas exposed to catastrophic losses. Today we talk of weather patterns covering thousands of square miles where, by way of definition, catastrophes are occurring regularly. We have standby precautions in case the Thames floods central London. Who would have forecast the total insured damage that would be suffered at Darwin in December of 1974? It may be that the impact of inflation of both sorts is responsible, with insurers covering ever increasing values, and being required to cover perils such as flood, under political pressure, which they would not normally have considered prudent.

In the field of casualty, the impact is commensurately greater. The life of a severe injury claim is between six and eight years, and during this period, inflation can double the settlement value. Alternatively, it will halve the value of a fixed deductible in real terms. If one is dealing with injuries suffered by a minor, any statute of limitations would not normally apply, and the injured party would have full legal rights at the time he or she reached majority. It is impossible to reasonably predict the effects of inflation over this period of time. A court or arbitrator will assess damage on values at the time of judgement, and will include an assessment for the effect of further inflation on future costs. An insurer, and/or reinsurer, must respond. Considerable headway was made by the introduction of indexed deductibles in the USA in the mid 1970s which were of considerable benefit to reinsurers. Indexation, of course, has been common in Europe for many years, but has never been readily accepted in other parts of the world. In these more competitive days, the initiative is under pressure, but the dangers of a fixed deductible remain as formidable as ever.

Any reinsurer calculating excess of loss rates without allowing for the impact of double digit inflation is certain to regret the mistake! The difficulty when negotiating on such contracts is to persuade prospective reinsureds of the logicality of the arguments, assuming in the first instance that he is even willing to listen, which itself cannot be guaranteed in a competitive atmosphere. Any rate on casualty business, excess of a fixed deductible, will appear in the first instance, to be exorbitant, if the reinsurer is solely to bear the inflation risk. By the time the last claim has been finally settled, a very different picture will inevitably have emerged, and it is usually the reinsurer who regrets the experience.

Can we return to the logicality of indexed deductibles over the next 10 years? I fear not, unless the pressures fuelling competition drastically abate, and interest rates fall in line to a more normal pattern. Ignoring the impact of inflation on this class of business, can only lead to disaster. Reinsurers will eventually learn of their mistakes, and reinsureds may well find themselves with security unable to respond to the final cost of the claim. It may well be that both will end up the loser.

Investment earnings

When I first came to LloydÆs some 30 years ago, investment earnings were considered so unimportant that some of the more conservative syndicates were content to leave the money on bank deposit, with a rate of return which today would be considered derisory. The impact of investment earnings on the industry is a very different story at this time, since it has become the most important ingredient to profitability. The UK has now accepted double digit interest rates as standard, and the US market has probably to adapt to the same situation. Whatever else may be said on the subject, insurance companies have inevitably to accept the "bottom line" principle, which basically means a nil or even minus return from underwriting, provided investment earnings cover underwriting losses, if any, and in addition, dividends to shareholders plus the necessary finance to keep the companiesÆ growth in line with government solvency margins. What we are seeing today is a new phenomenon, where interest rates in the USA are higher than those prevailing in the UK. During 1980, American interest rates have exceeded 20% for a short period and after a few months of decline, stand at 21% in December. When one considers that over the past 10 years an historical average of between 7% and 8% prevailed, the profound effect on underwriting attitudes cannot be denied. Perhaps it is even more significant to appreciate that it is possible to invest US dollars today, with first class security for a guaranteed return in the area of 15% per annum firm for the next five years.

The conclusion to the writer is clear, namely, that whilst this situation persists, we are in for a period of continuous deficit underwriting. The third quarter results for 1980 for both American and European companies are showing combined loss ratios well in excess of 100% which, in the absence of the present level of interest rates, would have meant an immediate reaction to improve rate levels generally, and a tightening up of underwriting attitudes. It is now taken in its stride, because other income is covering the deficit and leaving an acceptable margin. The rule of thumb today is that an underwriting ratio of 105% is bearable. We must, however, accept that the level of interest rates are not within the control of the insurance industry, and they can fall sharply as experience has shown. Inflation will inevitably increase claims and expense costs and the present world recession is holding back premium growth. If the level of interest rates should fall unexpectedly during this period, the industry will be left stranded, with underwriting and expense losses which are not covered by investment income. As happened in the mid 1970s, the first item which will suffer is the solvency margin and a subsequent increase in the security risk.

The general non-life account can be broken down into two distinct parts, namely, those classes of business where claims are normally paid within a short period of time (for example, property) against those classes where the claims take many years to mature (casualty). It is obvious that when the industry is relying heavily on investment income, the attraction of the latter outweighs the former. There is ample evidence that the extreme levels of competition are more severe in the casualty area, bringing as it does, the danger of the effects of inflation when claims come to maturity. Insurers and reinsurers alike, in years gone by, have failed to charge sufficient rates to meet the eventual cost of these claims and the related expense. The higher the investment earnings reach, the more exposed those involved will become. What will happen when interest rates eventually fall? The earnings from this source will decline quickly, but claims and expense costs will continue to rise with the going rate of inflation, leaving insurers in a position where they cannot protect themselves.

Whilst it would be true to say that the reinsurance industry has the same opportunity for investment return, this is always contingent upon the premium flow being maintained in the normal way. Unfortunately, experience shows that at times of high interest rates, reinsurance funds are subject to delay, and the conclusions are inescapable. When the original writers are relying so heavily on investment return, it is not unnatural for them to keep more of their business, and cede less to reinsurers. This has become particularly noticeable during 1980 in the surplus and quota share field, where working excess of loss covers have been utilised to a far greater extent than before and at the expense of sharing treaties. This will inevitably reduce the funds flowing to reinsurers, who will obviously lose investment advantage. When business is so competitive, and underwriting margins of profit have virtually disappeared. the reinsurers normally suffer more than the direct companies.

Asbestosis

Any review of the next ten years would be inadequate without a reference to claims. The writer believes that the impact of asbestosis losses will be substantial during the decade and beyond and is worthy of particular mention. The situation provides a good example of the difficulties facing all those involved in casualty business, and the impossibility of scientifically forecasting the effects of inflation and investment earnings when rating this, and similar typos, of business.

Mineral fibres inhaled by industrial workers and others are now known to be responsible for pulmonary lung disease. Severity depends upon the personÆs bodily health, influenced by the amount of the fibres inhaled and the period of exposure. In recent years, the dangers have been recognised, and productsÆ liability claims are being made against manufacturers in the USA, Canada and elsewhere, for failure to warn of the inherent dangers involved. Litigation is under way to decide whether such claims, if they are justified, should fall on the insurers carrying the risk at the time the fibres were inhaled, or whether it should be those on risk when the injuries become manifest. A dozen or more declaratory relief actions are now being pursued n the USA to rule on this issue.

At the time of writing, one can reasonably conclude that the courts are more in favour of the exposure theory, meaning that insurers and reinsurers who were on risk from the mid 1940s onwards, and over a period of 30 years, will be held responsible, although it would be correct to state that this is not necessarily the final decision. The amount of damage and provision for medical costs will be decided by the courts at the time of judgement, and must bear the full impact of many years of inflation. Subject always to the policy limits, the productsÆ liability insurer must bear the present day costs and their reinsurers will be called upon to respond accordingly. There are currently reported 6,000 individual claims in litigation in the USA alone, and unknown numbers in Canada and other parts of the world. Individual damages, if liability is established, will be substantial, and defence costs will add to the total. One need only think of a reinsurance excess of a fixed deductible to realise the dangers involved. No amount of investment earnings is going to compensate for this loss. We must expect that situations similar to asbestosis will always be a burden which the insurance market will have to bear, and todayÆs underwriters should be prepared to learn from lessons of the past.

A further example of the impact of social inflation is the litigation and court decisions following the use of the drug "DES". Some 20 years ago, the drug was taken by women during pregnancy and has resulted in injury to female children, becoming apparent when reaching puberty. The product was manufactured by a dozen or more companies. Many of the plaintiffs were unable to identify the particular manufacturer, since records were not always available. They proceeded on the "enterprise" theory, using the argument that specific identification was not necessary, and the industry must collectively respond, with the responsibility for damages allocated pro-rata over those manufacturing the particular product. The argument has been supported by some important jurisdictions, and is already setting the pattern for this and other similar situations. Perhaps we have a perfect example of the impact of social inflation which has added to it financial inflation, from losses which occurred many years ago. The reinsurance industry again, will undoubtedly be carrying a major part of this particular burden.

Security

Whenever a group of underwriters get together, the one subject which is inevitably raised, is the question of security. Can the reinsurance industry meet its obligations, regardless of the amounts involved and whenever the event occurs? The answer, unfortunately, is not an unqualified "yes". It is not possible in the insurance business to avoid the financial risks involved, both in writing reinsurance of other companies and placing business with them, and it is interesting to note that a part of this conference has been allocated to the problem specifically.

The writer has already commented on the growth of the international reinsurance market, which brings with it political problems which could well affect the ability of a domestic company in meeting its obligations. Whenever balance of payments problems arise in a countryÆs budget calculations with overseas trading partners, the classic defence is to restrict the outgoing flow of funds. Insurance has often suffered, and actions in the courts to enforce payments, mostly prove futile. Considerable effort is devoted by underwriters and brokers alike in studying balance sheets, chairmanÆs comments and whatever other information is available. Creditable as this is, it does not, unfortunately, tell the complete story. Balance sheets will normally only show a companyÆs net trading position, and it in turn may well be relying heavily on reinsurance contracts placed with other parties. Most countries of the world do not have any limitations on the amount of reinsurance which a company can purchase, although some will restrict placements to licensed or approved foreign operators.

Are these fears groundless? I think there is every justification in the effort currently being applied to the subject. The demand for insurance on ever-increasing values, brought about by newly created wealth, the impact of technological progress, and the effects of inflation, ever increase a potential catastrophe loss. The influence of government in such areas as provision of flood cover for home owners property insurance, compulsory participations in beach front buildings and contents in hurricane zones, satisfaction of demand for earthquake coverage on the known fault lines, are excellent examples. Hurricane Betsy in 1965 is regarded as one of the most expensive insurance losses in history, Causing damage in the region of US $700m. It is quite feasible to anticipate that this figure could be incurred by the Texas or Florida coastal pools alone in their own right, with other insured losses swelling the total to a massive figure.

It is in this sense that anxiety arises, coupled with the belief that many reinsurance companies do not themselves have the capital or reserves to meet their gross liabilities. They in turn are relying on an immediate response from their own contracts, failing which their financial structure would be under considerable strain. In the UK, US and Canada, legislation has been introduced requiring insurers in one form or another, to contribute to insolvency funds on a "pre" or post assessment basis. This requires them to subsidise any insolvencies from licensed companies, which would be an additional burden upon them at a time which could be most inopportune from their own point of view. There is also concern that although companies may eventually be able to meet their liabilities, they will not be able to respond in the short term. In the event of a major catastrophe. and based on past experience, a reinsured would need to collect within 30 days to maintain cash flow. The writer sincerely doubts whether all companiess in all parts of the world would be able to comply with this deadline. The responsible companies and underwriters with a reputation to lose, would be expected to fund on demand, regardless of whether they in turn could collect from their reinsurers in a like manner. As we progress down the chain of security, there will inevitably be hold-ups and the difficulties could multiply at an alarming rate.

What can one propose as a solution to this problem? There is no easy answer for certain, but there are some suggestions which might be put into practice in anticipation of the event. It is possible to ascertain in many cases, the amount of reinsurance which a company purchases, and the standard of the security with which it is placed. Companies or underwriters who offer themselves as reinsurers, should volunteer to make this information freely available. LloydÆs underwriters are restricted in the amount of reinsurance which they are permitted to place, and I think this adds to the security behind the policy. In addition, reinsuring companies and underwriters should be prepared to offer letters of credit issued by approved banks as additional security, which will provide for the immediate draw down facility for paid and approved losses, should any delay be incurred in normal accounting procedures. Letters of credit are widely used in commerce in all countries of the world, and are issued by all major banks. The charge is nominal. With the accepted ability of the banking community to decide on the credit-worthiness of any insurance operation, we would benefit from the additional safe-guard which this would introduce. The banker concerned would normally be the one responsible for a companyÆs or underwriterÆs normal cash requirements, and is in an ideal position to decide whether letters of credit can safely be issued, and also to conclude what security needs to be made available. If it were possible for such arrangements to be made available down the chain of security, many of our fears would be substantially reduced. The writer therefore advocates that all reinsurers should be prepared to issue letters of credit on catastrophe reinsurances, with the expectation that a similar facility will be made available to him.

It can be done! When LloydÆs underwriters became licensed insurers in New York and Canada, the necessity to provide letters of credit for outstanding losses and for unearned premiums, was eliminated. As far as catastrophe business is concerned, we elected to continue to provide them on demand. This was done to give added security behind the LloydÆs policy, and to comfort our clients with the certain knowledge that if claims payments should be in any way delayed, such as would cause embarrassment to the company, reimbursement within 48 hours would be possible under the draw down facility. The writer would like to see this arrangement extended throughout the reinsurance industry, and is convinced we can cope with the administrative burden.

When discussing this possibility with a friend in one of the Scandinavian reinsurance companies of impeccable pedigree, he argued that such a request for letters of credit brought into question his companyÆs solvency standards, and must be resisted for that reason alone. With respect, I do not believe this argument to be valid. If such a scheme has merit, it needs to be supported by the strong, whose attitudes and leadership will influence those smaller, and perhaps less experienced reinsurers, along the chain.

The fortunes of reinsurance are so closely linked to the original business that they cannot be divorced one from the other. Reinsurers should never overlook the fact that they are a service industry and should always endeavour to meet the needs of their client companies. The contribution which they can make when facing up to difficulties and providing the solutions, is substantial. In my view it is still the most interesting part of the insurance underwriting scene!

5 May 81

Niagara County -v- Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 80 A.D. 2d 415, 439 N.Y.S. 2d 538, 4th Dept, 5 May 1981. Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York held insurer had duty to defend Love Canal action despite pollution exclusion. Pollution exclusion will only be applied to active polluters.

12 May 81

Asbestos ... a Social Problem: A 63 page position paper prepared by the environmental issues task force and issued by the Commercial Union Insurance companies.

Introduction:

.... Though the health effects linked to asbestos exposure have been known since early this century, failure and unwillingness to take necessary measures to control its hazardous tendencies have led to a medical situation in which as many as 5.6 million individuals may die from an asbestos-related disease or from complications associated therewith, and in which millions of others may be disabled... The estimated number of cases filed to date ranges as high as 12,000, involving some 25,000 Plaintiffs and more than 260 Defendants. The demands placed on the Courts have been substantial. The judicial process has been impeded in many jurisdictions, affecting asbestos victims and other litigants alike. With the likelihood that many thousands of additional claims will be filed during the next 25-30 years, it is becoming increasingly apparent that our judicial system will be incapable of providing an effective means of relief for those injured by asbestos-related diseases.

... In an effort to provide compensation to deserving claimants, courts have often fashioned new concepts of law. This recent expansion of the boundaries of insurance and product liability law has confronted defendants with unprecedented levels of liability.

These factors place severe burdens on those responsible in the first instance for compensating asbestos victims - the members of the insurance and asbestos industries. Viewed objectively, the proliferation of asbestos claims and the costs associated with their administration, defence and payment jeopardises the financial stability of many of these companies. ....

  1. The victims of asbestos use: 1. Work-place Victims:

The incidence of the various asbestos-related diseases has been most marked among individuals occupationally exposed to asbestos. Though precise numbers are not available, the National Institute of Health has estimated that between 8 and 1I million individuals have been occupationally-exposed to asbestos since the early 1940s. Included in this number are some 4.5 million shipyard workers, approximately 4 million of whom are believed to have been heavily exposed to asbestos. Estimates as to the total number of individuals who will contract an asbestos-related disease are frightening. In 1978, Joseph Califano, the then secretary of the former Department of Health, Education and Welfare warned that as many as 5.6 million Americans may die of cancer or the other diseases associated with asbestos as a result of exposures in shipyards and other work places since World War II. This would compromise roughly one half of those occupationally exposed to asbestos during this period. Dr. Philip L Polakoff, an Occupational Health Specialist, has estimated that as many as 2.15 million of these individuals will die from one of the asbestos-associated cancers. As most of these cancers will manifest during the next 30-35 years, the per annum average of cancers that may be attributable to asbestos will be 67,000, or about 17% of all cancers detected annually in the United States.

  1. Other Victims:

.... Less identifiable but potentially of greater significance in terms of numbers and liability are the millions of individuals who have been and continue to be exposed to asbestos outside of the workplace...

The impact of such exposures is not known. However, the frightening possibility exists that a large proportion of the American population could some day be plagued by diseases brought on by their everyday, incidental exposure to asbestos......

  1. Ramifications of the Problem: Compensation of Asbestos Victims:
  1. WorkersÆ Compensation and other "non-fault" programs:
  2. Litigation as a Compensation remedy:
  3. The Nature of asbestos product Liability Litigation.

... In view of the extensive and heavy use of asbestos products for shipbuilding during World War II and its aftermath, it is apparent the United States Government will play a role in asbestos litigation. Evidence exists to the effect that the government possessed early awareness of the hazards inherent in asbestos use. Despite this, the government not only failed to take those steps necessary to minimise the risks involved in asbestos exposure, but actually fostered the mineralÆs use. In the effort to win the war, the government condoned careless work practices in naval shipyards, required inclusion of asbestos in products sold to it, and actually provided the asbestos to be used for various projects. These activities by the government demonstrate its legal, moral and financial responsibility for many of todayÆs problems.

  1. Inadequacies of Litigation as a compensation remedy:

.... As claimants continue to look to tort litigation as a means of compensation, the system is in danger of coming to a virtual standstill. Continued and proper resolution of these matters by the Courts will necessitate the employment of thousands of additional personnel and will require the expenditure of millions of dollars for capital improvements, equipment and the like...The situation is likely to get worse in the future. Because the incidence of asbestos diseases will increase in coming years, thousands of additional law suits can be anticipated. With increased efforts being undertaken to determine the existence of parties who are responsible for the injuries either by themselves or in concert with others, these cases will witness an endless addition of Defendants and third party Defendants.....

V. Ramifications of the Problem: the effects on the insurance industry and the implications for society:

  1. The Insurance IndustryÆs Financial Distress:

The proliferation of asbestos litigation and the money that must be expended for legal costs and damages threatens the financial stability of many of the insurance companies that are presently defending and indemnifying the various asbestos defendants. The problems that these insurers will face will effect not just their insureds, but ultimately society as a whole.

It is impossible to assess with exactitude the total liability that the insurance industry will be forced to bear. However, data compiled as to past actions and estimates as to future claims allow rough parameters to be set.

A study conducted by the Insurance Services Office indicates that for the period between July 1976 and 15 March 1977, the average payment in an asbestos case (for settlements and jury awards) was approximately $170,000. If just one million asbestos claims are resolved at that average value[$170,000], the insurance industryÆs liability will be $170bn.

Though the above figures serve to indicate eventualities they, do so without accounting for all possible contingencies. Because future projections are based on past performance, they do not reflect the impact of inflation. As medical costs and wages rise in future years, losses sustained will be higher and will result in increased liability payments. Similarly, the possibility of high jury awards becoming commonplace will cause chaos among insurers. Though we are aware of only two claimants having obtained in excess of $1m, the trend toward higher and higher awards will alter this course.

Perhaps most importantly is the fact that we are only now beginning to perceive the enormity of the situation. In view of the previously-mentioned estimates as to occupational exposure to asbestos and the mortality rates to date, it is not inconceivable that several million claims will ultimately be filed. Taking into considerations the latency periods for the asbestos diseases, the heavy and continued use of asbestos since the 1940Æs, and the potential for future medical evidence linking asbestos with other diseases, we can anticipate an increased incidence of asbestos-associated diseases during the next two or three decades. With workersÆ compensation and public assistance programs remaining as inadequate compensatory sources, a staggering number of asbestos product liability claims may be filed. Potential total liability will be immense when one includes factors such as inflation and "run-away" jury verdicts. It is conceivable that the damages that will be ultimately awarded will exceed the combined assets of the insurance and asbestos industries.

In addition to liability payments, the insurance industry will be forced to bear tremendous expenses to process, administer, and defend each case filed.

... Because the massive expenditures that asbestos litigation requires exceed the industryÆs present liquid capitalisation, many insurers will be confronted with serious financial problems....

  1. The Expansion Of Tort Liability And Insurance Contract Law As Factors In The Social Problem:

Of ultimately greater significance to the future of the tort system and the insurance industry is the debate which rages today on the issues of insurance coverage. The dispute, which has taken the form of at least twenty declaratory judgement actions nation-wide, pit members of the asbestos and insurance industries against one another in an effort to resolve the issue of who is obligated to defend and indemnify the insured.

Because underwriters of 30 and 40 years ago did not perceive any great risk from asbestos claims, premiums charged were relatively small. Because claims did not arise during the terms of those policies, reserves were not established. Now, with asbestos claims inundating our judicial system, proponents of the exposure theory are demanding that a group of financial institutions - members of the insurance industry - suddenly provide the resources necessary to cover incurred and anticipated liability. The ability of insurers to handle on an "exposure basis" the thousands and thousands of asbestos cases that will be filed in the future is limited.

Vl. Conclusion: The need for Federal solution:

The report concludes that the nature of the problem necessitates Federal Legislative action to devise and implement a system that adequately addresses the needs and interests of asbestos victims, the asbestos industry and insurance companies.

81

The LongshoremenÆs and Harbour WorkerÆs Compensation Act Amendments of 1981 introduced into Congress. Comparable legislative efforts show Congressional recognition that the asbestos health solution must look to parties beyond those in Keene and related suits. This amendment would provide that failure to file a claim within the period prescribed by the law would not bar a compensation claim if such failure was occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause, or if it is found that the delay has not prejudiced the insurer.

81

Third-Party Product Liability Suits Filed against Johns-Manville Corporation.

Year

Suits Filed

New Plaintiffs

1976

159

---

1977

---

---

1978

792

---

1979

2,709

4,100

1980

5,000

9,300

Sources: "Workers Compensation and Disability in Asbestos-Associated Disease", Report to the U.S. Department of Labor 1981 citing S Soloman, "The Asbestos Fallout at Johns Manville", Fortune Magazine of 7 May 1979 and the Asbestos Litigation Reporter 1981, page 3059.

81

The Government ContractorsÆ Products liability Act of 1981 introduced into Congress. This would provide indemnification to suppliers and their insurers for certain products liability in supplying a product or service to the United States Government

81

The Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1980, now being revised for reintroduction in this Congress, proposed minimum standards under which State WorkersÆ Compensation laws would provide adequate and equitable compensation for asbestos-related disability and death. In States where the WorkersÆ Compensation Laws did not meet these minimum Federal standards, the claimant could seek supplemental compensation from his employer, or, through an apportionment mechanism, from other employers or from insurers.

15 May 81

LloydÆs List: Tory group is ready to talk out the LloydÆs Bill

A GROUP of Conservative MPs looks set to kill the LloydÆs reform Bill by talking it out at the report stage - unless the new clause on legal immunities is with-drawn.

Two of them, Mr Richard Needham and Mr Archie Hamilton, said late yesterday after a committee bearing on the Bill that the revised clause appeared no better than the original to which they had strongly objected.

"It also goes against the undertakings which we were given at second reading stage," said Mr Needham. "We are prepared to stop the Bill."

The contentious clause prevents members of the LloydÆs community from suing the overall society or its governing body for damages in a wide variety of circumstances.

In its original form this clause 11 was criticised by a number of M Ps, both Conservative and Labour, and various members of LloydÆs.

At the second reading LloydÆs agreed instead that immunity could be dealt with in a by-law passed by the new governing council, but subject to Parliamentary approval. However, on Tuesday, when the committee stage opened, a revised clause was presented.

Mr Needham and Mr Hamilton were among the group of more than 20 Conservative MPs who helped to get a number of changes in the original Bill, and they say they will have plenty of support for their move if it is necessary.

They are prepared to put down a series of amendments - which could mean debate at the report stage being extended beyond the time allotted for the Bill.

Said Mr Needham: "The Bill could be talked out. There are so many contentious issues which may need to be resolved."

Earlier during the committee hearing, LloydÆs broker Mr Peter Miller explained to the four MPs that the protection of clause 11 should allow the new governing council to use its powers to regulate the market more effectively.

Otherwise it could be inhibited from intervening, as had happened in the past.

The possibility of errors and omissions insurance as an alternative, Mr Miller rejected for several reasons.

It was argued, for example, that the cover would have to be so high that it could not even be placed in the London market, and this would mean revealing sensitive commercial secrets to competitors who were providing the insurance.

Mr Michael Mann, QC, counsel for the two petitioners against the bill, challenged Mr Miller over the immunity clause. "Do you know of any other institution in English law which enjoys immunity from suit for its own actionsÆ? Not even the Crown, since 1947, has enjoyed such an immunity."

Mr Miller argued that LloydÆs was a unique institution, and the restraint on legal action, as he preferred to call it, had to be considered in the light of the qualification that it was a place where people agreed among themselves to take certain actions and nothing more.

Mr Mann contended that the new clause was little different to the old one. It did not matter how incompetent a society or its officers were in dealing with matters covered under the clause, "They could deprive a man of his livelihood or fortune with impunity."

Said Mr Miller firmly: "I would not put that construction on it."

LloydÆs chairman, Mr Peter Green, told the committee that compulsory sale by brokers of their managing agency interests were still a possibility, even though it was not spelled out in the bill.

The new ruling council might decide after a thorough examination that this divestment was the only way to avoid a conflict of interest.

Earlier, though, he had suggested it could be done by less drastic measures.

21 May 81

memorandum by P B Thompson states:

On the 20th May I attended the office of H S Weavers in conjunction with Colin Drage to review the position with regard to asbestosis claims. The review was conducted with John Heath to whom the following queries were addressed:-"Subject: Asbestosis

  1. What was the purpose of the Working Party and when would the Market be able to see any reports of their activities?
  2. What was proposed method of
  1. collection of fees/expenses arising from the Working Party activities and
  2. the allocation of same?
  1. What statistics will be produced, by whom and at what cost?
  2. Has any further progress been made to resolve the Manifestation -v- Exposure Argument?
  3. What is the current A.C.P.C. and how many claimants have commenced actions to date?

In answering our questions John Heath was very forthright and demonstrated deep knowledge of the overall position. His remarks can be summarised as follows:-

Initially the Working Party was formed to try and "control" the issues arising from asbestos claims notwithstanding the Manifestation -v- Exposure Argument. It was felt that the establishment of a Working Party would relieve the Market of substantial costs which would flow through from a divided market and the resultant lawyerÆs bonanza., if that Working Party could firstly control the activities of lawyers, secondly demonstrate that Insurers and Reinsurers would meet losses (whether they are ultimately discharged on an exposure or manifestation basis) and thirdly set up a central computer system to develop and produce statistics (on a manifestation and exposure basis) in various forms for the benefit of the whole Market. ......

Two reports have been issued to date and a third will be submitted shortly. We were told that these reports are very non-committal and reflect the Working PartyÆs philosophy of keeping a low profile. To a certain extent this philosophy resulted in the appointment of Stephen Mitchell of Elborne Mitchell to advise the Working Party on matters involving Privilege and also co-ordinate the publication of reports, etc.. The Privilege issue arose from the deposition of Jim Ayliffe in the Armstrong Cork Declaratory Relief Action were he made reference to the Working Party. In hindsight, John Heath feels that there was a possible over-reaction to the disclosure although for the time being, at least, it is intended to continue the use of Elborne Mitchell. In any event, their activities to date have been fairly limited and no substantial fees are involved. John Heath recognises that to date the actions of the Working Party are unofficial. It is his view that the Working Party should approach the Market for a mandate as this would no doubt relieve most of the MarketÆs apprehension regarding the Working PartyÆs activities.

To date, there are approximately 12,000 claimants, although the number in suit is less. The current A.C.P.C. is $1,250 (including fees) and whilst Mendes have supported that this will hold to 1985, other lawyers are not so optimistic as they feel that it will be good until the end of the current year /beginning of 1982.

A lot of work has been done to computerise the statistics that will be needed by all interested parties. A Databank has been set up by an independent organisation in North America which contains details of claimants; defendants; policy limits per year; amounts paid and outstanding, etc.. The cost of developing the database is estimated at $300K. Information will be fed into the databank by the major defending attorneys, via terminals in their offices. The annual costs in running the system are estimated at $140K. At this stage, it looks as though there will be four or possibly five terminals. The system has two facilities for input and output, i.e. public information and confidential information. Public information will be available without restriction, whilst confidential information will be for the userÆs eyes only. Clearly it will be necessary to ascertain what parameters have been established, if any, to determine what is classified as public or confidential. As output is dependant upon input and the Market is going to have to rely on computer printouts, it follows that all vital information must be classified as public.

The allocation of costs, both for setting up and running the databank will be according to usage. Hence the total cost will be divided by the number of inputs and the lawyers debited accordingly. These costs will then be passed back in their fees.

The first printout is scheduled for the 1st November 1982 and will show amounts paid and outstandings by claimants and by insured. The claimant listing will be cross-referenced against a listing of class actions.

Towards the end of 1982 it is envisaged that the computer will produce monthly statistics by policy recall, (both on an Exposure and Manifestation basis) although paid losses will invariably be collected on an Exposure basis. It has not been decided how computer printouts will be distributed. although at this stage, it is thought that the London Office of Toplis & Harding will be used. Whether these reports will go directly to Insurers and Reinsurers or via the Brokers is a matter to be decided.

It is apparent that the database will contain a great deal of information and should enable Insurers and Reinsurers to come up with some reasonably reliable loss numbers. It should also be possible to diagnose the report and thus get a better fix on the IBNR position. Following the review with John Heath I have written to him raising a number of queries as per the attached letter.

21 May 81

A stop loss ú2,459,939 xs ú4,141,828 reinsurance placed for D J Walker, Underwriter of Aviation Syndicate 295 managed by Gooda Walker to incept at 31 December 1980 covering 1978 and prior years. Outhwaite 317/661 wrote 25%.

22 May 81

Financial Times: Commons committee seeks divestment by LloydÆs brokers

LLOYDÆs of London, the insurance market supported by a private membership, faces the biggest upheaval in its 300-year history following a Parliamentary decision yesterday.

A Commons committee wants LloydÆs insurance brokers to sell their underwriting management companies and it wants that requirement to be incorporated in the private Bill being promoted by LloydÆs.

The broker controlled underwriting management companies look after the underwriting affairs of over 10,000 individual underwriting members of LloydÆs, whose private wealth allows the market to function.

The underwriting management companies, owned by leading insurance broking firms such as Alexander Howden, Hogg Robinson, Willis Faber, and Minet Holdings, are worth in total over ú100m and contribute up to a third of LloydÆs brokersÆ profits. Brokers are fiercely opposed to divestment.

The practice of ownership by the brokers of LloydÆs underwriting companies was condemned by Lord Cromer, who studied Lloyd s affairs in the late 1960s. "There is a conflict of interest which cannot be ignored, " he said in a report.

Sir Henry Fisher identified areas of actual and potential abuse in the relationship when he studied Lloyd s affairs to produce the report into LloydÆs self regulation published last year, which forms the basis of the current proposed legislation

The Bill represents LloydÆs first major legislative change in over 100 years. But in its present form it does not embody Sir HenryÆs recommendation for the total divestment of the brokerÆs links with underwriting managing companies.

The Commons Committee, chaired by Mr Michael Meacher, Labour MP for Oldlham West which has been studying the private Bill, made its controversial decision yesterday. .

" We are of the opinion that the Bill ought to be amended so as to provide for complete divestment as between broilers and underwriters," within a period of five years from the Bill receiving the Royal Assent, Mr Meacher told LloydÆs.

" We therefore ask the promoters (LloydÆs) whether they are prepared to seek an additional provision," Mr Meacher said.

Counsel for LloydÆs, Mr Peter Boydel, QC, requested time for LloydÆs to consider the decision.

If LloydÆs does not accept the decision by the Commons committee its Bill could be thrown out by Parliament.

Yesterday Mr Ronald Taylor chairman of Willis Faber, said " It is a tragic day for LloydÆs."

Mr Peter Green, LloydÆs chairman, said: " You could say I am disappointed by the committeeÆs decision."

Christie Moir writes: Mr Nicholas Goodison, chairman of the Stock Exchange, said he had no doubt that the exchangeÆs own lawyers would be looking at the LloydÆs committeeÆs decision on divestment.

The exchange is defending its own rule book, which insists on separating the jobbing capacity from broking, in the Restrictive Practices Court. The exchange believes that conflicts of interest can occur where one firm acts as both principal and agent.

24 May 81

Sunday Telegraph: Why LloydÆs Bill is now at risk

THE HARSH reality for Peter Green, chairman of LloydÆs, is that the institutionÆs ill-fated Parliamentary Bill, heralding the first major legislative change in more than 100 years, has been torpedoed.

There has been no lack of smoke signals but I4 Conservative MPs are still incensed that an indemnity protecting LloydÆs officers from legal suits for damages has remained in the main body of the Bill.

There is now a strong risk that the Bill will not pass the third reading and will be talked out.

On Wednesday LloydÆs Committee, led by Green, meet to decide their next move now that the House of Commons committee has insisted on a new clause to force the insurance broking fraternity, who dominate the market, to dispose of their captive underwriting agencies.

Ever since the sell-off was urged last year in the Fisher report - commissioned by LloydÆs three years ago - Green and his colleagues have ill advisedly sought to defuse the most explosive issue facing the market.

Far too many of the scandals that have convulsed LloydÆs in recent years have involved the conflict of interest which arises when an underwriting agent (who must consider whether to accept risks for his syndicate) is controlled by the broker who brings the risk to him.

Lord Cromer called for the divestment of brokersÆ underwriting interests 12 years ago, Fisher recommended it last year, but the response of Green and his colleagues has been: Wait till the new Council of LloydÆs has been formed which will deal with the issue then.

But the Commons committee, chaired by Left-wing Labour MP Michael Meacher (who is supported by members on both sides) has found in favour of the petition calling for immediate divestment.

Green has no choice but to listen to ParliamentÆs voice.

24 May 81

Sunday Telegraph: The going rate for protection

AS we warned last wee the Hedderwick Stirling debacle, coming hard on the heels of broker Norman CollinÆs crash, has led to a 50 per cent increase in the Stock ExchangeÆs general levy on member firms from 1 per cent to 1.5 per cent, with effect from July 1.

HedderwickÆs estimated deficiency of just over ú1 million is covered by its 22 partners estimated assets of ú1. 3 million but it is the Compensation Fund which takes the initial strain in settling clientsÆ claims. it then becomes a creditor of the hammered firm.

Stock Exchange reserves of close on ú9 million are behind the Fund - now standing at around ú1. 25 million - but the Tower has clearly been guided by prudence.

HedderwickÆs gilt activities as we have stressed for some time have much to answer for.

81

In 1981, the Association of British Insurers introduced with Government support, a Code of Practice for the selling of general insurance by intermediaries other than registered insurance brokers. The ABI has consistently argued that self regulation is preferable to statutory control and that there was little evidence of abuse of the current system. Over the years certain amendments have been made and the latest version stems from 1989. The Code is monitored by an independent Committee including insurers, consumers and the DTI. The CommitteeÆs last report published in January 1993 concluded that "the Code offers reasonable protection to consumers and that a statutory scheme is not warranted." The DTI agreed with this view. The ABI Code is, however, considerably less stringent than the requirements imposed by the IBRC.

26 May 81

The Times: LloydÆs Bill faces new hurdle

A new threat to the luckless LloydÆs Bill emerged at the weekend. At a hurriedly called meeting rebel members of the market decided to continue their fight for the removal of a clause in the Bill which would have the effect of giving LloydÆs proposed ruling council an indemnity against legal action.

The rebel names claimed to have enlisted the support of at least 17 Tory MPs, who will attempt to wreck the BillÆs Parliamentary progress by talking it out at its Third Reading, if the clause is not removed.

The new threat will come as an added blow to LloydÆs existing committee, which is due to meet tomorrow in an effort to hammer out a response to last weekÆs surprise demand from a Parliamentary Committee that the Bill be changed to provide for complete divestment of insurance brokersÆ underwriting interests within the market.

The new move means, however, that even if LloydÆs can come up with a satisfactory formula on divestment, the Bill r could still be in danger of falling by the wayside.

Leading insurance brokers whose representative dominate the LloydÆs committee may yet attempt to resist the divestment clause, which would force them to sell off their lucrative underwriting interests within five years. But the committee is known to be fearful that the marketÆs very status as a self-regulatory body could be at risk if the Bill does not succeed.

Some officials fear that s LloydÆs could eventually become directly answerable to the Department of Trade - as are all insurance companies - if the market cannot prove its ability to police itself properly by producing a Bill embodying much needed reforms in rules and regulations.

This view is heightened by the knowledge that Whitehall has been taking a keen interest in the recent spate of financial scandals at LloydÆs. In many of these cases LloydÆs antiquated rule book was thought to be in part at fault.

Ironically the indemnity clause which is the subject of the latest outcry was approved by the same Parliamentary Committee which made the call for divestment.

Despite this, some members claim that it is wrong that the institution should be able to put itself above the law.

The group, yet to identify its members, claims to be acting on purely altruistic grounds although it is understood that many of its members have been incensed by the growing power wielded in the market place by major insurance broking houses in recent years.

The major publicly-quoted insurance broking firms now control around half the underwriting operations at LloydÆs and, as suppliers of the majority of its business, are in a strong position to dictate terms.

27 May 81

Letter from H S Weavers (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd to Stewart Wrightson North America Ltd Re: PPG Industries.

We require to put you on notice that Underwriters subscribing to Umbrella Policy 78/14758/14 for the period 36 months at the 1st July 1978 in the amount of $5,000,000 do not provide coverage for Liability emanating from any Disease or Injury arising out of Asbestos Products.

At the time Policy 78/14758/14 was negotiated we were not informed by any party that the Primary Policies had an exclusion relating to Liability emanating from any Disease or Injury arising out-of Asbestos Products. Had we been properly informed we would have included a similar exclusion within our own Policy language. We must also advise you that at no time did Underwriters agree to the inclusion of Endorsement 6 to Umbrella Policy 78/14758/14.

We request you advise the Insured and any other necessary party of our position.

27 May 81

The Chester Report finalised, following the appointment of a formal Enquiry into the affairs of Oakley Vaughan & Co Ltd, Oakley Vaughan (Underwriting) Ltd.. The Committee met on 19 occasions. Definitions of certain terms used throughout the report:- "Writes" means tonner reinsurances placed with Oakley Vaughan managed Non-Marine Syndicate 862; "Buys" means tonner reinsurances effected on behalf of Non-Marine Syndicate 862. The Committee of Enquiry consisted of:-

A.H. Chester

Committee of LloydÆs

N F Holland FCA

Ernst & Whinney

A J Pagram

Aviation Underwriter Syndicate 580, Lambert Bros

81

U.S. Federal Government publications: "The Economic Consequences of Asbestos-Associated Occupational Disease" by Johnson & Heller; unpublished study for the U.S. Department of Labor.

 

30 May 81

Economist: LloydÆs is not immune - A draft bill before parliament gives LondonÆs international insurersÆ club excessive privileges

Set two big tests on a private parliamentary bill to strengthen the self-regulatory powers of LloydÆs of London, a four-man house of commons committee has passed one test and flunked the other. It has, wisely, told the committee of LloydÆs to work out detailed proposals for divorcing LloydÆs brokers from managing agents. It has unwisely recommended that a yet-to-be-formed ruling council of LloydÆs be granted sweeping immunities from legal liability for some of its actions.

As some Labour members of parliament are aware, if parliament does indeed grant LloydÆs the immunities it wants, the Conservative government may find it harder (or, at least, more embarrassing) to push through proposed legislation to deprive British trades unions of some of their legal immunities. This is a side-show. Much more important, by granting such immunities parliament will be placing the council of LloydÆs above the law on certain issues and depriving many individuals of their legal rights.

LloydÆs counters that it has already responded, constructively, to outside pressure and narrowed the scope of clause 11 of the bill to give it only limited immunity. Lawyers, as is their wont, are in disagreement on this. What is beyond dispute is that, under the proposed bill, it will be impossible for many people to sue the council of LloydÆs, the society of LloydÆs or any of its employees for damages for negligence or breach of duty. Among those who will have this legal right whipped away from them are the members of LloydÆs (who back the market with their personal wealth), underwriters (who write risks on behalf of members), and LloydÆs brokers (who alone can bring risks to the underwriting room at LloydÆs). This smacks more of self-indulgence than self-regulation.

The four-man committee has made a mistake that parliament needs to correct. No other body in Britain enjoys an immunity from liability for negligence - not the trade unions, not even the crown. Nor do regulatory or disciplinary bodies, such as the council of the Stock Exchange, the Law Society or the General Medical Council, shirk their duties in the absence of such protection.

In its defence, LloydÆs has voted in favour of clause 11 before. But, in evidence to the parliamentary committee, Mr Peter Miller, a past committee member of LloydÆs, has confessed: "I always found, I think, this clause 11 in the bill very unclear as to what it was we were about." If Mr Miller finds it "unclear", how obvious are the ramifications of clause 11 to the vast membership of LloydÆs?

The answer? Give LloydÆs only the immunity enjoyed by companies under section 448 of the 1948 Companies Act-immunity already written into clause 10 of the LloydÆs bill (which looks redundant in the face of clause 11). Section 448 immunity would permit the courts to excuse the council of LloydÆs, the society of LloydÆs or its employees from liability in any proceedings brought for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust where the court found they had acted "reasonably and honestly".

No need to be railroaded

The pass has not yet been sold. A group of Conservative MPs, Mr Archie Hamilton, Lord Cranborne, and Mr Jonathan Aitken prominent among them, want clause 11 removed from the bill. Unless it is, they could frustrate, by filibuster on the third reading, a bill granted a limited amount of parliamentary time. But the bill may not reach even that stage unless LloydÆs can come up with a formula for divestment, acceptable to the commons committee.

Many LloydÆs insurance brokers own managing agents, which in turn control syndicates which underwrite risks. Managing agents contribute up to a third of brokersÆ profits. Both Sir Henry Fisher and, 11 years earlier, Lord Cromer, saw a conflict of interest and scope for abuse in such an arrangement. How can a broker, who in law is the agent of the assured, also have an interest in the syndicate which writes a risk? As Mr Ian Posgate, a marine underwriter whose syndicates are effectively controlled by the big broking firm Alexander Howden, succinctly put it in evidence to the commons committee: "The broker is not our friend; he should not be."

Last year Sir Henry FisherÆs working party recommended that LloydÆs brokers divest their interests in managing agents within five years of the bill receiving royal assent. LloydÆs ignored the recommendation when it drafted the bill, thanks mainly to pressure from the big brokers. The commons committee wants divestment à Fisher written into the bill. It also wants to ban managing agents from owning membersÆ agents, which introduce new names to LloydÆs.

Naturally enough, the brokers are unhappy about divestment and some have threatened to take business away from LloydÆs if divestment is written into the bill. Neither LloydÆs nor parliament should be railroaded by such threats. Brokers could be in breach of their duty to clients if they shunned the LloydÆs market simply because they were made to divest.

LloydÆs badly needs its bill to be enacted as soon as possible. It has muddled along in the past with inadequate self-regulatory powers. Unless it writes divestment into the bill and (even at this late stage) ditches clause 11, chances are that its private legislation will not reach the statute books. In that event, it will be left to parliament to impose its will on the reluctant self-regulators.

0 Jun 81

Risk Management: Superfund Liabilities: A Super Headache to Insure

Writing in Risk Management, an American lawyer, Robert S Faron, who was working for the US law firm LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, that is currently employed by LloydÆs to handle NamesÆ US tax returns, spells out the potentially enormous and unquantifiable liabilities created by CERCLA (Superfund) Act:-

Liability defences are limited - Insurers may face unlimited liability - Superfund supports retroactive liability against waste generators - The City of Philadelphia has asked for $20m in damages - The Liabilities Superfund created are uncertain and potentially enormous ..

0 Jun 81

Dr Irving Selikoff issues a further report entitled æDisability Compensation for Asbestos-related Diseases in the United States?Æ, containing some 650 pages for the U.S. Department of Labor, detailing the effects of exposure to asbestos together with projections of the expected death rate and partial incapacity. The period in question studied was from October 1978 to June 1981. A further report was published in June 1982, for the period October 1978 to June 1982, containing 691 pages.

Population at Risk of asbestos-related disease:

We estimate that there are presently more than 9 million American workers, survivors of over 13 million workers in primary and secondary manufacturing industries, shipyards, construction work and a number of other industries and occupations who, in the past 40 years, were significantly exposed to asbestos.

2 Jun 81

Daily Telegraph: LloydÆs backs down on divestment front

LLOYDÆS yesterday threatened to withdrew its parliamentary Bill rather than separate membersÆ agents from managing Agents, as a committee of MPs had suggested. But when the MPs called LloydÆs bluff and insisted on the amendment to the Bill, LloydÆs subsequently backed down and agreed to consult its members.

Counsel representing LloydÆs initially told MPs yesterday morning that LloydÆs would not even consult its members on the issue. Michael Meacher MP, chairman of the Commons committee examining the Bill, checked that this was a matter of policy, and was assured it was.

The surprise development represents the latest stage in a long retreat by LloydÆs in the face of repeated attacks on conflict of interests. Both Lord CromerÆs report in 1969 and Sir Henry FisherÆs last year wanted complete legal barriers between brokers and underwriters but LloydÆs has been delaying action and reluctant to make a drastic move.

When pressed by critics and MPs it fought against complete divestment but conceded the principle. Unwilling to trust LloydÆs to take action, the MPs wrote compulsory separation into the Bill. They added that membersÆ agents (who look after the accounts and interests of the l9,000 members of LloydÆs) should be distinct from managing agents (who run the underwriting syndicates).

Earlier LloydÆs had tried to deter changes to the Bill on the grounds that consultation would require the elaborate machinery of "Wharncliffe" meeting to approve changes in the Bill. Yesterday morning it said a postal ballot would be sufficient, but that would require two general meetings and approval from the Recorder of the City of London for a change in the by-laws, so the result would not be available until mid-August.

But yesterday afternoon LloydÆs conceded it may be able to get results from the membership by July 20, before the parliamentary recess.

One reason for the tactical error in fighting enforced changes was that LloydÆs had not realised separation of the two agency types would be forced on it, although it had notification in advance. Now the Corporation of LloydÆs is wondering how to head off a movement to insist on another change to the Bill - removal of the clause giving immunity from legal action even in the case of negligence or breach of trust.

3 Jun 81

Financial Times: LloydÆs plans postal vote on self-regulation rulings

THE RULING committee of LloydÆs of London is. pressing ahead with urgent plans to set, up its first postal vote in the marketÆs 300 year history.

LloydÆs needs to canvass its 20,000 members on rulings laid down by a Commons committee, which has been studying a Bill to improve self regulation, the first major legislative change that LloydÆs has sought in more than 100 years.

The committee decided over the past few weeks that the Bill ought to be amended to remove conflicts of interest which exist in LloydÆs structure.

The Bill "ought to be amended so as to provide for complete divestment between brokers and underwriters, and also preclude managing agents acting as membersÆ agents, and that this should be done within five years of the Bill receiving the royal assent," the committee said.

LloydÆs was asked by the committee to petition support on both recommendations, which are likely to cause the biggest upheaval that the market has seen.

The market plans to make a by-law which will create the postal vote through two general meetings of members. The dates were set at an extraordinary meeting of the LloydÆs committee yesterday, which met to discuss latest parliamentary developments.

The first meeting on June 9 will give notice to members of the by-law and on June 17 members will vote on its creation.

Approval for the by-law will need to be obtained from the Recorder of London.

LloydÆs may be able to gain approval from its members on the amendments to the Bill by July 20, the date when it indicated to the committee that it would be able to return with its support for the amendments.

All LloydÆs insurance brokers and independent underwriting management agents, the groups which look after the affairs of underwriting syndicates, have been studying the implications of the Commons decision and discussing whether there are ways to mitigate its effects on their operations.

5 Jun 81

An Unlimited run-off reinsurance placed for Brice, Underwriter of Syndicate 609 to incept at 31 December 1980 covering 1976 and prior years. Outhwaite 317/661 wrote 100%.

Jun 81

Letter from Attorneys to the Underwriters at interest. Assured: ... The enclosed attachments reflect that the Travelers has exhausted its aggregate limits and as a consequence Johns Manville Corporation demands direct, immediate payment from underwriters in the sum of $347,753 on an exposure basis against the following years: [1952-1959].

Earlier this year and on 7 January 1981 Mr. Von Wald [Corporate Counsel, Johns-Manville Corporation], during a visit to New York called the undersigned relating that he wanted to meet in order to discuss the role that Johns-Manville expected the London excess insurers would play once the primary limits are exhausted. It so happened that Jim Ayliffe was also in New York on that day, accordingly a meeting was arranged between Mr Von Wald, Jim Ayliffe and the undersigned. During the course of the meeting, Mr. Von Wald announced that the Travelers was at the threshold of exhausting its aggregate products limits of $500,000 per year for all years spanning its coverage from 1947 through 1976, and that Johns-Manville fully expected that the London excess insurers for their years would have to respond to future losses on the same basis that the Travelers had done so with exposure..... Thereafter, when Jim Ayliffe, Keith Rayment and John Heath were preparing to attend a conference in New York during the week of April 6th on the computerisation programme, the suggestion was put forth that a meeting with Home and Johns Manville would be a good idea. Accordingly, arrangements were made to meet.... The meeting with Home and Johns Manville had to be postponed. However, a dinner conference with Von Wald was arranged for the 9th during which limits and attaching levels were considered in detail. It was then agreed that on the following day Messrs Von Wald and Caton would conduct an examination of all the policies and/or slips. On that morning and prior to the examination, they did meet and conferred at some length with Robin Jackson, Jim Ayliffe, Keith Rayment and the undersigned whereupon for the most part a general discussion was had on Johns Manville underwriting that probably took place during the time in question.

9 Jun 81

E E Nelson, a Committee of LloydÆs Member and Chairman of the AWP, wrote to all interested underwriters requesting a General Authority containing a hold harmless in respect of asbestosis claims. Re: Asbestosis.

On February 10th I reported to you on recent developments in the United States Litigation relating to asbestosis. In addition I informed you that the Working Party had arranged for reports relating to this matter to be available at Elborne Mitchell for your inspection. During the last three months nearly all the London Market Insurers and Reinsurers concerned with this matter have taken the opportunity to review these reports. Over the last two months London Market Insurers concerned with the direct insurance of Johns- Manville Corporation have authorised certain leading underwriters, when supported by the Working Party, to bind them in relation to Johns-Manville asbestosis claims.... It will be necessary for the working party to obtain a general authority to act on behalf of insurers and re-insurers in the London market concerned with asbestosis... It is not the working partyÆs present intention to play a part in the exposure/manifestation controversy. Enclosed with the letter was a "general authority of the working party".(This met with a good response. By 1 December 1981, 88 LloydÆs Syndicates and 23 Insurance Companies had given authority. In 1981, there were 420 active LloydÆs Syndicates.)

17 Jun 81

General Meeting of Members of LloydÆs: Statement by Mr Peter Green, Chairman

As you know, the new LloydÆs Bill was deposited Parliament on 26th November, 1980 and a Petition was filed against it. The Bill had its Second Reading on 24th March and was approved at the end of the Debate by 206 votes to 42. It then went to the Committee Stage and Hearings were started in front of the Parliamentary Committee on 12th May and continued for another 5 days.

At the end of the Hearing the Parliamentary Committee rejected the PetitionersÆ amendments with regard to a single electorate and they accepted LloydÆs amendments for 8 External members on the Council. They also accepted the new Clause 11 presented by LloydÆs seeking restraint from suit by Members of the LloydÆs Community. I think it worthwhile quoting the Chairman of the Parliamentary CommitteeÆs words in a BBC broadcast which he made afterwards:

"Immunities are a protection against legal come-back in the form of a suit for damages, by aggrieved parties. Now we believe that it is reasonable that LloydÆs should have immunities if they are going to intervene in the Market in order to prevent abuses. Otherwise there is a risk that they will be unduly timid and cautious because they will be looking over their shoulder, fearing that they will be a subject of damages if they intervene wrongly. They must define the immunities that they want as tightly as possible, because we donÆt want LloydÆs to be a law unto itself, we donÆt want it to be above the law, but we wish it to have sufficient power properly to regulate the Market. Now we did force them to make changes, they have made changes in the way that we approved of and weÆre basically therefore prepared to allow that degree of immunities."

Lastly, the Parliamentary Committee requested LloydÆs to seek additional provisions on Divestment and Divorce as they have become known. I will not deal with these matters here as they are the subject of the Extraordinary General Meeting which follows this Meeting. Meanwhile, much continues to be done regarding the recommendations of the Fisher Report. The 20 or so Task Groups which we set up have continued to carry out a considerable amount of research and preparatory work. These Task Groups, which include representatives from the Committee of LloydÆs, the Market and the Corporation Departments will, in due course, provide full briefing papers for consultation with interested parties. Major changes are, of course, dependent on the outcome of deliberations in Parliament.

As I have mentioned on several occasions recently, a major cause of the problems confronting our industry is the availability of too much cheap reinsurance, supported by high interest rates. The prospect of failure of a reinsurer and the repercussions flowing therefrom should not be under-estimated.

Most of you will be aware that the Committee of LloydÆs has decided to reduce the reinsurance allowances when calculating each NameÆs calendar year premium income for premium limit purposes. These reinsurance limits for 1982 have been reduced to 30% (20% in the Marine market) and further reductions are likely in the future. The percentage for Aviation is still under discussion. Your Committee considers this to be an essential step designed to ensure that syndicates do not "overtrade", thereby placing undue reliance on reinsurers in order to settle claims.

As you will know, the Committee felt it necessary to set up two Agency Companies (known as Additional Underwriting Agencies Limited and Additional Underwriting Agencies (No. 2) Limited), to handle the run-off of the Ashby and Sasse Accounts. Your Committee is deeply grateful to those members of the Community who continue to give so freely of their time to serve as directors of these Agencies and who have worked so diligently on behalf of the Members concerned to resolve these problems.

The number of new Names coming forward as at 1st June was 833, compared with 604 at the same time last year, an increase of about 38%. We expect the total for the year to be in excess of 1,200, compared with 880 last year.

Your Committee believes that it is necessary for LloydÆs to reinforce its efforts to enhance the systems serving the Market and to plan for the use of the new information handling and communications technologies and, accordingly, has made changes to the composition and role of the relevant Policy Board. These changes include the addition of a small number of members with experience of such activities outside LloydÆs. Mr. B. J. Brennan is Chairman of this new group which is known as the "Systems and Communications Policy Board", and a senior member of the CorporationÆs management, Mr. R. T. P. Ellington, will be giving the major part of his time to this work.

I now turn to a number of matters affecting our internal organisation, dealing first with an important cost item. In approving the Corporation Budget for 1981 your Committee was fully aware of the decline in profitability in the Market and was determined to contain costs. To this end the Secretary General and his colleagues proposed that a 5% reduction in staff numbers be achieved by natural wastage during the year, a recommendation which was supported by our Policy Boards and welcomed by the Committee. Reductions made to date suggest that the year end target will be achieved. However we must not lose sight of the fact that over the last ten years the number of Members of LloydÆs has increased from 5,981 in 1971 to 19,136 in 1981, the requirements for information of the UK and foreign governments has greatly increased and the need for effective self-regulation has grown both in extent and detail. In spite of all these pressures the number of staff employed has been reduced from 2,208 at the end of 1970 to 2,085 at the end of 1980. Each figure includes LloydÆs of London Press. I believe that you will endorse the CommitteeÆs view that it is a considerable achievement to reduce staff numbers during a period when the demands on the staff have never been greater

I am pleased to report that the Redevelopment project continues to proceed well. The demolition of the 1928 Building was completed by Willments Ltd. on time at the end of January and Bovis Construction took possession of the site at the beginning of February.

Work has commenced on the sub-structure and certain preliminary piling work has been done. Before the main piling is undertaken however a further 34,000 cubic metres of material will need to be removed from the site in order to get down to the level of the floor slab of the sub-basement of the new building.

Site huts, to accommodate the ContractorÆs offices, have had to be located over Lime Street where it is intended that they shall remain throughout the contract. There will not be space for them on the site unless they are moved as work proceeds. This would of course be disruptive and expensive.

The contract with Bovis was signed in the sum of ú74.8m at February 1981 values and your Committee anticipates that the only major effect on the estimated cost will be increases due to inflation as it affects the construction industry. A very careful watch is being kept on redevelopment expenditure and all sub-contracts let to date are within the cost plan figure.

I am very pleased to tell you that Her Majesty the Queen Mother has consented to visit LloydÆs on Thursday 5th November to mark in a short ceremony the start of the major works on the new building.

The new underwriting area, which opened last autumn, and which is known throughout the Market as the "Yellow Submarine", has become an established part of the Room sooner than was expected. There are now 15 boxes with a total seating capacity of 70 in the area as well as 94 occupied brokersÆ booths. Two major syndicates are shortly moving down from the ground floor in order to gain extra space. We are very grateful to the Director of the National Maritime Museum for the loan of the unique collection of photographs which is now displayed around the walls.

With regard to catering arrangements in our present building, there has been an increasing demand for the extended services introduced last spring in the Basement Restaurant. The number using the Carvery has steadily increased and now shows a growth of 30% over the last six months. The Wine Bar is usually filled to capacity at lunch time. It is not as well patronised as one would wish in the evenings but efforts are being made to promote its use.

The division of the CaptainsÆ Room at lunch-time into separate æClubroomÆ and æa la CarteÆ restaurants has proved to be very successful. The CaptainsÆ Room management, with the advice of an outside consultant, is now undertaking a detailed study of operating methods to ensure that appropriate services are being offered in the most effective way.

Work has now started to modernise the lifts throughout the 1958 Building. This is a long term project but a much needed improvement, and I realise the considerable inconvenience it is causing.

In times of staff cut-backs training is doubly important both from the employerÆs and employeeÆs point of view. LloydÆs Training Centre has responded by increased marketing of its courses and by running some shorter courses on particular topics of concern within the Market, notably Terms of Credit requirements.

On a less domestic note our co-operation with LloydÆs Register of Shipping, in providing shipping information services through the Data Centre in LloydÆs Avenue, has taken a further step forward. Both LloydÆs of London Press and LloydÆs Register have agreed to investigate in detail whether the sharing of selected resources would be in the interests of both organisations, particularly in terms of economies in information collecting and data processing.

British Telecom invited LloydÆs of London Press to take part in the international market trial of the Prestel View data service. The trial has met all of the criteria for success laid down and the services will go public from 1st July, 1981, when it will be only the third fully public Viewdata service in the world and the only one available on an international basis. The trial has given us valuable experience in the field of international electronic publishing and a market lead in the dissemination of shipping information via this medium.

I am glad to report that, following friendly discussions with the I.R.B. in the normal manner in which discussions of this nature take place between members of the London insurance market, an agreement in principle has been reached to dispose of the reinsurance dispute between Syndicate 762 and the I.R.B. A number of legal formalities still remain to be concluded and confirmations obtained before the settlement is final.

29 Jun 81

U.S. Business Insurance Magazine: Asbestos Insurers apply Exposure Rule

Even as they press their battles through the courts, U.S. insurance companies appear to be edging toward a consensus on how to pay for asbestos disease claims.

The exposure theory of liability for asbestos-related claims is gaining ground with some insurers since it was adopted ... in INA -v- 48 Insulations and two subsequent courts.

Conceding that the courts appear to prefer the exposure theory over the manifestation theory, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co and Travelers Insurance Co have both announced their intention to pay asbestos claims according to the exposure approach.

A senior claims executive at another insurance company told Business Insurance that INA had also recently adopted the exposure approach. But an INA spokesperson said the companyÆs current position is that manifestation is the appropriate way to handle cases.

æWhile the court decisions to date have held to the contrary, those court cases are not as yet final - they are all on appeal," said the spokesperson."

"We still believe the manifestation theory is correct, but we cannot ignore the fact that two U.S. circuit courts and a district court have all ruled in favour of exposure", explained John F. Shea, Jr., Aetna vice president and claims counsel."

23 Jun 81

The Times: Letter of 11 June 1981 to the Editor from H A P Fisher (Sir Henry Fisher) - LloydÆs Bill

Sir, The reasons which led to a substantial majority of the Fisher working party to recommend that LloydÆs brokers should be required to divest themselves of the owner-ship of managing agencies (Business News letter, June 1) are set out in chapter 12 of the report. The same considerations do not apply to links between membersÆ agents and managing agents.

The possibility of action contrary to the interest of assureds (which was a powerful motive for our recommendations in chapter 12) does not arise. I believe that, if it became impossible for the same person, firm or company to act both as a managing agent and as, a membersÆ agent so that it was no longer possible for managing agents to have direct names, standards of underwriting would decline and LloydÆs would suffer. Names would be deprived of the freedom which they now enjoy (and which they may well consider to be in their best interests) to put their affairs in the hands of an agency which has its own syndicates.

Incidentally, it would become far more difficult to carry through the divestment by brokers of the ownership of managing agents.

1 Jul 81

An unlimited xs $8m run-off reinsurance placed for English & American, a Bowring Captive Insurance Company, to incept at 1 July 1981 covering the 1975 and prior years. Outhwaite wrote 100%.

1 Jul 81