1985

0 Jan 85

Rand Institute of Civil Justice Study: Asbestos in the Courts

(vii) Period of study late 1983 - early 1985.

(12) Asbestos suits characteristics quite unlike those of other product liability cases.

(21) Since 1982 new filings have declined in some jurisdictions remained high in others.

(24) by the mid-80s, the surge in filings begun in 1978 had ended ... yet the number of dispositions continues to fall behind the number of new filings.

(32) The asbestos crisis is far from ending: new filings projected to continue into the next century. In addition new types of asbestos personal injury and property damage cases will continue to be filed in uncertain numbers into the future. In addition to the traditional plaintiffs, new types of plaintiff and new types of injury (property damage).

(41) Cites 1983 Philadelphia Court which notes that litigating with these claimants is like gambling at a casino.

(114) Seriously injured litigants will be under-compensated, less seriously injured parties

overcompensated.

0 Jan 85

Ernst & Whinney INSIGHT No. 26. Environmental considerations.

When carrying out work on the environmental considerations input of the SRA work papers, members of staff may like to know that the Insurance Technical Section does maintain specific environmental files, relating to all areas of the industry. Accordingly, if you wish to avail yourself of this facility, please speak to a member of the section.... A paper, entitled Insurance Industry Scan 1984, has been prepared to summarise many of the more significant developments recorded on these files and will be circulated in early February.

85

The Committee of Management of Toplis & Harding Inc., a wholly owned principal subsidiary company of the Corporation of Lloyd's, which managed the asbestos computer database in the USA:-

Committee

Agency

M H Cockell (Chmn)

Willis Faber

R Ballantyne

Sedgwick Forbes

R D Hazell

Three Quays (Sedgwick Forbes)

G W Hutton

Hutton

J A W Moir

 

T O Pitron

Secretan

H A R Rokeby-Johnson

Sturge

C W Welch

Chairman of Lloyd's of London Press Inc. USA, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, Lutine Publications; Member of the Agency Committee, the Advisory Panel on Public Affairs, the Systems and Communications Policy Board.

G C King FCA (Secretary)

General Manager, Lloyd's Membership Dept

Jan 85

Mr Ian Winchester has resigned as Managing Director of Winchester Bowring Ltd. Mr Hugh Prior is appointed Managing Director of the company. Mr Winchester will remain a director of Winchester Bowring Ltd until he takes up his new appointment with Toplis & Harding Inc. in the United States early in 1985.

4 Jan 85

Pulbrook Underwriting Management Ltd acquired by Merrett Holdings Plc.

4 Jan 85

Meeting of Ernst & Whinney held at the City Office.

Present Holland, Bolger, Standish, Hill, Harris....

Nigel Holland stated that historically the reinsurance to close had been on a net basis. True and fair forces the syndicate to gross up their reinsurance to close between the premium element and the claims element. He cited Merretts as an example as having no pattern in their fourth and subsequent year run-off position, although the figures were not particularly large when compared to the reinsurance to close itself.

Michael Bolger stated that Lloyd's has a very low expense ratios and many syndicates will not go to the extra expense of having full risk written records in order to arrive at a "technical" premium accrual....

Stephen Hill was quite categoric when he said that if there were no records, then, the auditors should qualify their report.

Nigel Holland stated that Davison had felt that a mass of qualified opinions is harmful to Lloyds as a community. He believed that pocket books are being kept at the box, but that they are not related to the accounting records maintained....

Peter Standish and Michael Bolger discussed the problems relating to treaty and binding authority business....

Nigel Holland stated that historically by ignoring the premium accrual, an extra loading was given to the reinsurance to close.

7 Jan 85

GOODA ADDENDUM WRITTEN

7 Jan 85

A M Farrar, solicitor and Lloyd's Council Member, writes to a BPR Name stating, inter alia, "

Is not the likely chain of events that Sir Edward Singleton will report shortly to Lloyd's and that if, as you allege, the matters disclosed by that Report are on all fours with Fidentia, that Lloyd's will then consider disciplinary charges? If this happens, then there are really two possibilities; it is I suppose possible for Lloyd's to say that any charges will lie on the file whilst matters disclosed by Sir Edward Singleton's Report are fully disclosed to Names and an appropriate offer of compensation made, or, alternatively, the matters will proceed in the manner in which the Brooks and Dooley affair did

11 Jan 85

Keene Corp. -v- I.N.A. Judgement redefined.

The US Court of Appeals amended its judgment of the 19 November 1984 which upheld the decision reached by the District of Columbia.

Jan 85

Mr. Ayliffe of Merretts received a letter enclosing a recent article which stated that in the last three or four years, the number of claims filed by railroad workers alleging asbestos disease has far exceeded the total of such actions in the entire history of the American railroad industry.

Jan 85

The Government publishes its proposals contained in the White Paper, "Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A New Framework for Investor Protection".

22 Jan 85

Letter to C. J. Ayliffe enclosing recent articles from the Brief including (133B) Asbestos Litigation by R Motley:-

In the last three or four years, the number of claims filed by railroad workers alleging asbestos disease has far exceeded the total of such actions in the entire history of the American railroad industry. These claims reflect a growing awareness of the enormous toll exacted by the railroads' use of asbestos, particularly in the Steam Era.... Railroad have long been among the heaviest users of asbestos containing products in American industry.

24 Jan 85

PROPERTY DAMAGE - GENERAL LITIGATION

Recent filings by a variety of plaintiffs, including the State of Maryland, the City of Baltimore, the City of New York, several school districts, and various associations, highlight the potential for far-reaching and protracted litigation in the proper damage area.

The State of Maryland has filed suit against 40 manufacturers and distributors of asbestos, including PCC, seeking $500 million in compensatory damages to clean up asbestos in more than 3,000 public buildings in the state, including schools, prisons, dormitories, hospitals and offices. The State's complaint alleges that it has had to spend millions of dollars to inspect, identify, test, analyse, remove encapsulate, decontaminate or enclose asbestos or asbestos-containing products in public buildings and facilities. The State also requests an injunction requiring the companies to perform all "necessary asbestos abatement remedial actions" and to pay for the cost of the suit.

A similar suit has been filed by the City of Baltimore seeking some S225 million from 55 defendants for asbestos abatement costs in public buildings ranging from schools and office buildings to prisons. The City has also charged the companies with fraud for allegedly making false statements about the safety of asbestos and with conspiracy "to deprive the public, and particularly the users, of medical and scientific data" linking asbestos to lung disease and cancer. This action is in the early stages of litigation.

In November 1984, the City of New York and The Board of Education through the office of the Corporation Counsel and the firm of Kriendler & Kriendler, filed an action against more than 60 manufacturers seeking S250 million in order to recover the cost of asbestos removal and containment. The action was filed in the Supreme Court, New York County, and alleges causes of action based upon restitution, nuisance, negligence, fraud and misrepresentation, strict liability, implied and express warranties, and conspiracy. In addition the complaint seeks punitive damages in an unspecified amount

The number of filings by school districts continues to increase, with more than 70 property damage actions now having been commenced nation-wide. PCC has been named as a defendant in 20 school district actions to date, including the national class action pending in Philadelphia. Developments in the Philadelphia national class action are set forth separately hereinafter.

In Michigan, a class action has been filed in Ingham County Circuit Court by eight public school districts against 65 defendants requesting class certification for all Michigan school districts to recover the costs of asbestos abatement and removal therein. The complaint also requests the establishment of an indemnity fund of at least $1 million per school district for any personal injury claims that may be brought against the school districts and punitive damages of S1 million per district.

A similar class action was filed in October in Wayne County Court, Michigan, by the Detroit and Flint School Districts on behalf of all other school districts in the State. That action also remains pending.

In Ohio, a motion is pending before the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court requesting certification of a state-wide class action for school property damage suits. That class complaint is on behalf of 54 private and parochial school districts against some 60 defendants.

Other recent school district filings include actions by The University System of New Hampshire in the Federal Court, New Hampshire, wherein plaintiff seeks $5 million in compensatory damages in addition to unspecified punitive damages, and the Selah School District in Yakima, Washington, wherein plaintiff demands $200,000 compensatory damages and unspecified punitive damages involving the installation of asbestos acoustical plaster.

Various associations are also now starting to take action to protect their members allegedly affected by exposure to asbestos products in public buildings. The New Jersey Education Association has filed a class action suit in Mercer County Superior Court, New Jersey, against 157 school-boards and 125 unnamed asbestos manufacturers, suppliers and contractors seeking to recover the cost of medical check-ups for teachers and other school employees exposed to asbestos, alleging that the defendants have permitted the continued presence of asbestos in school buildings even though they knew this presented a substantial risk of harm to them. Meanwhile, in Washington, D.C., the Service employees International Union representing 100,000 school workers, filed a suit in Federal Court against the Environmental Protection Agency for its failure to promulgate effective rules to deal with the problem of asbestos in public and private schools.

PCC continues to view its property damage exposure as not significant due to the fact that its only asbestos product, Unibestos, was a high temperature product principally used in oil refineries and nuclear submarines rather than schools and public buildings. Notwithstanding this fact, the assured is being named in a greater percentage of the more recent property damage filings as plaintiffs' attorneys attempt to include large corporate defendants perceived as having a "deep pocket." These defendants must then participate in costly litigation until evidence produced through discovery confirms that their product was not involved, at which time dismissals are negotiated with plaintiffs' attorneys or sought bad motion. PCC has attempted to obtain voluntary dismissals prior to discovery on the proviso that it could be brought back into the suit if discovery shows that Unibestos was involved, however, thus far plaintiffs' attorneys have not been receptive.

31 Jan 85

Mr. Floyd Knowlton of the Travelers Insurance Company, Inc. is recorded as stating in Mrs. Rowe's (claims manager at the R J Kiln Agency) contemporary record of a conversation with Mr. Knowlton on 31 January 1985:-

"Knowlton said the asbestos B.I. problem may be more or less under control, but he feels the P.D. will be at least as large - and may in turn spark more B.I. claims..."

Feb 85

The Johns-Manville settlement was reached by Manville Corporation, the parent Company of Johns-Manville, for $111.8m with three excess insurers, which increased the insurance cover of Manville Corp. to $426m, with a consequence increase in the quantum of asbestos-related claims falling upon insurers.

85

In early 1985, The Investigations Committee of Lloyd's appointed Mr D R P Baker FCA, a partner in Touche Ross & Co, to act jointly with Sir Edward Singleton on the Committee of Enquiry into Bellew, Parry & Raven.

18 Feb 85

Letter from Toplis and Harding (Asbestos Services) Limited to insurers at interest, signed inter alia, by C. J. Ayliffe of Merrett Syndicates Limited.

(The steady increase in the number of advices being received in the Market from insureds who have potential problems relating to environmental pollution emphasises the need to establish inter market co-ordination... Bearing in mind that the Market is presently involved in excess of 300 sites which constitute problem areas, it is essential that a system be put into place which can provide an index open to all London participants which records the name of Insured, site designation and the name of the Counsel acting on that account. At the present time the Environmental Protection Agency of the U.S. Government have designated some 783 dump sites as locations subject to special investigation. Quite apart from the damage to persons and property that may arise beyond the area of the site, it has been estimated that the average cost of clean up at any one site will amount to $6.5M... Legislation, such as the Compensation Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act has provided that liability for the cost of clean up will be imposed on a joint and several basis with the dump site owner and major dumpers being the initial target of the Government. In a number of instances there can be in excess of one hundred dumpers and transporters of industrial waste involved at one dump site. Control will need to be exercised to ensure that the legal profession does not precipitate mass litigation under contribution theories. Recent budgetary increases granted by the Federal authorities to the Environmental Protection Agency will permit them steadily to increase the site designations in which they are actively involved. This general background leads the Claims Group to conclude that it is essential that the Market addresses the implications without delay).

The steady increase in the number of advices being received in the Market from Insureds who have potential problems relating to environmental pollution emphasises the need establish inter-market co-ordination... Unfortunately, as has been experienced in claims arising from asbestos related injuries, matters involving alleged pollution often extend over many decades, with London placings for individual insureds being handled by various brokers and being subscribed by different markets... It is inevitable that environmental pollution will produce many coverage issues for insurers, and if the present indications from the United States can be taken as a guide the London market is likely to become involved in coverage litigation ... The co-ordinated effort that is required in order to address the issues that arise can and must start within the Market. In an effort to explore how this can be achieved, an inter Market group of Claims Managers, whose names we detailed below have been meeting to exchange views.... The purpose of this letter is to give you some insight into the problems that exist and the future developments that are foreseeable, more importantly the manner in which the problems should be addressed within the Market. It must be emphasised that it is not proposed that the active handling and decision making process be removed from the participating Market, but more towards liaison with the Group whose prime task will be to monitor all matters in the general interests of the entire Market. To succeed in this endeavour it is essential that general support is demonstrated, and to determine if this is forthcoming it would be helpful if you could complete the attached letter and return without delay to ..., Toplis & Harding (Asbestos Services) Ltd., Greenly House, 40 Dukes Place, London. EC3.

Feb 85

An address was delivered to the Chartered Insurance Institute entitled, Insolvencies: A fear or a favour.

22 Feb 85

Ernst & Whinney note from N F Holland to C Watt.

We maintain that a syndicate is a joint venture of one year's duration. Assuming the account is then reinsured, that year ceases. Reinsurance to close, therefore, is not just a matter of what is known at the time but takes into account what is likely to creep out of the woodwork at a later date in order to preserve equity between the closing year and the reinsuring year. A company is an on-going entity and, therefore, any shortfall in the funds one year can be made good in a later year without in any way affecting the entity as such. I accept that an unduly good or bad result may affect the price of shares which , of course, is pertinent for those buying and selling, but I do not believe that it follows that what is good for the companies is necessarily good for Lloyd's.

25 Feb 85

R A G Jackson attended a meeting with Senior Executive Officers of the Aetna, Hartford, Liberty Mutual, I.N.A. and Continental, which was held in New York on Monday, 25th February to discuss the latest developments of the formation of the Asbestos Claims Facility and consider the next stage to be addressed at an executive level .

25 Feb 85

The Chairman of Lloyd's, Peter Miller, writes to a working Name and syndicate Underwriter stating inter alia

"Thank you for your two letters. As to the first one concerning the number of FCII's in Lloyd's, I can only reflect that Lloyd's underwriters, by the large, appear to make much better profits than their company colleagues! Frivolity apart, the lack of technical qualification is deplorable and the numbers I agree, are surprisingly low".

26 Feb 85

Letter from Peter Miller addressed to Dear Senior Partner/Chairman

I refer to the letter of 12th October last, in which deputy chairman, Mr. Murray Lawrence, advised you of the membership requirements which would apply for new members who commenced underwriting from 1st January 1986 and to existing members who changed their underwriting arrangements after 1st January 1985.

27 Feb 85

The Wellington Resolution Group gives the ‘Green Light' to the Asbestos Claims Facility. This was an Insurance Market initiative to resolve the asbestos problem without Government interference, legislation and an imposed solution..

28 Feb 85

The Chancellor of the Exchequer has decided to take action to counter the practice known as "Bond Washing". The new rules will apply on and after 28 February 1986 when the scheme comes into effect.

0 Mar 85

Cornell University researchers have concluded in a recent study on the adequacy of workers compensation payments to the survivors of men who died from workplace exposure to asbestos, that "the compensation is neither adequate nor equitably distributed."

The study, one of the first on compensation for occupational-related illnesses and diseases, focused on benefits payments in 1979 to 249 widows, whose husbands would have been living that year had they not died from asbestos exposure. It was found that workers compensation payments replaced only 36.2% of the losses of widows for whom it was the only source of income. The figures are far below the normal standard that workers compensation benefits should equal, approximately 66% of the workers wages before his death.

Additionally, the study showed that widows who succeeded in common law actions received the most adequate compensation, but it also showed that tort awards were inadequate for some widows and that, furthermore, some of these awards would be exhausted within one year.

0 Mar 85

EPA FINDS 20% OF NON-SCHOOL BUILDINGS CONTAIN ASBESTOS

A recent survey released by the EPA indicates that 20% of commercial, federal and residential apartment buildings in the United States may contain friable asbestos. The survey was conducted on 231 buildings to determine how much friable asbestos-containing material might be in buildings other than schools. The 20% figure translates into approximately 733,000 commercial, federal and residential apartment buildings with friable asbestos.

The report noted that only 38 of the surveyed buildings had asbestos-containing ceiling tiles. The report also noted, however, that buildings constructed in the 1960's were found to be 15% more likely to have asbestos-containing sprayed or troweled-on friable material than other buildings.

The report went on to say, "It appears that the extensive use of asbestos-containing sprayed-on friable material would have continued and perhaps increased in the 1970's had not the EPA banned the use of those materials for all but decorative purposes in 1973." The EPA banned all other uses of these materials in 1978.

0 Mar 85

In March, the Chairman, Peter Miller, visited Brussels accompanied by the Deputy Chairman, Mr David Coleridge. Meetings were held with Lord Cockfield, Vice President of the EEC and other senior officials of the Community.

1 Mar 85

Mendes & Mount letter to R A G Jackson, Chairman, Asbestos Working Party, C/- Merrett Syndicates Ltd. Re: Report on the Asbestos Working Party activities during the past twelve months:

As attorneys servicing the interests of the London Market in various asbestos related matters, we submit the following report to Underwriters and Companies, highlighting the events of significance which have received the attention of the Working Party during the past twelve months.

1. Asbestos Claims Facility:

As the market is aware, negotiations aimed at the establishment of the Asbestos Claims Facility have become somewhat protracted. We understand that the Chairman of the Asbestos Working Party has at frequent intervals provided advice to the Market on how matters had been developing, and bearing in mind the importance which is attached to the success of this venture, we feel that it would be beneficial to provide the Market with a broader review of the background to the discussions that have taken place; the problem that presently exist in establishing the Facility; and finally the consequences to the London Market that could arise in the event that the Facility fails to get underway.

  1. Past Developments:

The concept of the Asbestos Claims Facility was two-fold: Firstly, it was recognised by industry leaders that there was a pressing need to arrive at a negotiated solution with Producers of various coverage issues which continue to persist under numerous declaratory judgment actions.

Secondly, which is much more material in addressing the problems which exist domestically was the need to establish a claim handling capability to provide asbestos claimants fair and equitable compensation as an alternative to resorting to the civil tort system.

The backlog of suits in the various jurisdictions, Federal and State, were a source of increasing concern, because it was unreasonably delaying the time before which the claimants could have their suits addressed by the court. It was the unacceptable delay in the ability of the tort system to provide compensation to meritorious claimants which was progressively attracting more attention from the Federal Government.

The negotiations to bring about agreement in regard to both coverage issues and claims handling commenced in October, 1982, by a small representative group of Insurers and Producers. As the Market is aware, two London Market representatives have served on that Resolution Group, which over the past two years, met on no less than 32 occasions, involving 58 days of intense and difficult negotiations.

It is interesting to record that the role of the leading negotiator on behalf of the insurance group was assumed by Ray Stahl of the Travelers Insurance Company, who diligently pursued solutions to various problems using innovative ideas in order to bring about agreement. Although the proposals that evolved recognised the Keene interpretation of coverage, their effect was nevertheless to bring about a controlled application of Keene by applying indemnity over a block of coverage. In addition, it was through Ray Stahl's persistence that ultimately agreement was reached in regard to the establishment of a defence funding mechanism! in connection with policies issued on the pre l966 C.G.L. wordings.

By May 1984, agreement had been reached on all issues within the Resolution Group and the "Agreement Concerning Asbestos Related Claims" was released throughout the Insurance Industry and to all the commercial concerns who had any involvement in the asbestos problem in the U.S. Thereafter, both groups undertook to educate their individual constituencies with a view to obtaining provisional commitments to the Facility concept. Unfortunately development of the necessary support has proven to be a slow process, for with respect to the Insurance Industry a number of issues continue to be raised by direct writers who, among other matters, were concerned at the negative attitude being indicated by the reinsurance market. A further difficulty arose in June 1984, when the Travelers announced that certain aspects of the Agreement relating to the resolution of coverage matters were not in keeping with that company's approach, and, therefore, indicated that it was unlikely that the Travelers would become a provisional subscriber. By December 1984, provisional commitment had been received from the following insurers:-

 

Direct Insurers

1.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co.;

2.

American Universal;

3.

Argonaut Insurance Co.;

4.

Bituminous Casualty Corp.;

5.

Continental Insurance Co.;

6.

Crum & Forster;

7.

Employers of Wausau;

8.

Fireman's Fund

9.

First State Insurance Co.;

10.

Harbor Insurance Co.;

11.

Hartford Insurance Group;

12.

Highlands Insurance Group;

13.

I.N.A.;

14.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.;

15.

Underwriters for Lloyds of London;

16.

Reliance Insurance Co.;

17.

Royal Insurance Co.;

18.

The St. Paul Cos., Inc.;

19.

U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co.;

20.

Zurich Insurance Co.;

However, in order for the Facility to be truly viable, it remains the view of the Resolution Group that subscription from the following companies was highly desirable:-

1.

A.I.G.

2.

American Mutual

3.

Chubb

4.

C.N.A.

5.

Commercial Union

6.

Home

7.

Kemper

8.

Northbrook

9.

Midland

10.

Travelers

Although negotiations aimed at this objective have been underway for some time, to date provisional commitments have not been obtained. The immediate problem that this poses for the Facility Agreement is that within the provisions relating to the broad band of coverage, gaps could be created by the non-participation of certain carriers. This factor was recognised within the Agreement, which essentially provides that provided the gaps are small, the participating Insurers will on a temporary basis assume those additional obligations, subject to the Assured pursuing the non- subscribing Insurer through the courts.

Regrettably, as matters stand at present, the absence of participation by the majority of the companies listed above could create gaps of considerable size so as to make the position unacceptable in regard to certain accounts. Indeed, it may ultimately develop that non-subscribing carriers would feel compelled to make some payment to their Insured in such a situation, which could have the effect of reducing the gap to a more manageable proportion for participating Insurers to assume on a temporary basis.

The delays that have arisen have proven counter-productive to the interests of both Insurers and Producers, to the extent that certain coverage issues for which the Facility proposed solutions are with the passage of time now being addressed by the courts. While in most cases these are at a lower court level, it is inevitable that any decision rendered after the terms of the Agreement were concluded will detract support from either the Producer or Insurer element. Despite this fact, it must be recorded that Producers have been highly successful in obtaining support from their industry, and to date have received provisional commitments from no less than 31 companies involved in mining, producing or in some way handling asbestos products. The only major Producer yet to make a commitment is GAF. However, negotiations continue, and it is hoped that their support will ultimately be forthcoming.

B. Future Implications:

With the Co-ordinated Action in California due to start in March, 1985, .it has been decided that in the short time available one final effort should be made to enlist support of at least some of those major Insurers who have yet to make a commitment to the Facility. Negotiations along these lines are now being conducted at a Chief Executive officer level through the Aetna, Hartford, Continental, INA, Liberty Mutual and London interests. It has generally been accepted ; by its supporters that the Asbestos Claims Facility is the only viable way in which to control the developing asbestos problems which rage in the States, and there is Federal Government support for that conclusion. It is equally apparent that in the event through lack of support the Insurance Industry fails to achieve success in resolving the issues, the pressure that will be brought to bear upon the Federal authorities from uncompensated claimants will be such that ultimately there will be a Government imposed solution.

There is no question that in the event this were to happen, the effect on the Insurance Industry would be dramatic, and far less palatable than the regulated handling provided for within the Facility Agreement. In the event that the Facility concept were ultimately to collapse, it is important that Underwriters do appreciate the serious problems that would arise in the London Market in endeavouring to handle some 30,000 outstanding claims which, from past experience, will increase by some 5,000 new suits each year.

The conflict issues that would face your various Counsel would no longer be capable of being kept low key, and this fact, coupled with the dramatic increase that would arise in expense incurred on handling accounts, would undoubtedly be far in excess of anything the Market has currently experienced. This fact, coupled with the inevitable increase in coverage litigations would prove extremely burdensome to the Market.

During the course of the past year there have developed new issues in regard to damage to property allegedly caused by asbestos containing materials, which create unique coverage issues which have yet to be addressed. If the solution proposed in respect of bodily injury claims under the Facility Agreement receive the support they deserve, the Facility must be the best forum through which to address resolutions of coverage in regard to Property Damage. This would undoubtedly be a more satisfactory way in which to deal with this particular problem than permitting the courts to adjudicate on the matter, which would only serve to create additional dilemmas by reason of the conflicting rulings that could arise.

II. Johns-Manville

As the Market is aware, following the collection of the estimated then present value of the Settlement agreed with the Insured the funds were invested with Citibank through Lord, Day & Lord. The return being achieved, together with the capital gain which will arise, will be adequate to meet the sum specified in the Settlement Agreement at 31st December 1985, or thereafter. We understand that participants have recently received tax advice from U.S. and UK advisors, which sets out the tax implications that arise for Lloyd's and companies.

The terms of settlement arrived at between Travelers, Home & London continue to attract the criticism of the Plaintiff and Creditors Committee, who argue that the liabilities of settling Insurers was in excess of the $315M accepted by Johns-Manville. As a result of the opposition that developed, Judge Lifland has ordered a Fairness Hearing at which the issues can be adjudicated. Originally the Hearing was set for early December 1984, but due to continued discussions between Johns-Manville and other excess insurers, the court continued the hearing to 22 February 1985, although further extension are a distinct likelihood. Irrespective of the ruling handed down by Judge Lifland, the matter will be appealed.

Johns-Manville has expended considerable effort over the past three months to reach agreement with other carriers for either a cash buy out of coverage limits or an understanding on the manner coverage will be applied. It is clearly their hope that by the time the Fairness Hearing takes place they will have substantially increased the amount of the settlement fund, which could have the effect of deflating the plaintiffs' objections.

Considerable court activity is anticipated before the Insured's Plan of Reorganisation has final judicial approval, and there is little doubt that, with the authority of the Bankruptcy Court still subject to question, appeals will be filed, perhaps all the way to the U S. Supreme Court. Some sources have expressed the view that if the Settlement Fund is approved there is a possibility that Judge Lifland will make a partial order to permit Johns-Manville to address the substantial number of claims that have remained pending since the Chapter 11 petition was filed on August 26, 1982.

As was indicated in our Year End reserve recommendation report, it is necessary that participants recognise that on certain layers of London coverage liabilities will continue to accrue, and this situation will persist until there is a binding decision from the Court.

In accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Johns-Manville has dismissed London participants from the California Co-ordinated Action on a without-prejudice basis. Effectively, the Insured is at liberty to refile coverage litigation, should the settlement ultimately be rejected by the Court. However, participants should be aware that as a result of the filing of cross-complaints in the Co-ordinated Action by certain company defendants, declaratory judgment counsel continue to be involved in matters relating to Johns-Manville, albeit on a more restricted role than was formerly the case. Whilst this will inevitably involve participants in additional defence costs, the terms of the Settlement Agreement require Johns-Manville to indemnify Insurers in respect of any compensatory award that may arise.

Reinsurance

During the last year the anticipated increase in re- insurance involvement has developed, as is demonstrated the volume of reports now monitored by the Re-insurance Claims Committee [see Toplis and Harding (Asbestos Services) Limited]. It is reasonable to expect this trend to continue as the overall cost of the asbestos problem increases and more cedants' potential exposure exceeds underlying retentions. In addition, it is inevitable that the Market will develop a further up-surge in retrocessional involvements.

All year end reserve reports are reviewed by the Reinsurance Claims Committee to ensure that the reserve recommendations are in keeping with factual information emanating from the original account. Due to the increased volume of reports being processed, the membership of the Reinsurance Claims Committee has been broadened to include Peter Dodds, John Heath and Jim Teff. The prime objective of the Committee is to ensure that reports which contain year end reserve recommendations are circulated with a minimum of delay. Narrative reports on each account will thereafter be prepared by reporting Counsel setting out in more detail the present posture of each matter and outlining the manner in which the reserve recommendations were established. Due to pressures involved it was not possible to produce a narrative report on every account during 1984, but Counsel have been asked to correct this situation for the current year.

One problem which is tending to recur at more frequent intervals is the difficulty of tracing Market participants on early years of involvement. The Reinsurance Committee is depending upon information held by the broker, which can be incomplete at times. In such instances the Market has been asked to review their records to assist in identifying participants.

During the ensuing year, 1985, it is intended to develop subscriber information on layers of reinsurance over those levels presently impacted by reserves. Once this information is available, the Claims Committee will circulate advice to upper levels of coverage once reserves attain 80% of underlying limits.

L.U.N.C.O. will shortly be advising that, with the exception of LMX business, there will be no change in the manner in which reserves are recorded for this year end. The most up-to-date figures available for year end closing are those provided by Toplis Harding (Asbestos Services) Ltd., and that office should be given full credit for the service that they have afforded to the market.

Asbestos declaratory judgement actions:

During 1984, deposition testimony of a number of London Market Underwriters and claim staff was taken in connection with the California Co-ordinated Declaratory Judgment Action. Although the possibility still exists that this litigation could be concluded by settlement prior to the 5th March 1985 trial date, especially if the Asbestos Claims Facility secures the critical mass necessary to a viable organisation, the closer that date comes the more certain it is that the first phase of the litigation relating to the existence of policies will commence.

While the litigation instituted by Celotex Corporation against its insurers in Tampa, Florida, has not proceeded through pre-trial discovery, an interpleader action was filed on behalf of the London Market seeking a declaration as to whether the benefits of the London policies belong to Celotex Corporation or Rapid American. Significant developments are anticipated in the interpleader action, although the Declaratory Judgment Action has not proceeded to any extent, partially due to the insured having settled with some of its other Insurers.

Decisions of significance in coverage actions during 1984 include: Keene Corporation -v- I.N.A., where Keene's motion for punitive damages against the I.N.A. for refusal to defend was dismissed on a Summary Judgment Motion by the trial Judge, June Green. Judge Green determined that Pennsylvania law controlled since I.N.A.'s decision with respect to defence was made at its home office in Philadelphia, Pa. Under Pennsylvania law it is against public policy to allow recovery of Punitive Damages against an Insurance carrier. Keene had also sought punitive damages against its other primary insurers, Aetna and Liberty Mutual, but since the respective laws of the states of incorporation, Connecticut and Massachusetts had not been brief and argued, the judge reserved decision.

In a later decision in the same case, Judge Green denied Keene's motion for partial Summary Judgment seeking a determination that I.N.A. was required to continue defending Keene subsequent to the exhaustion of I.N.A.'s Aggregate Limits for products bodily injury. The judge found the I.N.A. policy wording to be unambiguous and that under the plain meaning of that wording I.N.A.'s defence obligations ceased with the exhaustion of the policies' Aggregate Limits.

In a more recent decision in the case of Owens Illinois -v- Aetna Casualty and Surety, Judge Hogan endorsed the Keene "triple trigger" finding and also held that the decision by Owens Illinois to manufacture and sell the asbestos product, "Kaylo" should be regarded as a single occurrence with the result of only one deductible would apply.

Asbestos Property Damage Actions:

As anticipated, in 1984 there was a continuing increase in the number of property damage actions filed against the producers of asbestos products. The most significant of which were those filed on behalf of various Districts. These include the actions instituted in Ohio, Alabama, New York, Michigan and Maryland. As an illustration. in the Maryland action brought on behalf of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore the Plaintiffs seek actual damages of $225,000,000 and in addition seek an unspecified amount of punitive damages and costs.

When the new school year commenced in September, much adverse publicity was generated by the fact that a number of School Districts had failed to comply with the requirements of the Environmental Protection Agency, regarding testing and removal of friable asbestos.

Following public debate, the U.S. Congress was persuaded to pass the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984 whereby the Environmental Protection Agency was granted a total of $600,000,000 to be used for loans and grants to schools for the abatement of the asbestos problem. Significantly The Act preserves claims for damages against manufacturers and producers.

Letters of Credit/Funding

In the year end 1983 Market report strong emphasis was placed upon the need for timely collection of funds from the Market, in order to satisfy both servicing and data bank commitments, and more importantly to provide indemnity to direct Insureds. At that time it was hoped that through the gradual adoption of Letters of Credit the situation would effectively be improved, which would enable us to satisfy the loan account that we were compelled to establish in order to meet data bank and servicing requirements. Unfortunately, the improvement took far longer than had been expected consequently it was not until December, 1984, that sufficient funds were in hand to enable us to reduce the loan to a manageable level.

The reasons that have contributed to these delays are two-fold:

Firstly, the refusal by certain company participants to grant Letters of Credit has imposed an administrative burden on brokers who have been forced to process collections in the traditional manner to satisfy each cash call made during the period. To a great extent this problem has been alleviated as more companies have become participants in the Letters of Credit Scheme. However, we must again emphasise that the efficiency of a Market funding mechanism based on Letters of Credit is geared to total acceptance by participants, and we, therefore, again implore these companies who have yet to give a commitment to reassess their position so as to avoid any criticism that could well develop if funding delays continue. More importantly we are fearful that some producers might not be quite so indulgent which conceivably could precipitate actions for bad faith and/or extra contractual damages against the entire Market.

Secondly, the period of time which has elapsed between dispatch of a draw down request and the receipt of the requisite authority to proceed. We shall shortly be again contacting all brokers involved in Letter of Credit funding to re-emphasise the need for prompt handling. It is our understanding that only the agreement of the Leading Underwriter is required for a draw down, and we would ask that those involved leads provide priority handling to these matters. It is essential that the Market recognise that its performance is going to come under increasing scrutiny as more Insureds become dependent upon this Market for indemnity. In addressing this need, we are firmly of the view that it is essential that the Market develop the ability to respond to funding requests in a maximum time frame of 30 days. Performance at that level will enable us to eliminate the present line of Credit which we had to establish in order to respond to contractual obligations of the C.I.S. and other servicing needs. Of greater importance will be the Market's ability to address the cash problems confronting its Insureds whose financial viability could well be dependent on prompt indemnification.

These factors have been under constant consideration by the Claims Committee, who now recommend that we modify the basis of the projections on which Letters of Credit are currently predicated from a one-year projection to two years. Significantly, this will ensure that credit is always available on which to make drawings, and reduce to an extent the administrative effort for the Market. It is intended that future needs will be based upon a two-year projection which will be adjusted at one year intervals to respond to changing circumstances. One such changed circumstance could be the establishment of the Asbestos Claim Facility. The Facility would require funding promptly and at frequent intervals from the entire Insurance Industry. New Letters of Credit reflecting the new two-year projection are currently in preparation, and will be circulated shortly.

As indicated elsewhere in this report, C.I.S. expenses are subject to constant review, and we are pleased to advise that the projections for 1985 will again show a reduction from the preceding year. Now that the Reinsurance Market is deriving greater benefits from the C.I.S., the Reinsurance Claims Committee have agreed to recommend that an annual charge of $2,000 per original account be made. This is, we consider, an equitable way in which to allocate expenses throughout the Market in keeping with benefits being received.

Reserves:

The Market should be aware that per Claimant reserves on each account continue to be reviewed annually by the Claims Committee together with reporting counsel. Indemnity reserves are adjusted to reflect the historical level of settlements for each account to which is then added a percentage loading - normally 20% - to provide for future inflationary trends. In addition, a defence expense allowance is calculated on each account in order to recognise that upon exhaustion of the primary aggregates, the obligation to indemnify for these defence costs will pass to the excess carrier.

It must again be re-affirmed that reserves recommended by your servicing counsel are based on filed claims outstanding for each assured, and no attempt has been made to project an IBNR factor in respect of claims yet to be filed.

This year end there was some recognition of the potential for Property Damage Liability in cognisance of the increasing number of School District claims filed although the issues of liability and date of loss remain unresolved.

Any increase in property damage reserves in the future will depend upon the results of court cases pending in various jurisdictions during the ensuring year, and/or attempts to resolve disputes by negotiation.

Databank:

As has been reported previously, the London Claims Information System (C.I.S.) has proven to be the most flexible system yet devised to monitor Asbestos claims. For some time work has been proceeding on the Claims Facility database with input from Alexander Grant as representative of London's interests. It has now been recognised by both Insurers and Producers that London's system is the only one possible for creating the foundation for the Facility database and, therefore, London will have a much greater say as to the ultimate design of the system. Members of the Claims Committee continue to meet with Alexander Grant to evaluate current requirements and methods in a constant endeavour to reduce costs. Towards this end London now owns the software relating to the Asbestos Databank which, including the Purchase, will result in a reduction of costs for 1985 and produce even greater benefits in the long term. This software package also gives Underwriters the ability to create a database for other requirements as will no doubt arise in the future at a greatly reduced cost and with an improved efficiency.

Toplis & Harding (Asbestos Services) Ltd

This office has now been in operation for just over a year, and the volume of work, for both Direct Accounts and Reinsurance, has increased dramatically.

The number of Direct reports containing reserve recommendation remains in line with the previous year; however, some 145 Reinsurance reports were circulated, compared with 66 last year end.

In view of increasing litigation, this office has proven invaluable to the Market. During the course of 1984, the operation broadened its responsibilities to embrace the D.E.S. litigation and reporting. It is envisaged that during 1985 it will encompass other areas which cannot be fully serviced by the Broker. All such costs incurred are debited specifically to the accounts in question.

Working Party Authority

Last year in our Market Report dated 19th January 1984, reference was made to the need to create a company limited by guarantee, so that a proper asbestos General Authority could be obtained from the Market. Unfortunately, after a long delay, we are advised that the Companies Registry reports that exception had been taken to the proposed name of the company, "Asbestos Working Party Ltd.", since there is a Government body called the "Asbestos Working Party." The incorporation of the company is therefore proceeding under the name "Market Claims Services Limited." As soon as the company is incorporated, the Working Party will circulate a revised General Authority, and request that the Market assist by signing and returning the document as soon as possible after it is received.

Mendes & Mount and the Working Party

The past twelve months have again served to confirm the comments we expressed in our year end 1983 report, that the guidance, perception and efforts of members of the Working Party have not only immeasurably aided us, as well as other servicing counsel, in properly representing the diverse interests involved in the asbestos litigation, but more importantly have served the interests of the entire Market.

The clearest illustration of this is the extent to which a concept totally unheard of in the insurance industry - co-operation between insurers - in the form of an Asbestos Claims Facility has progressed to the degree it has. It cannot be gainsaid that had not the London Market, through its representatives, exhibited the support it did, the Facility concept would be languishing on a drawing board and not on the threshold of emergence as a viable Organization. It is only through imagination, foresight and old fashioned hard work that such creative thinking becomes reality.

We unquestionably look forward to continuing our efforts on behalf of the Market, as well as the continuing assistance, guidance and active participation of the Asbestos Working Party until these matters are completely resolved.

85

In America, by universal acclaim, insurance seems to have been constituted the general money tree. Just to take one example the New York Superintendent of Insurance, James P Corcoran, introduced an amendment which would prohibit insurance companies licensed in New York from requiring tests for AIDS, on the grounds that the proposed amendment would result in the denial of essential health insurance coverage to individuals. Insurance is looked on as a substitute for social welfare. The many obvious advantages this must have where politicians are concerned hardly needs to be emphasised.

4 Mar 85

Asbestos Working Party letter to Insurers at interest enclosing a copy of a draft press release that will be made to all trade journals and newspapers, including "Lloyds List". The Facility currently boasts 33 producers and 22 insurance companies that have conditionally signed the Agreement.

I enclose for your information Mendes & Mounts year end report reviewing matters involving the Asbestos Working Party during the course of 1984.

As you will observe, our main concern during the past year has been in relation to the Asbestos Claim Facility, and we have continued to work closely with certain U.S. Domestic Insurers in an effort to develop the support necessary to ensure that the Facility becomes operational.

As recounted in the attached report, negotiations have been somewhat protracted, but I wish to report that a sufficient measure of success has been achieved during the past months that it now appears that the Facility will go ahead.

I attended a meeting with Senior Executive Officers of the Aetna, Hartford, Liberty Mutual, I.N.A. and Continental, which was held in New York on Monday, 25th February to discuss the latest developments and consider the next stage to be addressed at an executive level.

The most significant development which has taken place in the past few days has been the provisional commitment of both the Home and C.N.A. to become Facility members. Both companies are significantly involved in the asbestos problem, and their participation is of considerable importance to the effectiveness of the Facility. Discussions will continue with other companies who have yet to make a decision, but indications are that the present Insurer commitments received are now adequate for the Facility to move forward. Obviously, for total effectiveness it would require support from the entire Insurance Industry, but we have now achieved enough support to enable U8 to proceed, whilst efforts continue to attract others to join.

You will appreciate that all Insurer commitments are subject to approval being obtained from their Reinsurers. To date certain professional Reinsurers in the U.S. Market have not been particularly positive in their reaction to the Facility, but plans are now in hand for a meeting of Senior Executives to take place within the next month to develop a more positive approach. My personal view is that it is unlikely that any direct writer will obtain the total support of all his Reinsurers, particularly in view of the extended periods affected by the asbestos problem. However, it will be up to each participant to determine whether they have sufficient indications of support to enable them to make the necessary binding commitment.

As an indication of where matters now stand, I am enclosing a copy of a draft press release that will be made to all trade journals and newspapers, including "Lloyd's List". As you will observe from the future activities outlined in the press statement, there remains much to be done to achieve a final closing date of 29th May. Several sub-committees are in existence, which are addressing such varied issues as staffing and terms of employment, transitional arrangements for claim files from each Insurer participant, funding and financial integrity of the Facility, office site selection, incorporation and computer design.

The two London representatives will continue to be actively involved in future meetings, and I have agreed to participate with Pete Thomas, Chief Executive of the Hartford; John Baldwin, Chief Executive of Pittsburgh Corning; and Harry Wellington, Dean of the Yale Law School in making a presentation before Senator Nicholls at the hearing set up by the Senate Labour Sub-Committee to consider the Facility agreement.

The proposed meeting with producers in April is of major importance, for it has as its objective agreement between Producers and Insurers of any specific coverage problems that have not been addressed within the terms of the Agreement, in order that matters remaining for the attention of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures can be kept to the minimum. It is important that you appreciate that at this negotiating session London representatives will be required to make certain decisions on your behalf on the manner coverages will apply within the Facility. Whilst it is not possible to foresee all the issues that could be raised, I trust that you will accept that our representatives are authorised to participate in the manner indicated and can assure you that wherever possible, there will be no departure from the basic principles on which the Facility Agreement was based.

Now that we have the Facility momentum underway, I would like to address the procedure I would advocate for the London Market sign-up. Directly the final minor amendments to the Facility Agreement have been agreed, the document will be reprinted. Once the final agreement is received in London I propose to distribute one copy to each Lloyd's syndicate, and two copies to each London company. As detailed in my letter dated 30th August, 1984, Lloyd's participants will be requested to return to me an authority to sign the final document on their behalf. If for any reason a Lloyd's participant wishes to sign a separate Agreement, the necessary arrangements can be made, provided I am given prior notice to this effect. So far as London companies are concerned, I will require one signed Agreement from each company, which on the present timetable must be returned to me no later than Wednesday, 15 May.

The operation of the Facility will raise two issues for the Market. Firstly, in addressing future year end reserve recommendations, it will be necessary for our U.S. Counsels only to consider an exposure concept in line with the Facility Rules. The liability share allocated to each Producer member will simplify calculations of reserves, which will in any event be affected by the reductions in defence costs that will arise.

Obviously, it will be necessary to continue to operate the London Databank for some time to come, but eventually it should be possible to scale down that operation, once we are satisfied that the Facility Databank will cater for our needs in London.

The second issue that needs early attention is a new authority for the Asbestos Working Party, which will enable prompt commitments to be made on behalf of the Market to the many administrative issues that have to be addressed in the Facility formation, and in the processing of claims. I expect to be writing to you shortly on this subject.

In conclusion, let me say that I am now more satisfied with the progress that has been achieved for my colleagues, and I on the Asbestos Working Party remain convinced that the Facility is the only answer to the problems which confront the Insurance Industry.

WELLINGTON RESOLUTION GROUP CEOs GIVE "GREEN LIGHT" TO ASBESTOS CLAIMS FACILITY; SET SCHEDULE TO CLOSE FINAL AGREEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C., 27 February 1985 - The Wellington Resolution Group announced today that the proposed Asbestos Claims Facility, a private sector solution to the massive number of asbestos-related injury suits clogging the nation's court system, has been given a "green light" and is expected to be established in May of this year.

The Facility is the result of over two years of highly complex and intense negotiations between producers and insurers involved in asbestos-related lawsuits and insurance coverage disputes.

A unanimous decision was made by the chief executive officers of the Wellington Resolution Group to proceed with a concrete schedule designed to achieve finalisation of the Facility.

"We are going forward with the Facility and we will proceed swiftly," said John Baldwin, president of Pittsburgh Corning and chairman of the Wellington Producers Group. "There is no question that this alternative to our court system will satisfy the interests of the parties involved, especially the injured workers," he added.

The Facility is designed to provide a faster, less costly, and equitable alternative to asbestos claims litigation. It will be available to those claimants involved in the more than 23,000 cases currently pending in state and federal courts, as well as the new suits that are being filed at the rate of about 500 per month.

John F. Shea, Jr., vice president and claim counsel of Aetna Life & Casualty and chairman of the Wellington Insurers Group, stated that "although we will actively continue to seek additional subscribers, the recent conditional sign-ups of Fireman's Fund, C.N.A. and Home Insurance companies has greatly enhanced our effort to move the proposal forward."

"We applaud the decisions of the CEOs of these companies to join us and hope that other insurers will soon follow," said Shea. The Facility currently boasts 33 producers and 22 insurance companies that have conditionally signed the Agreement.

Robin Jackson, chairman of the London Asbestos Working Party stated that he was very encouraged by the progress that is being made, and pledged the continuing support of the London insurance market to the objectives of the Wellington Group.

The Rand Corporation has estimated that producers and their insurers have spent approximately $1 billion in compensation and legal expenses in the last ten years. Injured workers, however, have received only 37 cents of every dollar.

"Providing fair and equitable compensation to injured workers does not require that hundreds of millions of dollars be wasted in legal expenses," said Dean Harry Wellington, Dean of Yale Law School and Chairman of the negotiations.

"The proposed Facility serves the national interest. It will ease the judicial morass that the suits have created in the tort system. It will allow the companies involved to manage their liability and pursue financial planning for the future, thereby making greater contributions to the nation's economy," Wellington continued.

Wellington praised the companies involved for their persistence and strong commitment to finding a fair solution to one of the nation's greatest occupational disease problems and noted that the Facility provides a precedent for settling massive numbers of suits in other segments of our society.

The Facility has received the support of many Members of Congress and Administration officials in recent months. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge said the efforts of the Wellington Resolution Group "are clear testimony to the ability of the private sector to resolve major problems that widely affect our society. It is significant that you have done so without requiring the intervention of Government."

The next few months will be marked by a number of significant dates leading to the proposed May culmination of the Agreement. They include:

March 12

Mandatory meeting of subscribing producers to assure completion of insurance coverage information essential for final closing of Agreement.

March 19

Senate Labor Subcommittee holds oversight hearings on Facility; Wellington subscribers testify.

March 29

Insurance coverage information provided by subscribing producers to subscribing insurers.

April 24 - 26

All subscribing insurers and producers meet to reconcile insurance coverage information agreeing on items for alternative dispute resolution.

May 10

Reconciled insurance schedules provided by subscribing producers to subscribing insurers.

May 22

Pre-closing meeting of all conditional subscribers.

May 29

Final closing, final signing, Washington, D.C.

During this time period the Facility will be incorporated and the Wellington Resolution Group will also complete its search for a chief executive officer as well as other personnel. The Facility will be headquartered in Boston with a claims office in San Francisco.

The Wellington Resolution Group is comprised of six major producer companies and six major insurance companies that have negotiated the Agreement to establish the Asbestos Claims Facility. (Kathryn Broderick refers to only 34 Producers and 16 insurers that formerly signed the Asbestos Claims Facility Agreement on 19 June 1985)

Mar 85

The Chairman of Lloyd's, Peter Miller, accompanied by the Deputy Chairman, David Coleridge, visited Brussels. Meetings were held with Lord Cockfield, Vice President of the EEC and other senior officials of the Community.

Mar 85

Victor B Levit, a partner in the San Francisco law firm, Barger & Wolen, and the legal editor of Underwriters' Reports, delivers a paper entitled "Toxic Perils and Products Liability: Current Insurance and Legal Developments" to the Under 30's Lloyd's Non-Marine Claims Committee.

Mar 85

The US Attorneys reports addressed to Underwriters at Interest advise that "there was some recognition of the potential for property damage liability in cognisance of the increasing number of school District claims filed although the issues of the liability and date of loss remain unresolved".

6 Mar 85

Letter from Wilson, Elser, Endelman & Dicker to

Asbestos Claims Facility

 

Page 1 missing

directors chosen from among the subscribing insurers and asbestos producers. The Facility would operate from two offices, one on the east coast and another on the west coast. Additional regional offices could be opened when and if the need arises.

The Asbestos Claims Council invited interested insurers and asbestos producers to conditionally subscribe to the Facility by 15 July 1984. Final subscription was originally scheduled for 13 September 1984, but was extended indefinitely to allow insurers additional time to consult with their reinsurers.

As proposed, the Facility has two major objectives. First, it will operate as a claims processing center to administer, evaluate, pay, settle and/or defend all asbestos-related bodily injury and disease claims brought against subscribing asbestos producers and their insurers. For the present, property damage claims would not be processed under the Facility.

Each asbestos claimant would be required to support his claim by submitting valid evidence, such as job, medical and compensation histories. Claimants would also be required to demonstrate that they suffer from a recognised asbestos-related condition and that they were exposed to a subscribing producer's asbestos products. The Facility would be empowered to settle on behalf of all subscribing asbestos producers. Punitive damages claims would, however, be disallowed. The Facility would also be empowered to toll the statute of limitations for claimants whose claims have not yet matured, thereby allowing such claimants to resubmit their claims when additional medical evidence becomes available.

One last point should be emphasise. Participation in the Asbestos Claims Facility is purely voluntary. Present and future asbestos claimants may choose to forego the Facility's alternative dispute mechanism, and sue the asbestos producers in court, thereby preserving their right to a jury trial.

The Facility's second major objective is to resolve coverage disputes between asbestos producers and their insurers by providing asbestos producers and their insurers with a cheaper, faster and more efficient way of disposing of those claims. Under the proposed Facility, asbestos producers would be afforded "comprehensive coverage". Each producer would be permitted to select a "coverage block" consisting of some or all of its insurance policies issued before 1 January 1973. 1 January 1973 is the pivotal date, since after that date, insurance policies written for asbestos producers either contained high per-claim deductibles and self-insured retentions or excluded coverage for asbestos-related disease liability altogether.

As claims come into the Facility, each producer would be assigned a predetermined percentage of liability for each claim and its liability would be allocated among all the insurers in its "coverage block". An asbestos producer's percentage of liability would be determined by a complicated formula which takes into consideration the number of claims that have been filed against the producer as well as any amounts that the producer may have paid out on those claims.

For example, if a subscribing asbestos producer's percentage of liability is found to be 10% and the claim is settled for $50,000, the producer's $5,000 liability would be distributed among all of the insurance policies in effect during its coverage block. Thus, if a company had a twenty-five year coverage block, which included twenty-five insurers, each insurer would pay 1/25 of $5,000, or $200.

Under this coverage approach, an asbestos producer does not have to pay any of its own money until all of the insurance in its coverage block is exhausted. Thus, even if the primary and excess policies in a particular year are exhausted, the producer would not have to participate in affording coverage; rather, coverage for the exhausted policy year would be divided among the remaining insurers in the coverage block.

An asbestos producer may still include post-1973 policies in its coverage block, assuming, of course, that such policies do not exclude liability for asbestos-related diseases, but in that case, the asbestos producer would be required to pay its proportionate share of any per-claim deductible or self-insured retention. For example, if a subscribing asbestos producer is found liable for 1/25 of a claims payment, the subscribing asbestos producer would pay 1/25 of the deductible obligation toward it.

Unlike the "triple trigger" theory of coverage first enunciated in the Keene case, which would allow an insured to select a particular policy that would apply, and then force the selected insurer to seek contribution from the other insurers, the Facility's comprehensive coverage approach eliminates the need for contribution actions because all years of coverage in the coverage block are triggered, and thus each insurer is required to pay its proportionate share.

The proposed agreement would also prohibit subscribing asbestos producers from cross-claiming against each other, and would require all subscribing producers to terminate their declaratory judgment actions against their insurers and waive their bad faith and punitive damages claims as well. This last aspect of the agreement is particularly unappealing to many asbestos producers, such as GAF, Nicolet and Manville, who strongly believe in the merits and substances of their bad faith cases against their carriers.

On the question of the duty to defend under pre-1966 policies, the proposed Facility would provide that the duty to defend would cease on exhaustion of the policy limits. However, if a subscribing producer exhausted all of its other pre-1966 coverage, including its excess coverage, then defence coverage would be revived. The revived coverage would come from a defence fund established by all the subscribing insurers and would guarantee lifetime payments of defence coverage under pre-1966 policy forms.

Not all potential subscribing producers are pleased with the proposed defence coverage provisions. Some producers argue that at least two decisions, AC & S -v- Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, and Raymark -v- Zurich International, hold that insurers under pre-1966 policies have an unlimited duty to defend even after their policy limits are exhausted. In addition, many asbestos producers argue that the Facility's proposed defence coverage plan could mean less excess coverage for some asbestos producers, since excess policies, unlike primary policies, frequently include defence costs within the policy limits and therefore, if excess insurers are tapped for defence costs (instead of primary insurers providing unlimited defence), excess coverage that would normally be used to pay claims would be spent on defence.

The proposed Facility also attempts to resolve the question of putting "caps" on policies and deductibles that have no aggregate limits. This is frequently seen in early Lloyd's policies, many of which were written without aggregate limits. Under the agreement, the coverage cap would be calculated by multiplying the per-occurrence limits by numbers ranging from one to ten. High per-occurrence limits would be multiplied by a lower number, and lower per-occurrence limits would be multiplied by a higher number. Thus, policies with high per-occurrence limits would have a low aggregate limit and policies with low per-occurrence limits have a high aggregate limit. A similar formula would be used to calculate caps on policyholder's deductible obligations.

Most members of the Asbestos Claims Council agree that without widespread industry participation, the Facility cannot succeed. To attract additional subscribers, the Asbestos Claims Council has taken two steps. First, as noted above, it has indefinitely extended the final subscription deadline to allow insurers additional time to consult with their reinsurers. Second, it has extended the cut-off date for individual "coverage buyout" agreements to 24 October 1984. Before this change, any agreement executed between producers and insurers after 1 January 1984 that involved insurers "buying back" the policies they had issued to a producer to end the insurers' liabilities would have been set aside if the producer or insurer joined the facility. As a result of this, many producers and insurers balked at giving up all coverage agreements made after 1 January 1984 in order to join the claims facility.

The extension of the cut-off date for buy-out agreements is believed to be what motivated Manville to conditionally subscribe to the claims facility in mid-October. Manville reached a $315 million settlement with its three primary carriers, Travelers, the Home and Underwriters at Lloyds in July 1984. Were it not for the extension of the cut-off deadline, Manville would have had to set this agreement aside if it joined the claims facility. The topic of Manville's insurance settlement will be discussed further in the next subsection the Manville Bankruptcy Proceeding.

The following are reported to have conditionally subscribed:

 

Asbestos Producers

Incorporation

Status

1.

AC&S, Inc.

USA

 

2.

Amatex Corp.

USA

 

3.

Armstrong World Industries, Inc.

USA

 

4.

Brinco Mining Co.

USA

 

5.

Celotex Corp.

USA

 

6.

CertainTeed Corp.

USA

 

7.

Dana Corp.

USA

 

8.

Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.

USA

 

9.

Eastern Refractories Co.

USA

 

10.

Fibreboard Corp.

USA

 

11.

Flintkote Corp.

USA

 

12.

Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.

USA

 

13.

Lake Asbestos Corp. of Quebec

Canada

 

14.

Manville Corp.

USA

Chapter 11

15.

Maremount Corp.

USA

 

16.

National Gypsum Co.

USA

 

17.

National Services Industries

USA

 

18.

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

USA

 

19.

Owens Illinois, Inc.

USA

 

20.

Pacor, Inc.

USA

 

21.

Pittsburgh Corning Corp.

USA

 

22.

Porter Hayden Co.

USA

 

23.

Shook & Fletcher Co

USA

 

24.

Turner & Newall

UK

 
 

Direct Insurers

Incorporation

 

1.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co.

USA

 

2.

American Universal

USA

 

3.

Argonaut Insurance Co.

USA

 

4.

Bituminous Casualty Corp.

USA

 

5.

CIGNA Corp.

USA

 

6.

Continental Insurance Co.

USA

 

7.

Crum & Foster

USA

 

8.

Employers of Wausau

USA

 

9.

First State Insurance Co.

USA

 

10.

Hanover Insurance Co.

USA

 

11.

Hartford Insurance Group

USA

 

12.

Harbor Insurance Co.

USA

 

13.

Highlands Insurance Group

USA

 

14.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

USA

 

15.

Underwriters for Lloyds of London

UK

 

16.

Reliance Insurance Co.

USA

 

17.

Royal Insurance Co.

UK

 

18.

The St. Paul Cos., Inc.

USA

 

19.

U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

USA

 

20.

Zurich Insurance Co.

UK

 

THE MANVILLE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING

Since our last report three significant developments have occurred in the Manville Bankruptcy proceeding.

First, as noted above, in early June Manville announced that it had settled with three of its large insurers -- the Home Insurance Company, The Travelers Insurance Company, and a group of Lloyd's syndicates - for $315 million dollars. Manville originally sued its 27 insurers in 1980 in a dispute over how much insurance the carriers should provide the company for its asbestos claims. A wrinkle emerged in the settlement in early August, however, when it was learned that as part of the settlement package, Manville had agreed to indemnify the three insurers if they were named in any future Manville-related actions.

Manville's co-defendants and the representatives of Committee, expressed concern that could reduce the amount of funds and cause the co-defendants to pay the Asbestos Claimants' payment to the insurers available for claimants more. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. Bankruptcy Court presiding over Manville's bankruptcy reorganisation will approve this provision in the settlement agreement.

The second development, also noted above, was Manville's recent decision to subscribe to the Asbestos Claims Facility. Manville's support for the facility has boosted the hopes of the facility's proponents and brought new pressure to bear on more insurers and producers to join.

Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether New York Bankruptcy Judge Burton R. Lifland, the Bankruptcy Judge presiding over Manville's reorganisation, will permit Manville to participate in the facility before its reorganisation plan is approved. No forthcoming ruling on this point is expected from Judge Lifland.

The third noteworthy development, which could jeopardise Manville's entire reorganisation plan, occurred in late June when congressional draftsmen, hurriedly putting together a new bankruptcy bill, slipped up in the bill's final wording.

As we noted in our earlier report, the United States Supreme Court struck down a sizeable portion of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act in the 1982 case of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. -v- Marathon Pipeline. In July, Congress passed a bill that overhauled the U.S. Bankruptcy Court System in accordance with the Supreme Court's Northern Pipeline guidelines. Under the bill, the Bankruptcy Courts were supposed to continue handling the asbestos-related bodily injury claims against Manville that they were currently handling, and all future asbestos-related bodily injury claims against Manville were supposed to be filed in Federal District Courts. In other words, the revised Bankruptcy bill was supposed to apply only to future and not current cases. This is not, however, what happened.

Instead, legislative draftsmen incorrectly applied the new Bankruptcy bill to current cases, which means that all of the 16,500 asbestos-related lawsuits against Manville may have to be transferred to United States District Courts for handling.

The significance of this mistake is debatable. On the one hand, asbestos-related claimants' chances of recovering large judgments are significantly improved in District Courts and thus, Manville's reorganisation plan could be placed in jeopardy. On the other hand, Manville contends that the bill also provides that the District Courts could still transfer bankruptcy cases back to Bankruptcy Courts for handling.

Although there has not yet been any definitive court ruling on this question, two federal district court judges, one from New York and the other from Illinois, have ruled that the new bankruptcy law requires both pending and future asbestos cases to be tried in a federal district court at some point.

Congress could amend the bankruptcy law in its next session so that it conforms to its original intent, although, many legislators concede that such an attempt may run into a bureaucratic blockade that could become insurmountable.

VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS, AWARDS

CALIFORNIA

A California jury recently awarded a 63 year old welder with lung cancer who had smoked 1 1/2 packs of cigarettes a day for 50 years $200,000 with a 40% reduction for comparative fault for smoking, for a net award of $120,000.

When asked after the trial why they returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favour, the jurors said that they were impressed with the plaintiff's expert's testimony about the "synergistic effect" of asbestos exposure when combined with cigarette smoking.

HAWAII

A Hawaii Federal District Court Judge recently dismissed a $500,000 punitive damages award against Raymark Industries on the ground that the award was barred by the State's two year statute of limitations.

The jury had originally awarded that sum to the Estate of Manuel S. Carvalho, a Pearl Harbor rigger, who died of bronchogenic carcinoma in 1980. In assessing punitive damages, the jury concluded that Raymark had distributed its products "wantonly, oppressively and with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference."

However the jury also found that Carvalho should have known of the cause of his illness on 5 July 1978. This meant that his suit, filed on 28 July 1980, was brought 23 days to late to comply with the State's two year statute of limitations and was dismissed accordingly.

MICHIGAN

A Detroit Michigan jury has awarded $400,000 in damages to a former insulator who claimed to be suffering from asbestosis. The claimant, who worked as an insulator in the Michigan area for 26 years, also suffered from severe rheumatoid arthritis, and severe heart disease.

The jury had originally awarded the plaintiff $800,000, but that award was reduced by 50% under Michigan's comparative negligence law because the plaintiff had not worn a respirator and had continued to smoke for many years even after he was warned to stop.

OHIO

The first ten cases processed under the Ohio Court's "Asbestos Case Management Plan" were recently settled for $1.1 million dollars. In December 1983, the Ohio Courts, both state and federal, implemented the Asbestos Case Management Plan to streamline asbestos litigation and facilitate the preparation of asbestos cases for trial. In processing asbestos cases, the plan makes use of such devices as case consolidation, expedited discovery and summary jury trials.

These first ten cases are among the more than 100 asbestos cases filed in Ohio State and Federal Courts between 1979 and 1981. Each of the settling plaintiffs is expected to receive approximately $100,000.

PENNSYLVANIA

In what is believed to be one of the largest damage awards ever made to a non-cancer claimant, a Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas jury has awarded $875,000 to an asbestosis sufferer and his wife. The defendants in the case included GAF, Pittsburgh Corning and Keene Corp. The trial court did not permit the plaintiff to offer any evidence of lost present and future earnings, lost past overtime or medical bills for future suffering of cancer and mesothelioma.

Interestingly enough, both plaintiff's and defendants' medical experts agreed that plaintiff was neither presently disabled nor suffering from cancer or mesothelioma. Plaintiff's medical expert diagnosed the plaintiff as having both pleural thickening and asbestosis, while defendants' medical expert diagnosed only pleural thickening.

TEXAS

A jury in Marshall, Texas recently awarded $7.9 million in damages to 3 insulators and the widow of a fourth. All four insulators suffered from asbestosis and the total award included $1,000,000 in punitive damages for each claimant.

VIRGINIA

The families of five former shipyard workers, who died from mesothelioma after working more than 50 years at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, recently reached a settlement totalling more than $12 million dollars with nine national asbestos producers. While neither side would disclose the precise amount of the settlement, court sources indicated that they range from a high of $3 million dollars to a low of $2 million dollars.

WASHINGTON

A jury in King County, Washington has returned the first defence verdict in an asbestos-related disease case in the State of Washington. The case, Kinsman -v- Fibreboard, involved an action brought by a widow of a man who died at the age of 54 allegedly from mesothelioma caused by 37 years exposure to asbestos. The decedent, a vice president with the Brown Company, who was earning $51,000 at the time of his death, was allegedly first exposed to asbestos while employed as an insulator for the Brown Company.

The plaintiffs sought to recover $500,000 from Fibreboard, and $50,000 from its co-defendant, Pittsburgh Corning. The jury, however, returned an 11 to 1 defence verdict following extensive medical testimony from the defendants' expert witnesses that it was impossible to tell with a "reasonable degree of medical certainty", whether the tumour present in plaintiff's decedent was mesothelioma or abdominal adenocarcinoma.

 

RECENT STUDIES

STUDY SUOWS WIDOWS' COMPENSATION IS INEQUITABLE AND INADEQUATE

In a recent study on the adequacy of workers compensation payments to the survivors of men who died from workplace exposure to asbestos, Cornell University researchers have concluded that "the compensation is neither adequate nor equitably distributed."

The study, one of the first on compensation for occupational-related illnesses and diseases, focused on benefits payments in 1979 to 249 widows, whose husbands would have been living that year had they not died from asbestos exposure. It was found that workers compensation payments replaced only 36.28 of the losses of widows for whom it was the only source of income. The figures are far below the normal standard that workers compensation benefits should equal, approximately 66% of the workers wages before his death.

Additionally, the study showed that widows who succeeded in common law actions received the most adequate compensation, but it also showed that tort awards were inadequate for some widows and that, furthermore, some of these awards would be exhausted within one year.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF ASBESTOS CLAIMS

In another study, researchers for the Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice concluded that neither the legal jurisdiction (federal or state) nor the region of the country, made any significant difference in the outcome of an asbestos-related disease case. While noting that the more severely injured plaintiffs generally received higher awards, the Rand Corporation's researchers found that other factors besides the plaintiff's injury, influenced the plaintiff's award. Those factors include:

(1) Claims with more defendants than the average of 15 - resulted in a maximum estimated increase in compensation of about 15%;

(2) The largest multiple plaintiff lawsuits resulted in an estimated average compensation per claimant that was about 70% of the compensation for single-plaintiff lawsuits;

(3) The cases that went to trial resulted in verdicts 2.28 times greater than the amounts received in comparable cases settled before trial.

SURVEY FINDS 27% OF EASTERN U.S. HOMES CONTAIN ASBESTOS

A recent survey conducted by the American Society Home Inspectors of 670 homes in the eastern United States indicated that 181 homes, or 27%, contain asbestos products. The results of the survey were published in a report which was presented to the Consumer Products Safety Commission in mid-October.

Of the 181 homes where asbestos was found, the most frequent location of the material was the heating system; 123 homes, 18% of those surveyed, had asbestos material in the heating systems. In 56 of the homes. the asbestos was visibly damaged.

The report cautions against predicting a national average based on the survey and notes that other regions of the country, such as California, may have widely different patterns of the use of asbestos-containing products.

The report concludes, "Asbestos was commonly found in homes more that 20-40 years old and is particularly common in components of home heating systems. The asbestos products in inspected homes were often damaged or worn; these are the conditions under which the Consumer Product Safety Commission staff is most concerned about the possibility of asbestos exposure to home residents. "

EPA FINDS 20% OF NON-SCHOOL BUILDINGS CONTAIN ASBESTOS

A recent survey released by the EPA indicates that 20% of commercial, federal and residential apartment buildings in the United States may contain friable asbestos. The survey was conducted on 231 buildings to determine how much friable asbestos-containing material might be in buildings other than schools. The 208 figure translates into approximately 733,000 commercial, federal and residential apartment buildings with friable asbestos.

The report noted that only 3% of the surveyed buildings had asbestos-containing ceiling tiles. The report also noted, however, that buildings constructed in the 1960's were found to be 15% more likely to have asbestos-containing sprayed or troweled-on friable material than other buildings.

The report went on to say, "It appears that the extensive use of asbestos-containing sprayed-on friable material would have continued and perhaps increased in the 1970's had not the EPA banned the use of those materials for all but decorative purposes in 1973." The EPA banned all other uses of these materials in 1978.

DECISION NOTES - ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION - SECOND CIRCUIT

Recently, in In re: Asbestos Litigation, the Second United States Circuit Court of Appeals sitting in New York dismissed four consolidated asbestos cases brought by workers

 

Page missing

ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS

Claims brought by school districts against asbestos producers are becoming ever more frequent as the public's awareness of the asbestos hazard continues to grow. No one is exactly sure how widespread the problem may be, but anxieties are growing about the threat posed to the nation's 36 million students by asbestos flaking from classroom and hallway ceilings and walls.

The average cost of cleaning up a single medium sized school building is $100,000. Educational officials project that the total cleanup cost for the nation's 122,000 public and private schools may run as high as $1.4 billion.

In April 1984, a bill, known as the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act, was introduced in the Senate. Under this bill $500,000,000 would be spent over the next six years to remove asbestos from schools across the country. The bill would require states to submit priority lists, indicating which schools are in the most need of federal assistance.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

MAINE

In the case of Austin -v- Raybestos Manhattan, the Maine Supreme Court ruled that comparative negligence can only be used as a defence in a strict liability action in Maine if a plaintiff's conduct rises to the level of "assumption of the risk."

The ruling came after the plaintiff appealed a 1981 jury verdict to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit certified the following question of state law to the Maine Supreme Court: Whether the failure of plaintiff's deceased husband to wear a respirator constituted a comparative negligence defence for the asbestos manufacturers?

The Maine Supreme Court concluded that this failure to wear a respirator was not "fault" as fault is defined in Maine's comparative negligence statute, and that any contributory negligence on the decedent's part in failing discover asbestos dangers and guard against them is not a defence to a Maine products liability action.

DUAL CAPACITY

The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia recently held that the husband of a woman who died as a result of her exposure to asbestos both at work and when she washed her husband's clothes at home could sue her employer for injuries resulting from the exposure in her home.

In the case, Joyce -v- AC & S, the claimant had contended that his wife contracted mesothelioma as a result of her continuous and repeated exposure to asbestos both in her home and on the job with DuPont. In reaching its decision, the Court said, "Although DuPont is immunised from suit in its capacity as an employer, with respect to the claim to the decedent's exposure as a housewife, DuPont occupied a position no different from any other joint tortfeasor and should be treated accordingly."

THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DEFENCE

Manville has filed another third-party action in the U.S. Court of Claims against the United States Government, this time seeking $36,000,000 in damages and legal costs that the Company claims it paid in connection with claims brought by nearly 1,200 shipyard workers. Manville charges that the U.S. Government failed to fulfil its contractual obligation regarding asbestos containing products in shipyards, thereby resulting in unobserved safety and health regulations. Manville claims that the government was aware that it was delinquent in meeting Navy safety and health standards for asbestos exposure and it has offered documents into evidence that will allegedly prove it.

This is Manville's third third-party action against the Government. The first action, filed in July 1983, sought contribution for damages Manville paid to asbestos victims who suffered shipyard exposure during World War II. In the second action, filed in November 1983, Manville sought contribution for damages it paid to government shipyard workers exposed to asbestos after 1964.

INSURANCE COVERAGE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

A District of Columbia Federal District Court Judge recently ruled that the Insurance Company of North America's (INA) obligation to pay defence costs for Keene Corporation terminates with the exhaustion of the aggregate policy limits.

This action, part of the ongoing Keene litigation, involved pre-1966 coverage that INA sold to Keene between 31 December 1956 and 1 June 1968. INA told Keene that the indemnity limits of the pre-1966 policies were exhausted and that the defence obligation would be transferred to Keene's excess liability insurance carriers.

Relying on the cases of A C & S -v- Aetna Casualty & Surety and Commercial Union -v- Pittsburgh Corning corporation, Keene argued that the standard pre-1966 policy language created an "open ended " duty for INA to continue paying defence costs in all present and future asbestos-related suits brought against Keene.

In reaching its decision, the Court specifically rejected the holdings in A C & S and Commercial Union and held that the policy language is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, namely, that the policies limit the duty to defend as to both the nature and the amount of insurance provided. As the Court said, "without offering any objective evidence of a contrary intent, Keene suggests that it reasonably could have expected the defence duty to continue long past INA's payment of the policy limits. This construction would remove any connection between the duty to defend and the payment of insurance premiums."

This decision marks the first time that any court has limited a primary insurer's defence obligation under pre-1966 policies. Many insurance company lawyers are already saying that this decision will be useful in appealing previous opinions in such cases as A C & S and Commercial Union where courts have held that the primary carriers have an unlimited defence obligation under pre-1966 policys.

If the District Court's opinion is affirmed on appeal, it may well prompt additional asbestos producers and their insurers to subscribe to the Asbestos Claims Facility, since the rule of the facility is that the duty to defend under pre-1966 policies ends with the exhaustion of the policy limits.

In early October, this same District Court dismissed a punitive damages claim that Keene had brought against INA. Keene had based its punitive damages claim on INA's alleged "malicious breach of conduct and bad faith in blatantly switching to a manifestation interpretation of its comprehensive general liability insurance policies on a national scale to enable it to escape its recognised enormous financial liability for asbestos law suits."

The Court ruled that the law of the state where an insurer's corporate headquarters is located governs punitive damages claims. Since INA's corporate headquarters is located in Pennsylvania, the Court found that Pennsylvania law was controlling.

In reviewing Pennsylvania law, the District Court found that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had dismissed punitive damages claims for an insurer's alleged "bad faith" on the ground that the Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act constitutes the sole remedy for such conduct in Pennsylvania. In conclusion, the District Court said, "This Court must respect Pennsylvania's policy of not imposing punitive damages against insurance companies, which reflects the State's judgment to protect the financial security of resident corporations rather than impose punitive damages to regulate conduct."

Second Circuit Adopts "Injury In Fact" Theory of Coverage

On November 13, 1984 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Federal District Court Judge Abraham Sofaer's decision in the case of American Home Products -v- Liberty Mutual that "injury in fact" is the trigger for coverage in progressive or delayed manifestation disease cases.

The American Home Products case was concerned with determining the nature and extent of Liberty Mutual's liability for defence and indemnification in fifty-four suits filed against American Home Products by plaintiffs alleging injuries from a variety of pharmaceutical products, including DES. In each of these suits, the alleged injuries did not manifest themselves until after the termination of Liberty Mutual's insurance coverage on 1 November 1976.

Article 1 of Liberty Mutual's CGL policy provided liability coverage for occurrences that result in "personal injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person."

Article IV of Liberty Mutual's policy provided that "this policy applies to (1) personal injury, sickness or disease including death resulting therefrom...which occurs during the policy period."

Liberty Mutual argued that the Court should resolve the coverage question by applying the manifestation theory while American Home Products urged the Court to adopt the exposure theory.

In reaching his decision, Judge Sofaer carefully considered the other coverage theories enunciated by the various Federal Circuit Courts and adopted an "injury in fact" test for determining when insurance coverage is triggered in progressive or delayed manifestation disease cases.

Judge Sofaer held that the key determination should be whether a compensable and diagnosable injury occurs within the policy period, regardless of whether injury corresponds with exposure or manifestation.

In his decision, the Judge was guided by the well-established policy of New York courts that when construing an insurance policy, a court must enforce the plain meaning of the policy and not attempt to vary its meaning to accomplish desirable social objectives.

Judge Sofaer rejected the exposure theory on the ground that Liberty Mutual's policy required injury and not exposure to occur within the policy period. As he said in his opinion, "The result is keyed to the policy period, not the exposure period."

He also rejected the manifestation theory for failing to take into consideration latent but real illnesses. The Judge noted the policy covered all injuries occurring during the policy period, not just those manifesting themselves.

In adopting his "injury in fact" theory, Judge Sofaer relied on several sources. First, he referred to the draftspersons of the 1966 CGL form who expressly rejected the manifestation and exposure theories and said that coverage would be extended only to injuries resulting during the policy period. Second, he pointed to the course of dealings and past practices between the parties, noting that the parties treated injury as the trigger for coverage, not manifestation or exposure. Finally, he relied on implications drawn from rate computations for insurance premiums. He pointed out that premiums were computed on the basis of loss records that used the "injury in fact" approach for assigning claims to various policies.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the "District Court's reading of the trigger-of-coverage clause as plainly providing for coverage upon the occurrence of an injury in fact, an injury that has occurred, is the only interpretation of the clause that neither departs from the policy's language nor imports expansions of or limitations on the words that do not ordinarily exist." The Court did, however, modify Judge Sofaer's decision by eliminating the terms "diagnosable" and "compensable" from the coverage trigger. The Court noted that no clause in the Liberty Mutual policies uses either of these terms and that compensability is a legal concept that is not material to the determination of whether an injury has "in fact" occurred.

With the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in American Home Products, six Federal Appeals Courts have attempted to resolve the question of when insurance coverage attaches in progressive or delayed manifestation disease cases. The following is a brief survey of the Federal Appellate Court decisions concerning the attachment date for insurance coverage in such cases:

Circuit

Case Name

Coverage Theory

     

First (Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts)

Eagle-Picher -v- Liberty Mutual

Manifestation

     

Fifth

(Texas, Louisiana and

Mississippi)

Porter -v- American Optical Corp.

Exposure

     

Sixth

(Ohio, Kentucky

Tennessee & Michigan)

INA -v- Forty- Eight Insulations

Exposure

 

     

District of Columbia

Keene -v- INA

Triple trigger

     

Third

(Pennsylvania,

Delaware, & New Jersey)

AC & S -v- Aetna

Casualty & Surety

Triple trigger

     

Second

(New York, Connecticut

& Vermont)

American Home Products -v- Liberty Mutual

Injury in fact

     

In other developments, it was recently announced that Keene Corporation had settled its suits against INA, Aetna, the Hartford and Liberty Mutual. The settlement came after Keene Corporation instituted a declaratory judgment action against those carriers in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to determine the nature and extent of the insurance coverage they provided it. As you will recall, it was in the Keene case that the "triple trigger or continuous trigger" theory of coverage was first enunciated. Trial of the case was scheduled to begin on 26 November. This would have been the first trial to determine whether an asbestos producer's insurers are liable for bad-faith conduct in their handling of asbestos claims.

In announcing the settlement, a spokesman for Keene Corporation indicated that it will try to resolve any coverage disputes with its insurers before the proposed Asbestos Claims Facility. Although Keene Corporation has not formally subscribed to the Claims Facility, the memorandum of points and authorities accompanying its settlement provides that "Keene and its insurers will attempt to compromise their differences on this issue through the proposed Asbestos Claims Facility, which is viewed by Keene and its insurers as providing a framework for a possible global solution to the asbestos litigation crisis."

ILLINOIS

In one of the broadest decisions on the allocation of defence costs in asbestos coverage disputes, an Illinois County Circuit Court has ruled that primary insurers on pre-1967 policies have an unlimited duty to defend asbestos producers, even after their policy limits are exhausted. In the case of Raymark -v- Zurich Insurance Co., the Court reasoned that since none of Raymark's pre-1967 primary carriers had any language in their policies limiting their defence obligations and since Illinois case law clearly indicates that the duty to defend is independent of and broader than the duty to indemnify, the duty to defend is unlimited.

With respect to post-1967 policies, the Illinois Circuit Court ruled that while the primary insurers of asbestos defendants generally do not have an unlimited duty to defend the assured after their policy limits are exhausted, the primary insurers must continue to provide a defence for cases they are currently defending, even after their policy limits are exhausted. Here the Court reasoned, based on the well-settled principles of insurance law and on the ideals of American Jurisprudence, that an insurer cannot abandon a case in progress once it has assumed a defence.

Barring a successful appeal, this decision means that Raymark's primary insurers will pay virtually all the defence costs and that its excess liability insurance (approximately $370 million) can be used solely to indemnify asbestos injury damages assessed against the assured.

MARKET SHARE LIABILITY IN ASBESTOS CASES

FLORIDA

In the landmark decision of Copeland -v- Celotex, a Florida appeals court became the first court in the United States to adopt a market share theory of liability in an asbestos-related disease case. In Copeland, the Court ruled that defendants in asbestos-related disease suit are required to apportion their liability and damages according to their total market share, even when plaintiffs cannot identify which company's product caused their injuries. The Copeland decision is a technical variation of the landmark California decision in Sindell -v- Abbott Laboratories, in which the California Supreme Court first used the market share theory of liability in a suit involving the anti-miscarriage drug DES.

The plaintiffs in Copeland claimed that they were unable to identify the asbestos product's brand names after they were removed from their original containers. They sued virtually all the manufacturers and distributors of the asbestos products to which they were exposed. Celotex argued that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed, since they failed to show a causal connection between the injuries they sustained and their exposure to Celotex's asbestos-containing products.

While agreeing with Celotex that a plaintiff ordinarily has the burden of proving that a particular defendant has caused him harm, the appeals court declined take this position in asbestos-related disease cases. In view of the scientific and technological advances which allow harmful products to be created which cannot be traced to a specific producer, the Court noted that the traditional theories of causation no longer apply.

The Florida appeals court's adoption of the market share theory of liability in Copeland was somewhat unexpected, since neither side urged the appeals court to apply the market share theory; indeed, plaintiffs and defendants had agreed at the outset that Sindell should not apply.

OSHA REGULATIONS

On 19 June 1984, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) held a hearing on a proposed permanent standard to reduce the permissible exposure level for asbestos, thereby reducing workers' exposure to the carcinogen. The proposed permanent reduction follows an emergency temporary standard, which was issued in November 1983, but which was struck down as invalid by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in March 1984. The proposed standard would reduce the permissible exposure level from two fibres per cubic centimetre of air to either .5 or .2 cubic centimetres of air, depending upon which level would be most protective and most feasible.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

FIFTH CIRCUIT

In the case of Jackson -v- Johns-Manville, the Fifth Circuit ruled that punitive damages should not be imposed on asbestos manufacturers because the companies are struggling to pay compensatory damages. This case arose out of an action brought by a former Mississippi sheet metal worker who received compensatory damages of $390,000 against Manville and Raybestos and punitive damages of $500,000 against Manville and $125,000 against Raybestos. In vacating the damage award and in remanding the case for retrial on the damages question, the Fifth Circuit said "[o]ur holding today is limited to the extraordinary circumstances of this litigation, where the allowance of punitive damages carries the manifest portent of undoing the strict liability remedy for present and prospective claimants and where the purposes of punitive damages are otherwise served."

In another asbestos case, Hansen -v- Johns-Manville, the Fifth Circuit ruled that punitive damages awards were appropriate. In Hansen, a Texas Federal Jury awarded punitive damages for the death of a 65 year old pipefitter who died in 1978 of asbestosis, after working 35 years in the Todd Shipyard in Texas. In appealing the award, Manville urged the Fifth Circuit to follow its Jackson decision and set aside the punitive damages award. The Court, however, disagreed, noting that its Jackson holding was based in Mississippi law and that it could " [f] ind no basis on which to hold that Texas courts would disallow punitive damages award in a situation such as this."

Notwithstanding the Court's attempt to explain the different results reached in Jackson and Hansen on choice of law grounds, plaintiff's attorneys believe that the Fifth Circuit may be preparing to overturn its earlier decision in Jackson. In its most recent punitive damages case, Foster -v- Pittsburgh Corning, the Court affirmed a trial court decision awarding an lnsulator $300,000 in punitive damages against Pittsburgh Corning. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reheard oral arguments in Jackson in mid-September, although no early ruling is expected.

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

NINTH CIRCUIT

In the case of Kline -v- Johns Manville, et al., the Ninth Circuit recently held that Pittsburgh Corning Corp. was not a successor in interest to Unarco Industries. This case involved actions brought by nine plaintiffs who allegedly contracted asbestos-related diseases from their continuous and repeated inhalation of asbestos fibres from pipe insulation materials manufactured by Unarco. Unarco manufactured the asbestos-containing product line known as Unibestos from 1936 to 1962, when it sold the Unibestos line to Pittsburgh Corning.

The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the case presented the question of whether, under California law, a successor corporation could be held liable for its predecessor's defective products when it buys only a part of its predecessor's business.

The Court held that California generally did not impose liability "[o]n a successor corporation that purchases the assets of a predecessor in an arm's length transaction." The Court did note, however, that in the case of Ray -v- Aldad Corporation, an exception was created. In Ray, the California Supreme Court held that a successor corporation could be held liable for the torts of its predecessor if the predecessor liquidates itself after the sale of its assets. The Ray holding is based on the following factors:

1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedy;

2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturers risk-spreading capacity; and

3) the fairness of having the successor assume the predecessor's liabilities together with the good will enjoyed by the continuing operation of the predecessor's business.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Ray was not controlling in the Kline case since Unarco did not liquidate; rather Unarco continued to do business with other product lines even after it sold its Unibestos line to Pittsburgh Corning and thus, the plaintiff's remedy against Unarco was still preserved.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS

U.S. GYPSUM

The United States Gypsum Company has instituted a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Cook County, Illinois, against its 23 insurers, seeking a declaration that its insurers are obligated to indemnify it for all of its costs and any punitive damages it is ordered to pay in the more than 2,900 asbestos-related bodily injury and property damage actions that are pending against it. Gypsum is also seeking damages for breach of contract, claiming that its insurers failed to fulfil their contractual obligations.

Gypsum is asking the Court to apply the "triple trigger" theory of coverage to its action, a theory which was first enunciated in the landmark decision of Keene -v- Insurance Corporation of North America.

H. K. PORTER

H. K. Porter has instituted a declaratory judgment action in Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against its 32 insurers seeking a ruling that its 32 insurers breached their contract and acted in bad faith by refusing to defend and indemnify Porter in the more than 18,800 asbestos-related bodily injury and disease suits that have been brought against it to date.

Porter urged the Court to adopt the "triple trigger" theory of coverage, which holds that all insurers on risk from the time of exposure through the time of manifestation are obligated to defend and indemnify the assured.

Porter charged that its carriers had taken a position that would deprive it of coverage or a defence for any asbestos-related injury or disease claims manifesting themselves after 1 May 1979. Porter claims to have spent $8.3 million thus far defending asbestos-related claims, paying out verdicts and satisfying judgments. Porter's declaratory judgment action is still in its preliminary stages and no trial date has yet been set.

The foregoing represents a distillation of significant developments in the field of asbestos litigation in the United States, and is not an exhaustive study of the subject. We hope that it has helped your understanding of this subject. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

6 Mar 85

Most members of the Asbestos Claims Council agree that without widespread industry participation, the Facility cannot succeed. To attract additional subscribers, the Asbestos Claims Council has taken two steps. First, as noted above, it has indefinitely extended the final subscription deadline to allow insurers additional time to consult with their reinsurers. Second, it has extended the cut-off date for individual Coverage buyouts agreements to 24 October 1984. Before this change, any agreement executed between producers and insurers after 1 January 1984 that involved insurers buying back the policies they had issued to a producer to end the insurers' liabilities would have been set aside if the producer or insurer joined the facility. As a result of this, many producers and insurers balked at giving up all coverage agreements made after 1 January 1984 in order to join the claims facility.

The extension of the cut-off date for buy-out agreements is believed to be what motivated Manville to conditionally subscribe to the claims facility in mid-October. Manville reached a $315 million settlement with its three primary carriers, Travelers, the Home and Underwriters at Lloyds in July 1984. Were it not for the extension of the cut-off deadline, Manville would have had to set this agreement aside if it joined the claims facility.

11 Mar 85

The Agency Agreements Byelaw (No. 1 of 1985, 11 March 1985). Standard Agency Agreements etc.

11 Mar 85

Lloyd's publishes the Findings of Disciplinary Proceedings, case No. 8401/7, into Dashwood, Brewer & Phipps Ltd.

12 Mar 85

Mandatory meeting of subscribing producers to the Asbestos Claims Facility to assure completion of insurance coverage information essential for final closing of Agreement.

12 Mar 85

Meeting of Ernst & Whinney chaired by M. Bolger. Stephen Hill spoke about:

(a) the question of Johns-Manville asbestosis settlements was raised ...

  1. the Rocky Mountain claim (Shell chemical waste 194344) is still around this year. As this claim involves the US Government there are various bases on which settlement can be made. Paul McNamara is to circulate a confidential memo to partners only regarding this problem.... It was also felt important that clients are sent copies of all recent Lloyd's publications prepared by E & W..

Alan Deeves felt (and Stephen Hill agreed) that syndicates were becoming "little companies." In this respect it was considered that underwriters need educating as to the procedures they should be adopting, and it is our job to educate them.

14 Mar 85

The Times: Lloyd's underwriter ‘made scapegoat for dubious practices'

Mr. Peter Coucher, a former Lloyd's underwriter who made a series of false insurance claims to pay for the running of his yacht, L'Obsession, claimed in an interview with The Times yesterday that he had been made a scapegoat for dubious business practice

Speaking on the telephone from St. Thomas, in the United States Virgin Islands, where he works, Mr. Coucher said: "I was singled out as the culprit for practices which everyone knew about, and I was paid off to resign Lloyd's and leave quietly".

He said that he had been available in London until July last year to answer any investigation into the £11,000 in false claims, but had never been approached by Lloyd's. "There is no question whatever of my fleeing the country.

On Tuesday the Lloyd's council published its ruling into the affairs of Syndicate 689, the group formed by Mr. Coucher to underwrite yacht insurance. Mr. Coucher was employed by Bellew, Parry and Raven as agent to run a similar syndicate owned by them, Syndicate 691.

At the end of 1982 it was revealed that L'Obsession owned by Syndicate 689 and berthed at Lymington, Hampshire, was having its expenses paid by false insurance claims.

According to Mr. Coucher., who is now working as a consultant to Insurance Unlimited (Caribbean), on St Thomas, the claims were used to pay £600 a year mooring fees for L'Obsession, which was used for business entertaining. From 1977 to 1982 a total of, £6,500 in false claims was paid out to run the yacht.

The case is certain to bring increased political pressure on Sir Michael Havers, the Attorney-General, to explain why there have been no prosecutions for alleged fraud in this and a series of similar cases that have been disclosed by Lloyd's investigations during the past two years.

Mr. Coucher said yesterday: "The purpose of those claims was known openly. I do not regard them as in any way fraudulent."

"I was then offered by Bellew, Parry and Raven £25,000 in cash, free of tax, and £89,000 for my half share in my company, Coucher Underwriting Agency, to leave quietly. I decided that I didn't want to face the hassle, and agreed to resign from Lloyd's after 35 years as a member because I was fed up with the whole business, and felt I was being victimised because the club did not like me."

Mr. Donald Mott, a director of Bellew and Raven underwriting agencies, agreed yesterday that Mr. Coucher had been paid to buy out his syndicate. "There is no question, however that we were buying him off. That is totally untrue."

Mr. Mott added: "At that time the bye-laws contained in the Lloyd's Act, which introduced the disciplinary procedures for such situations, was not in force. They came in at the beginning of 1983."

According to Lloyd's it was felt by all the insurers involved that, by paying £7.000 to Bellew and Raven in early 1983 to clear the false claims, Mr. Coucher had indeed acquitted his responsibility.

19 Mar 85

Robin A G Jackson had agreed to participate with Pete Thomas, Chief Executive of the Hartford; John Baldwin, Chief Executive of Pittsburgh Corning; and Harry Wellington, Dean of the Yale Law School in making a presentation before Senator Nicholls at the hearing set up by the Senate Labour and Human Relations Sub-Committee to consider the Facility agreement.

Testimony given by Robin A G Jackson, Chairman, London Asbestos Working Party to Senator Nickolls

(Mr. Robin Jackson in testimony stated that "the number of present and expected asbestos-related claims is enormous, and the problems they are creating for the producers and insurers are unprecedented, both in terms of the total dollars involved and of the human resources needed to handle these claims. ... Against this background of judicial uncertainty, already catastrophic losses, and the reality of massive property damage claims yet to come, the task of fixing meaningful reserves and managing cash-flow to pay claims will continue to demand virtual clairvoyance and a near reckless courage from the executives involved at primary level, as well from their re-insurer counterparts." (emphasis added). Mr. Jackson then added "You might well ask if we are getting it right. I will show you how we propose to do just that" and referred to the proposed Asbestos Claims Facility. While appropriate allowance must be made for the occasion on which these remarks were made their significance is obvious).

1. The number of present and expected asbestos related claims is enormous, and the problems they are creating for the producers and insurers are unprecedented, both in terms of the total dollars involved and of the human resources needed to handle these claims....

4. Against this background of judicial uncertainty, already catastrophic losses, and the reality of massive property damage claims yet to come, the task of fixing meaningful reserves and managing cash-flow to pay claims will continue to demand virtual clairvoyance and a near reckless courage from the executives involved at primary level, as well as from their re- insurer counterparts. You might well ask if we are getting it right. I will show you how we propose to do just that:... Since Domestic USA insurance companies rely heavily upon the availability of proper reinsurance facilities both in the USA and those provided in and through the London Market, the importance of securing all reinsurers' support and co-operation on the Asbestos Claims Facility is therefore paramount.... The Asbestos Claims Facility promises to bring order to an otherwise chaotic legal situation while controlling distribution of losses to insurers and ensuring efficient use of the insurance dollars available, not as legal costs but in proper timely compensation for the victims.... The Facility is a good deal for producers, claimants and insurers alike because it will:

a) set guidelines for handling the fundamental insurance issues of allocating liability and expenses over various policy years; regulating application of deductibles and self-insured retentions; allocating liability for "aggregate" and "any one loss" policy limits; apportioning disputed liabilities between primary, excess, and ultimately, reinsurance carriers;

b) provide an internal and informal arbitration mechanism for coverage disputes such as continuing defence obligations and applicability of exclusions, as an alternative to costly and protracted litigation,

c) introduce, by combining the first two benefits, a degree of certainty where none existed before, not only for insurers (and their reinsurers) wishing to determine their eventual asbestos commitment, but also for producers who would for example gain from the release of key personnel committed to claims processing;

d) offer centralised evaluation, settlement and defence of the numerous future claims arising on a scale which will otherwise swamp existing individual insurer and producer facilities. The opportunity is there for avoiding inefficiency caused by wasteful duplication or duplication of what are, contrary to public belief finite market resources, and for sharing the initial investment and overheads of a single system with other participants;

e) provide centralised data capture and storage, giving the broadest base for future management exercises on aggregating losses and deductibles, reserving and the like;

f) achieve consolidation of negotiations, settlements and defences on numerous claims, and thereby reduce overall legal costs, improve the payment of damages to legitimate claimants, and present a "single" defence where literally dozens would have been pleaded before,

g) eliminate, as one of the Facility's preconditions, punitive damage suits against insurers, and avoid similar actions against producers, by reducing the delays giving rise to such actions and by the Facility itself being evidence of defendants' willingness to resolve claims promptly;

h) offer to producers an existing mechanism for continued claims handling on their behalf if, and this is a very real possibility for many, their total policy limits available are eventually exhausted by claims.

19 Mar 85

Meeting of the Directors of Merrett Syndicates Limited.

Present: S R Merrett, K E Randall, C J Ayliffe and others.

Current Estimates on 1982 Account Results. Syndicate 418/417. The Chairman reported that syndicate 418 appeared to have produced a reasonably good result. However the early indications on syndicate 417 were showing a serious deterioration. A great deal of work was still to be done on syndicate 417 figures but a combined 418/417 bottom line loss could not be ruled out... Syndicate 421. John Emney reported that the claims experience on 1982 was exceptionally good and felt that an underwriting profit was likely. However the size of this profit could not be ascertained until more detailed work had been carried out particularly with regard to a number of special risks.

25 Mar 85

Ernst & Whinney meeting chaired by Peter Standish.

Standish stated that it was his belief that the existence of a time and distance policy should be disclosed as this was, in effect, a discounting of reserves. He then explained how a time and distance policy worked. John briefly touched on 3 other points:

(b) the likelihood that any factor preventing a true and fair report being given may also indicate non-compliance with a specific requirement of the bye-law and hence necessitate qualification in any event.

(c) Run-off accounts. It would be noted that if a qualified report is to be given, a full PSP must be convened.... Whatever happens, it was felt that as the reinsurance to close brought forward was an agreed figure, the treatment must be considered by the audit partner, and if necessary a PSP.

28 Mar 85

Market Claims Services Ltd incorporated, as a company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital. The principal activity being to process, litigate or settle insurance claims, particularly those relating to asbestosis. The original 13 Subscribers and Directors being main player Lloyd's Agency Underwriters and Claims Directors:-

Subscriber/Director

Agency

H R Rokeby-Johnson

Sturge

J W Pryke

Heath

C H A Skey

Sedgwicks

R A G Jackson

Merrett

C J Ayliffe

Merrett

W W Maitland

Janson Green

K R Rayment

Sturge

J Teff

Janson Green

J R Heath

Weavers, Walbrook, London United Investments

J W Webb

Andrew Weir

H A Taylor

Turegum

P D Downs

Home & Overseas

A J P King

Orion

R J R Keeling,

Murray Lawrence Underwriter, was appointed a director on 31 December 1988.

Solicitors

 
   

Auditors

 

Touche Ross & Co.

 

The company was dissolved on 27 October 1992.

0 Apr 85

In April, Mr Miller addressed the American-Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Geneva.

4 Apr 85

State of New York -v- Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044, 2d Circuit, 4 April 1985. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found retroactive strict liability "without regard to causation" under CERCLA, and under the law of the State of New York, for the cleanup costs of an environmental claim.

Apr 85

The Chairman of Lloyd's, Peter Miller, visited Switzerland and addressed the American-Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Geneva.

10 Apr 85

A revised draft was presented by the ACC on 10 April 1985 with additional rules to take account of the special concerns of those producers, especially Johns-Manville Corp., who had sought the protection of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act and to make it possible for them to participate in the Asbestos claims Facility.

12 Apr 85

Ernst & Whinney meeting to discuss problems on Lloyd's syndicates.

Present inter alia Holland, Bolger, McNamara, Abbott, Peter Standish

Peter Standish opened the meeting by stating that the purpose was to discuss where we were on true and fair reporting in terms of bye-law number 7 in general and premium accruals in particular..

2. Time and distance policies: It was generally considered that such policies amount to a discounting of the reinsurance to close, and such must be disclosed....

5. Qualification of reports. Peter Standish raised the question of whether we can give clean solvency opinion if we give a qualified audit report. It was felt that

(a) where there is a specific transgression of the bye-law, we must qualify the syndicate accounts;

(b) a non true and fair report amounts to a qualification;

(c) if there is a qualification, a PSP must be convened, and

(d) a standard qualified report... is to be issued covering various circumstances. Michael Bolger spoke at some length on the Neville Russell paper on syndicate audit reports. John Philpott spoke about the problems of run-off accounts.... There are attached examples of audit report qualifications.

Apr 85

HMSO publication "Asbestos: Effects on Health of Exposure to Asbestos" issued by the Health and Safety Executive.

15 Apr 85

Recovery of monies Paid Out of Lloyd's Central Fund or the Funds and Property of the Society Byelaw (No. 2 of 1985, 15 April 1985).

15 Apr 85

Mr Randall's memorandum to Mr Merrett refers to "the shattering news of the last ten days".

15 Apr 85

Ernst & Whinney meeting

... Solvency test problems may arise where we are unable to express an unqualified true and fair opinion on the syndicate accounts...

In cases of non- fundamental uncertainty arising from inadequate premium records, the premium credit which is omitted is likely to outweigh the additional reserve which would be created thus giving rise to a worse view being taken for solvency purposes which is probably acceptable in the context of the test, although questions arise as to whether names should be advised by their members' agents that they are being penalised.

15 Apr 85

Corporation of Lloyd's Annual Report at 31 December 1984

Statement by Mr. Peter Miller, Chairman of Lloyd's

By the end of 1984, the Council of Lloyd's, the principal policy making body of the Society, completed its second full year of activity since its formation under the provisions of Lloyd's Act 1982.

During 1984 the Council continued at its monthly meetings, to promulgate rules for the effective supervision and administration of the Lloyd's market within a self-regulatory environment. Byelaws were enacted covering the re-registration of underwriting agencies following divestment, the accounts and audit of syndicates, rules for members, and the monitoring of premium income. In legislating for these and other topics, the Council continued to ensure that opportunities were offered for full consultation with the market, the membership and other interested parties.

This vital task has benefited greatly from the contributions made by the working, external and nominated members of the Council and from the quality of support received from the staff of Corporation departments.

Against the background of the significant progress made over the past two years in the discharge of its regulatory function, the Council decided in November 1984 that greater emphasis should henceforth he laid on formulating policies that are directed towards enhancing the level and quality of support to the Lloyd's market to enhance its commercial success.

Some of the policy decisions have already been implemented and are referred to elsewhere in this report. Within the Corporation, a small unit has been established to act as a focal point for co-ordination of changes in market practices and procedures. This and other developments in the market services area allied to the introduction of enhanced systems and communications facilities, are directed to securing the provision of highly efficient yet cost effective services to the market in general and underwriters in particular.

The Council and Corporation will implement this programme on a carefully phased basis since we are concerned to maintain a flexible approach and avoid unrealistic deadlines. We are equally concerned to preserve the independence and individuality of our underwriters, who must be enabled to take advantage of the welcome current upturn in the market with complete faith in the regulatory and administrative services provided by the Corporation. We are all determined to earn and thereafter to continue to justify that faith.

Review of the Corporation's Activities

Council Elections

Postal ballots were held for eight seats on the Council of Lloyd's for 1985 in respect of both working and external members. This election was the first occasion on which external members of the Council were elected under the full provisions of Lloyd's Act 1982. Previous elections for external membership of the Council were conducted under the transitional arrangements of the Act. Under these arrangements, the four retiring external members of the Council were able to stand for immediate re-election on this occasion only.

There were eight candidates for the four working members' seats vacated by the retirement (by rotation) from the Council of Mr B J Brennan, Mr G W Hutton, Mr S R Merrett and Mr I R Posgate. Those elected were Mr R Ballantyne, Mr P T Daniels, Mr. H R Dobinson and Mr. A Parry.

Of the seventeen candidates who contested the election of four external members of the Council Mr J M G Andrews was elected and Mr C C Baillieu, Mr C V G Davidge and Mr R E M Elborne were re-elected to serve a further term.

Mr E I Walker-Arnott, one of the four nominated members of the Council who retired, by rotation, was re-appointed, with the approval of the Governor of the Bank of England, to serve for a further period.

Staff Organisation

The fundamental changes in the constitutional framework for the governance of Lloyd's recorded in the 1983 report led to further refinement and re-organisation of the Corporation's departments and of its senior management structure during the year.

A new organisation structure for the senior staff of the Corporation has been introduced recognising the three principal functions performed for the Lloyd's community by the Corporation: the regulation of the market; the provision of commercial services to support the operations of the market; and the management of the Society's facilities and staff. This new tighter structure has improved co-ordination between Corporation departments and with the Council and its Committees which lay down policy for Lloyd's.

During the year, Mr P J Rawlins, first secretary to the Rules Committee and personal assistant to the Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive, following the end of his period of secondment to the Corporation took up an appointment as managing director of R W Sturge & Co; Mr K E Randall resigned as Head of Regulatory Services upon his appointment as managing director of a Lloyd's underwriting agency; and Mr C T G Blackmore, Director, Redevelopment Project retired. All played a significant role in the work of the Corporation.

Pending the appointment of a new Head of Regulatory Services, Mr P A R Brown, Head of External Relations was appointed Acting Head of Regulatory Services. Mr P M R Hermon was appointed as Head of Systems and Communications Group and Mr W C Beckett, formerly Solicitor to the Department of Trade and Industry, was appointed to the new position of Solicitor to the Corporation at the beginning of 1985.

Membership

Membership of the Society continued to expand vigorously. The number of underwriting members of Lloyd's at the beginning of 1985 was 26,050, representing an increase of more than 11 per cent on the previous year. While the number of UK members increased by almost 10 per cent, the number of American citizens in membership rose by 18. 7 per cent. Overall, the increase in the number of foreign nationals compared with a year earlier amounted to eleven per cent. More than one fifth of the Society is now accounted for by female members.

There is every indication that this year will see further substantial increase in the number of individuals applying for membership of Lloyd's. The Society is indebted to members of the Committee and Council of Lloyd's who serve on the Rota Committees and to the Membership Department for the smooth processing of applications.

Regulatory Matters

Much of the Council's work, with the close involvement of appropriate Committees of the Council and Corporation departments, was concerned with the formulation and promulgation of byelaws relating to establishing improved standards for the preparation of syndicate accounts and for the auditing of those accounts. These standards are contained in the Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No 7 of 1984) and the Syndicate Audit Arrangements Byelaw (No 10 of 1984).

Important progress was also made in the promulgation of rules concerning .membership. This was reflected in the implementation of the Membership Byelaw (No 9 of 1984) and publication of a manual for members which contained detailed requirements and conditions for membership of the Society. The Long Term Review Working Party, under the chairmanship of Mr. P G Bird, completed its deliberations and, since the end of the year, its report has been published as a consultative document on which submissions and comment have been invited.

In May 1984, the Council promulgated the Underwriting Agents Byelaw (No 4 of 1984) which deals, inter alia, with the subject of divestment. It is a statutory provision of Lloyd's Act 1982, that Lloyd's insurance brokers must divest themselves of their managing agencies by 22 July 1987, five years from the date of enactment.

This process will inevitably have fundamental repercussions for the structure and shape of the Lloyd's market. The divestment programme has already gathered pace and by the end of the first quarter of 1985, almost half of the 114 managing agencies affected had announced plans to comply with the Byelaws.

In January 1985, the Council approved publication of the new Standard Underwriting Agency Agreement following consideration of responses to a consultative document published in July 1984.

Investigations have now been largely completed into those cases of alleged misconduct which came to light towards the end of 1982. In consequence, a number of cases have been heard by Lloyd's Disciplinary Committees. The verdicts and penalties have, in some cases, been considered at special meetings of the Council and the findings of the Disciplinary Committee and the Council's decisions made public.

External Relations

After prolonged discussions, in which Lloyd's law Reform Committee was actively involved, the Government decided not to proceed with a Michael Cockell, the Chairman participated in the annual meeting of the American Association of Managing General Agents. Finally, after a brief visit to Los Angeles, Mr Miller addressed a plenary session of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in Kansas.

8 May 85

K P. McNamara paper on Outhwaite's Syndicate 317/661 run-offs. Policies for discussion.

During 1984 there has been a very substantial deterioration in outstanding claims which relate to many years ago. The deterioration is related to three major factors; significant further increase in the number of claims for asbestosis; a larger than expected settlement of claims for sufferers from the defoliant used in Vietnam, Agent Orange, and a massive claim from Shell Oil in the USA relating to seepage of chemical warfare products in Colorado which they have been ordered to clean up by the US Environmental Protection Agency. These additional claims have added in the year approximately $70 million to the claims that may have to be paid eventually by Syndicate 317. However, insofar as our client never underwrote the business directly he is not well placed to assess whether the current estimate of outstanding tosses is excessively prudent or not. He has made enquiries in respect of one of these contracts which, so far, indicates that the position may be prudent. We are nevertheless left with a major difficulty in determining what the ultimate liability on these contracts is likely to be. Many of the long established syndicates at Lloyd's are having difficulties in assessing the reserves to make in respect of business written many years ago but insofar as the syndicates have expanded greatly in the intervening period the adverse effect of under provision is spread over a greatly increased number of names. However for Syndicate 317 we are effectively [sic] taking in the adverse run-off for more names than are currently on the syndicate and thus there is uniquely not the dilution that helps the others....

The Client's Position:

... Although it is a standard Lloyd's procedure to close an underwriting account by reinsurance into the following year it is possible to leave an account "open" and thus the 1982 Names stay on risk until such time as it is decided to close the account. It is widely known in the Lloyd's market that Mr Outhwaite has written these run-off contracts, not least by the many people he has insured who believe that he will end up paying out more than he expected. Mr Outhwaite is aware of the controversy surrounding these contracts and also the increased attention created by the substantial losses recently declared by our client, Merrett syndicates. Part of which has arisen from a dozen run-off contracts that they have underwritten some jointly with Mr Outhwaite. Whilst we do not doubt his sincerity in the proposed result for the year we appreciate that he would not wish Names to defect from his syndicate, rather the reverse, which could arise if he declared a significant loss. He has already had Merrett syndicates, who as a sub-agent had placed names on the syndicates, defect following an investigation and he would not wish others to follow.... the principal argument put forward by him [Mr Outhwaite] is that the insureds are pessimistic in the notification of the claims outstanding and that it is typical for outstanding claims to reach a peak and then fall out as they are compromised or not pursued. He considers the latter to be particularly relevant in connection with property claims arising on buildings, like schools, built with asbestos linings. However confident he may be it is still necessary for him to consider the adequacy of the IBNR. The client has not produced any documentation or calculations to support the IBNR. Indeed he did not until recently accept the principle of providing the future cost of financing losses provision which he has now effectively made by reducing the IBNR by a corresponding amount. Whilst it is recognised that determining the IBNR is not susceptible to actuarial projection we are in the position of relying on his opinion as to excessive nature of the claims already notified and the £34.1 million of IBNR.

Our position:

Apart from acting as auditors to this syndicate we also act for at least 17 sub-agents who have placed Names on the syndicate ... the new Lloyd's Regulations effectively stipulate that if we issue a qualified report that the 1982 account will have to be left "open". This course would be highly unpopular with the agent and also the sub-agents for the administrative chaos it would be likely to cause. It has to be recognised that if the account is left open there is every probability that it will remain so until at least 2010 which creates the difficulties for Names who die, resign etc. However the 1983 Names are already committed and they must receive an equitable premium for the risks they are assuming, particularly those who joined in 1983. There are a series of fundamental issues to address.

Firstly whether we are satisfied that the client has done enough to demonstrate that the reserve for IBNR has been calculated after due and careful consideration.

Secondly we have to consider disclosure. At the present level of reserve we are assuming an ultimate level of claim payments including IBNR that might be considered by many as being low although the judgement could only be made on the basis of even more limited knowledge than the Underwriter. If however the syndicates were to adopt the level of provision that Merretts were projecting for their run-off contracts then we would need to add approximately £40 million to the IBNR or £25,000 per name.

9 May 85

Meeting of Ernst & Whinney partners including Holland and McNamara re Outhwaite Syndicate 317.

EOME opened the discussion and enquired whether the numbers had been properly computed by the client particularly in respect of the IBNR. It was admitted that the client had originally been planning to pay out a profit of £7 million to the names and the revised figures were showing a distribution of only £400,000 and the difference represented adjustments made in respect of points which had been raised in the course of our audit which required the specific adjustment. Nevertheless, it was recognised that the element of IBNR had in one sense remained unaltered and had been initially derived backwards, the figure having first determined what profit the Underwriter wished to pay out.

N C L McDonald stated that despite making the adjustments there was still a very large degree of uncertainty because of the sensitivities of the projections to minor changes in the assumptions. He felt that as the initial starting number for the IBNR reserve was unsupportable no matter what changes we had made, the final concluding number still suffered from the inherent defects of the original estimate, as the adjustments we asked to be made represented only specific items and that the original Reinsurance to Close put forward by the client represented an element of the specific and the general and that whilst we had adjusted the specific little change had been made, if any to the general provision despite the client's acceptance of the fact that some interest factor adjustment would have to be made for the payment of claims running ahead of the recovery under the special reinsurance policies.

NCLM stressed that he appreciated that we were in an industry dealing with uncertainty and that we naturally expected, but it was nevertheless still possible, to come to a point whereby the uncertainty was so significant that we would be unable to express a view. He went on to say that insofar as he believed that the Underwriter was not necessarily putting forward a well constructed best estimate of what the outstanding losses are likely to be, that we should in no sense in our audit report, endorse the position taken by the client even in the knowledge that it might well be wrong...

N F Holland expressed the view strongly that what we did not want to do in our audit opinion was to say that the matter was such that we thought the Reinsurance to Close was understated but that we wished in fact to take a neutral position.

KPM supported this view and he appreciated the point that was being made by NFH. If we said it was under-reserved it will be very difficult for us to sign a solvency certificate with an opinion which would have a compounding effect on the overall solvency certificate for the whole of the Lloyd's Market....

KPM expressed the view that the professional reader of the accounts would be very much able to form his own view about the adequacy of the Reinsurance to Close if he was able to see that the ratio of the specific element to the IBNR element. It was also agreed that in view of the uncertainties we had, it would be inevitable that we would have to give a form of opinion that was tantamount to a disclaimer and that as a consequence, the account would be likely to be left open probably for many years to come. Note signed by McNamara on 15 May 1985.

May 85

The Chairman of Lloyd's Peter Miller, accompanied by Mr Colin Murray and senior members of the Lloyd's broking community paid an official visit to the Peoples republic of China. In Beijing, the Lloyd's party met the Chairman of The People's Insurance Company of China, Mr Shang Ming and other leading officials of the PICC, before being received by Vice Premier, Tian Jiyun and Madame Chen Muhua, State Councillor and President of the People's Bank of China.

13 May 85

Evening Standard: The Name Game – and why, today, there are some famous faces among the losers

EROS had his work cut out today. The God of love currently resting in the Royal Festival Hall while his Piccadilly site is renovated can rarely have felt so out of place. For the South Bank site was playing host this after-noon to a meeting of names - or members - of Lloyd's.

A few weeks ago they were brusquely informed that they had, each and every one, lost a fortune on insurance under-writing deals which had gone horribly wrong.

As they gathered this afternoon to get further possibly better, but more likely worse, news of the debacle. love would have been the last thing on their minds.

The few hundred people concerned include some of the best known names in the country, many of whom will scarcely be down to their last million, no matter how heavy the losses they have to bear.

These are folk from the fashion pages and the gossip columns - like Adnam Kashoggi, Lord Portman and the Duchess of Kent.

Their life savings

But for most of the other 400 names it is a deep personal tragedy and one made all the worse for the waiting, for they still do not know just how bad it will be, and just how much they will have to pay up.

"The vast majority of the 400 affected are normal, middle - class moderately wealthy people," says Christopher Crosthwaite, a partner in Ashurst Morris, a leading firm of solicitors.

He is involved because he acts for a steering committee of names formed under the chairmanship of Lord Goodman, which is even now seeing what can be done to limit the damage.

And he is extremely concerned at the toll the potential losses could have on these people.

"Many are professional people – barristers, solicitors and farmers, and the bulk of them are retired." says Crosthwaite. "In a lot of these cases a substantial portion of the security they have pledged is their holiday home or their life savings or both, and they it is who stand to lose all. Quite a number say they face personal bankruptcy."

The early estimates of the losses were bad enough. At the beginning of May, following a spate of rumours in the Press, Richard Beckett, the Lloyd's professional who runs the troubled syndicates, wrote to the names - the outsiders who put up the money and bear the risk-to tell them the bad news.

They stood to lose about £60 million for the insurance policies they had written in the years up to 1982 - a wallet-numbing average of £150,000 each.

But there is worse - possibly much worse - to come. That letter detailed the problems up to the end

of 1982 but they are still working out what has happened since then.

How, bad that will be is still anyone's guess but it could be as much again, or more. So the average

Liability immediately doubles to £300,000.

Losses on this scale raise a fundamental question. What is it that makes people invest in Lloyd's, and what return do they expect on their money which can possibly make worthwhile the risk of losing absolutely everything you have worked for all your life?

The key point about investing in Lloyd's or becoming a name is that you can lose much more than the money you put in. It is not like buying a share or betting on a horse, where all you can lose is your stake money

In fact it is quite the opposite. The investor in Lloyd's is the bookie, not the gambler - and if the favourite comes in he has to pay out no matter how painful the loss.

But it is worse than that. For what the names in these affected syndicates have found is that the horse which keeps winning is one they did not even know was in the race.

They are being asked to pay out claims which could one day reach $5 billion for compensation to workers for diseases like asbestosis which did not exist, or had not been diagnosed, when they agreed years ago to insure the employers against the possibility of their people being inured at work.

Passport to profits

Ignorance, of course, is no excuse. They agreed to write the insurance and they cannot in fairness, or in law, change their minds when it does not work out as expected.

Nor can they say they did not know they would be personally liable to their last penny - the committee of Lloyd's goes to great pains to make it clear that the shirt on your back is at risk, although. one member told me with a grim smile, they do try to leave the bankrupt with a clean pair of sheets.

But it is a bitter shock nevertheless, and one which is ironically the harder to bear because being a Lloyd's name is so often a passport to substantial profits.

To become a name, you have first to be able to show personal wealth of £100,000, excluding your house, but you do not actually have to deposit the money. So it can be left in shares or earning interest in a bank account, while at the same time it is technically working for you at Lloyd's. In other words, it earns for you twice over.

On top of that, writing insurance can be very profitable. If, for example, a syndicate has £1 million of capital, it would be allowed to collect insurance premiums under Lloyd's rules for two, three or perhaps four times that amount, depending on what was being insured.

So it might have £4 million in cash from premiums which it can invest, and the interest on that at today's bank rates of 12-5 per cent would be £500,000 a year.

So even if all the premium money ultimately has to be paid back in claims on the policy, the syndicate will still have made £500,000 on the £1 million pledged - a rate of return of 50 per cent.

The problem is that the prospect of that kind of return tends to blind people to the risks involved - until something on the lines of the present disaster happens.

Then the names find to their cost that they are alone. The rest of tile Lloyd's market will not bale them out, nor will the Lloyd's firm which run the business for them. The pounding is solely on their pockets.

It is at this time that they are all probably in mind of a homily told by a particularly austere Scots minister. He would tell his flock that sinners, as they saw the fires of hell, were wont to look up to heaven and cry "Lord. we did not know it would be like this." And the Lord would look down on them in his infinite mercy and say "Well you know now."

14 May 85

Meeting held at Lloyd's to inform them about the qualification in the audit report of Outhwaite Syndicate 317/661 in their 31 December 1984 accounts.

Present, inter alia, K P McNamara and N B Tyler of Ernst & Whinney.

Paul McNamara then explained to Cathy Shorthouse( Manager, Lloyd's Auditing Department) enough of the background for her to understand how we had come to the present position of an audit report with a disclaimer of opinion. He emphasised that the report on the Syndicate's accounts and the report on the Syndicate's solvency position for the 1982 year of account were two entirely separate issues. He agreed that for solvency purposes as the provisions to close 1982 were the Syndicate's best estimate and also that Ernst & Whinney were not saying that this estimate was too low we could sign off the solvency return for the Syndicate.

Paul McNamara pointed out that our audit qualification on the accounts was carefully worded to take a middle or neutral view, i.e. the disclaimer of opinion was purely on the grounds of uncertainty, Ernst & Whinney are not saying they consider the reserves to be either understated or overstated, ...

Maurice Hussey stated that he had discussed the Syndicate's audit report qualification with a number of sub-agents for the Syndicate and they did not disagree with this qualification. Robin Gilkes then strongly expressed his opinion that the 1982 accounts should be closed. He stated that to keep it open was not the best solution as it would not be possible to close it for say 10 years.

Cathy Shorthouse then stated that the final decision as to whether a year of account is closed rests entirely with the Managing Agent. She pointed out that discussion on this matter with a Syndicate's auditors would be beneficial but emphasised that the final decision on whether a year of account is closed is the Managing Agent's and not the auditors'....

It was thus agreed that the Syndicate could close its 1982 year of account and that the audit report would be qualified with what amounted to a disclaimer of opinion. It was also agreed that the solvency return for the 1982, 1983 and 1984 accounts at 31 December 1984 would be submitted with a clean audit opinion. Note by N B Tyler.

14 May 85

Cover Note issued by E W Payne Limited (a Sedgwick subsidiary) to Merretts summarising Time and Distance policy purchased from Mendip Insurance & Reinsurance Company Ltd ("Mendip") (a Sedgwick subsidiary), a company incorporated in Bermuda. The contract cost $3,275,000 and would generate potential recoveries of $7,250,000. The contract had the effect of reducing losses attributed to the Names on the 1982 year of account of Syndicate 421 by $3,975,000 (£3,426,724 at 31 December 1984 rates of exchange) which represented approximately 120% of the 1982 stamp.

15 May 85

In a file note dated 15 May 1985, in relation to the audit of the accounts of Syndicates 418/417 and 421 for the year ended 31 December 1984, Ernst & Whinney recorded inter alia:

"It was the initial intention of Merretts that having computed the necessary reinsurance to close for each of the above syndicates they would be closed out on the basis of a full reserve at this time, although it was recognised that there would not necessarily be settlement on many of the claims provided for many years to come.

After further consideration and discussions with the Chairman of Lloyd's and the Deputy Chairman by Stephen Merrett it was decided that they would take out an element of time and distance policy ... in order to mitigate the impact of the losses on the Names participating in the 1982 year of account ...

We stipulated to them that if they chose to purchase such policies we consider it essential that the timing of recoveries under those policies should be such that at no time were the funds carried forward left in the syndicate in respect of the 1982 accounts and prior being inadequate to meet the claims as and when they fell due. If in fact there was a position whereby subsequent underwriting years of account had to fund the difference then it will be necessary at this time to make an interest provision for that funding to be provided by future years of account.

After this discussion Merretts produced various cash flow forecasts in order to determine the pattern of time and distance policies that they would wish to purchase in order to ensure that there would be adequate cash in the syndicate to meet claims as and when they fell due out of funds provided in respect of the 1982 year of account. Full cash flow forecasts were produced for each syndicate by Peter McCann on the basis of spending various sums of money in respect of time and distance policies for each syndicate and with different periods of recovery as needed.

In preparing the cash flow forecasts account was taken of the various elements of the reinsurance to close in determining the claims settlement patterns. Particular attention was paid to the run-off contracts by reference to the excess point on each contract. Points beneath the excess points which are currently being reached and the current rate of settlement of claims by the individual syndicates or insurance companies. Arbitrary assessments were made of the pattern of settlements in respect of Shell claims and other Environmental Protection Act claims between now and 1999.

Cash flow forecasts have been prepared on a reasonably conservative basis and it is quite possible that there will be a slower rate of settlement than forecast."

Taking credit for time and distance contracts at their monetary value, rather than at their net

present value, in the RITC for the 1982 account was thought to be a radical concept at that time by Chatset; the 1982 Lloyd's League Tables, produced by Chatset and published in 1985, stated in a discussion on outstanding claims:

"At least on the face of it, Merrett Syndicates have adopted a brand new convention. This involves assessing today's value of the outstanding obligations, but taking into account reinsurance recoveries from a Time and Distance policy ... as if all the next ten year's interest had already been received..."

The Syndicate 421 Loss Review Committee accepts that the use of time and distance contracts was a common practice at Lloyd's at that time and that they were generally accounted for as "normal" reinsurance contracts, usually with no, or inadequate, disclosure. In contrast, Syndicate 421 made comprehensive disclosures of these contracts; in response to a question as to whether he regarded taking credit for time and distance contracts at their monetary value as a new convention, Ken Randall told the Committee:

"Not at all; I think that as it now appears maybe we were ahead of most in our disclosures."

and went on to say:

"I cannot see what point there would have been in purchasing time and distance in the context of the exercise we were undertaking at that time if we had taken the present value."

15 May 85

Financial Times: Accountancy muddle adds problems at Lloyd's

Accountants Price Waterhouse are uncovering a major accounting muddle which has contributed to the worsening problems of the Lloyd's underwriting members whose affairs are managed by interests of Minet Holdings, the insurance broker.

More details emerged yesterday about the events which led up to the £130m losses falling on the Lloyd's underwriting members.

So far the official reason for the losses, given by Minet's Richard Beckett underwriting agency, is that huge insurance claims arose from product liability, pollution, medical malpractice, personal injury business and asbestosis claims all largely from U.S. clients, which have led to a "dramatic deterioration" in the underwriting results.

However, independent accountants, Price Waterhouse, acting for a group of concerned underwriting members who have formed a steering committee to protect the interests have started to unearth an accounting muddle within the agency which has had a dramatic effect on the results.

The problems being discovered are linked to the troubles which surfaced in late 1982 when its was discovered by Minet executives that money had been misappropriated from the underwriting funds of the Lloyd's members by other senior executives.

By last year Minet had established that nearly £40m had disappeared from the underwriting members' funds to interests of Mr Peter Dixon and Mr Peter Cameron-Webb, managers of the group's PCW agency, and their associates. The money was used for the two men's personal benefit.

A part of the underwriting members' business was reinsured via a company in Bermuda called Chiltern. The business was then channelled to companies in Gibraltar, which it has since transpired were controlled by interests of Mr Cameron-Webb and Mr Dixon. Blanket reinsurance arrangements were made for underwriting members whose affairs were managed by the Minet's underwriting agency.

When Minet identified the full extent of the seriousness of the troubles it sought to regularise the position and cancelled reinsurance programmes arranged by Mr Peter Cameron-Webb and Mr Dixon. Minet managed to recover £25m of the missing money and with Alexander and Alexander, another insurance broker whose Howden interests had been used to siphon off the money, put up a further £12.7m to make good the loss to the underwriting members. In all a near £40m compensation offer was made to the underwriting members for their missing funds.

Price Waterhouse is probing the extent to which the reinsurance programme arranged by Mr Dixon and Mr Cameron-Webb was involved in reinsuring real liabilities of the syndicate. At the moment it is feared that the underwriting members reinsurance support may have been knocked away in Minet's attempts to unscramble the mess.

There are other matters which Price Waterhouse are examining. Last year when Minet discovered the full amount of the funds missing it also indicated that trading losses of roughly the same amount, nearly £40m, had also arisen. Minet's compensation proved timely and the underwriting members used the money to pay for their trading losses. In return for accepting the money the underwriting members had to agree to assign away their legal rights to sue Minet, or anybody else, in connection with the recovery of further funds and the scandal to a joint company owned by Minet and Alexander and Alexander.

The underwriting members are upset that they took up the offer in the expectation that there were no further losses of significance in the pipeline. Since then Minet's agency, now called the Richard Beckett Underwriting Agency, has changed the basis of accounting for future losses, taking a more prudent view of future insurance claims. As a result, a further £60m of provisions are felt to be necessary and other claims of £17m are in the pipeline. Price Waterhouse wants to know why the basis of accounting was changed.

Moreover, the reinsurance programme as a whole, admitted Mr Graham White, managing director of the agency, has been inadequate.

Price Waterhouse is wondering why the reinsurance programme had limits on the amount which could be paid out to the underwriting members when the type of business reinsured called for the most extensive laying off of risks which could be arranged.

Some members of the Minet syndicates took out personal stop loss, but some found their personal stop losses were arranged with a tiny syndicate formed of Mr Cameron-Webb and his associates. The wording of their policies was so tightly drawn that they may be unlikely to recover any money

in the form of claims, while the small syndicate has been virtually guaranteed a sure-fire profit.

At the Moment a Steering Committee of underwriting members, whose honorary chairman is Lord Goodman, is trying to raise a fighting fund of £1.5m to pursue legal action against various parties.

Underwriting members are putting up the cash and are prepared to inject as much as £3.8m into the fund.

Mr Ian Hay Davison, Lloyd's chief executive, said yesterday that the results of the syndicates in which the Beckett underwriting members are grouped " are absolutely dreadful," but Lloyd's is not intending to provide financial support to the troubled members.

18 May 85

Financial Times: The story of a £130m loss

THE audience was nervous before the performance on Monday at the Royal Festival Hall. Port and brandies were ordered at the bar by some of the elegantly turned-out ladies and gentlemen to calm churning stomachs.

It was no ordinary occasion, for this audience was formed of around 500 or so members of the Lloyd's insurance market, and their professional advisers, who had come to listen to the managers of their affairs give them details of their investment in Lloyd's. The members had not expected good news and they did not get it. They were told that they had to be prepared to fund £130m of insurance losses which were expected to fall on them as underwriting members of Lloyd's.

"Come clean. you devil," one angry underwriting member shouted at she stage where the managers of his affairs at Lloyd s, Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies were seated. It was a mark of the confusion and anger felt by him and his fellow underwriting members who want to know why the problems happened and whether they will happen again. Some face personal bankruptcy if they have to pay out for the insurance claims.

The underwriting members of Lloyd's are a very unusual class of investor. They are drawn from the wealthiest end of society and usually have to show that they have £100,000 of personal wealth before they become members. It is their wealth, which they pledge to Lloyd's, which allows the market to function. In return for their commitment they receive a share of the profits - but they also have to meet insurance losses even if those losses swallow up their entire personal fortunes.

Losses arise frequently for the 26,000 underwriting members at Lloyds. But the huge losses in this case have been compounded by the alleged misappropriation of funds. Members whose insurance business has been affected by the troubles include: the Duchess of Kent, the Duchess of Marlborough, Viscount Portman, Jeffrey Archer, the novelist, Adnan Kashoggi, the businessman and Charles Longbottom, a former Conservative MP.

Most of the 1,525 affected however, are not well-off celebrities. Rather they are farmers, successful businessmen, lawyers, accountants and insurance professionals of the Lloyd's market itself.

Those members who work in Lloyd's are known as "vocational" members.

One farmer faces losses of more than £500,000. A secretary put into Lloyd's by a former boss at the Beckett underwriting agency faces losses of around £250,000. But whole families - including members, their wives, sons and daughters - face combined losses running to millions.

The underwriting members affected are arguing that the situation has called into question Lloyd's regulatory structure. They are highly critical of the management of the Richard Beckett Underwriting Agency and its parent company, Minet Holdings, the large insurance broker. "I would not recommend anyone to become a member of Lloyd's until this is sorted out," said Mr Keith Whitten, a 39-year-old City head-hunter who stands to lose £105,000 from his involvement as a member of Lloyd's.

The anger of the members, meanwhile, has been fired by other troubles which have surfaced at the agency in the last three years. In 1982 Lloyd's launched an emergency inquiry into an insurance contract arranged by former underwriting executives of Minet's underwriting agency interests. The Lloyd's inquiry had been prompted by accountants Deloitte Haskins and Sells who were examining the books of Alexander Howden, another large insurance broker.

Deloitte Haskins & Sells had already established that $55m had gone missing at Howden allegedly misappropriated by former Howden executives. But they had discovered a new problem. Highly unorthodox insurance contracts had been arranged by executives of underwriting interests of Minet.

The Department of Trade and Industry decided to appoint inspectors to investigate the matter and asked the City of London Police Fraud Squad to assist it in its inquiries. Shortly after, Mr John Wallrock, chairman of Minet, resigned when he admitted that he had secretly gained benefit from insurance transactions for the Lloyd's underwriting members within the group.

Minet later discovered that £40m of funds had gone missing which it alleged had been misappropriated by its two leading underwriting executives, Mr Peter Cameron-Webb and Mr Peter Dixon. They had spent the money on buying yachts, executive jets, production costs of two films "Let's do it" and ‘ The last Horror Show," oil and gas wells in the U.S., a French orange juice company and other private investments.

How then did it happen and what has brought hundreds of comfortably off individuals to the brink of financial ruin?

A key figure in the story is Mr Cameron-Webb, a highly respected underwriter within Lloyd's who had established a considerable reputation in the 1960s and 1970s. He was, according to one broker, "one of the ‘brains' of the market." His early business life was spent working with Sir Peter Green, the former chairman of Lloyd's.

Later Mr Cameron-Webb set up his own underwriting agency, called PCW, that was to be renamed "Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies" by Minet once the troubles surfaced in later Years. The agency supervised the affairs of Lloyd's underwriting members and Mr Cameron-Webb took on insurance business on behalf of the members. It was a successful agency and in 1973 he decided to sell it on to Minet.

He received around £2m in the deal but drove a hard bargain with Mr Wallrock, the then chairman of Minet, in the way the agency was to be run. Under the arrangement, Mr Cameron-Webb and his partner Mr Dixon, were to be left with full autonomy in the running of the agency; they were to own the voting shares in the agency, while Minet would hold non-voting shares which received a dividend; and only one member of the Minet board was to be allowed to sit on the agency's own board - with the agency nominating the individual. It chose Mr Wallrock.

It was further stipulated that there was to be no involvement by Minet in the conduct of the agency unless the value of the asset became substantially impaired. By the end of 1982 action was needed. So for nine years, the entrepreneurial Mr Cameron-Webb, together with his partner Mr Dixon, was running his own show in the high risk business of insurance.

In arranging business for the members, Mr Cameron-Webb made extensive use of the world's arcane reinsurance markets. These are used to lay off the risks of the syndicates with other insurance concerns which are expected to pay claims to the syndicates in the event of large losses. To secure reinsurance the syndicates pay money in the form of a premium to gain the necessary protection.

But once Lloyd's started its inquiries and Minet launched its own investigation it was found that PCW was using reinsurance in a way that was not originally intended. The money, flowed out of the syndicates, ostensibly as a reinsurance premium, and was eventually channelled to companies in Gibraltar that were owned by interests of Mr Cameron Webb and Mr Dixon.

Minet found, among the contracts, that Mr Cameron-Webb had arranged hat around 5 per cent of the syndicates' premium income was passed across to companies which they owned. The contracts were drawn up so that in the event of losses the companies would pay 5 per cent of any claims falling on the syndicates.

Minet's Beckett agency has since sought to unscramble the mess. It located £25m of the missing funds in Gibraltar. But it faced a problem. If the money was to be returned to the members it had to be channelled back through a number of other companies. To channel the funds to their interests in Gibraltar, Mr Cameron-Webb and Mr Dixon had utilised independent companies outside the Minet group, which wanted the policies cancelled if the funds were to be returned. Minet's Beckett agency did that. The result of doing so was to remove a part of the syndicates' reinsurance programme.

Last summer, Minet arranged for a return of funds of £25m to the underwriting members which had allegedly been misappropriated by Mr Cameron-Webb and Mr Dixon. This was topped up by a £13.14m contribution by Minet and Alexander & Alexander, the parent company of Alexander Howden through which much of the missing money had been routed.

The offer was timely. Insurance claims were pouring into the syndicates arising from court cases against U.S. industrial companies by families of former employees who had contracted asbestosis. Other liability claims were coming through to the syndicates arising from the use of Agent Orange, the defoliant used during the Vietnam war. These claims were now arising on business which had been accepted in earlier years by the agency management. The losses from this and other business totalled £37.9m. So the £38.14m offer by Minet's interests helped wipe out individual losses of syndicate members who stood to lose up to £233,000 each.

Mr Ralph Bailey, a newly appointed underwriter, who had taken over the running of Beckett's 400-strong syndicate 918, decided that the possibility of other liability claims was so great that funds would be needed from the members in order to take account of future losses. Together with its sister syndicates, the members are to be asked to find £60m to fund future losses though the agency hopes that if the funds are provided the interest earned on the money over a possible 20 year period will be sufficient to meet the expected £130m of insurance claims which will arise.

Because of the mounting problems at the agency Minet has had to take urgent action. Richard Beckett is to be closed at the end of the year and the underwriting members will have to find other managers in the Lloyd's market to run their affairs.

The underwriting members are shocked that the possible claims were not anticipated last year by the current management of the agency, and are furious that Minet appears to be "walking away" from the agency's management. They are also arguing that they have not received up to £40m of interest on the money which went missing over the years.

For Lloyd's, the problems of the Minet agency have created their own regulatory nightmare. Much of what happened took place before Lloyd's legislation improving its regulatory powers was passed in the 1982 Lloyds Act. The powers of the Lloyd's authorities were limited in the extent to which they could intervene. Any intervention by the market authorities in underwriting affairs of the business was, and still is, resented by those working in a market where freedom of action is jealously guarded.

So Lloyd's has reacted to rather than prevented the problems. It is taking disciplinary action against Mr Wallrock, who is hoping to clear his name. Other disciplinary proceedings have been taken against Mr Dixon, who has been fined £1m, and expelled from the market subject to final ratification by Lloyd's council and completion of the disciplinary process. Both Mr Cameron-Webb and Mr Dixon are livings abroad and Mr Cameron-Webb is working on the Lloyd's style insurance market in Florida, the Insurance Exchanges of the Americas. Mr Cameron-Webb resigned from Lloyd's at the end of 1981 and is therefore now beyond the reach of Lloyd's disciplinary procedures.

Underwriting members hope that the troubles at the Minet agency will give impetus to further reforms at Lloyd's. A range of accounting reforms has already been pushed through and others are on the way. Better monitoring of what is happening in the market is also likely to be introduced. Unfortunately for the members of the Beckett agency the reforms have come too late to save them from their own financial agony.

May 85

The Cologne Re reported that only a small proportion of asbestosis cases were actually taken to trial up to 1982.

21 May 85

Letter from Merrett Syndicates Ltd (MSL) (J. Robson) to members.

21 May 85

Note of telephone conversation held on 17 May 1985 between Robin Gilkes of Outhwaite Syndicates and N B Tyler of Ernst & Whinney.

Tyler said he understood Lloyd's might be reconsidering the ruling they had given E&W and Outhwaite on Tuesday 14 May. At this point Gilkes put the phone down on him.

21 May 85

Letter from S R Merrett to N C Haydon.

We have .. given serious consideration as to whether the accounts should be kept open. After that consideration, and on the basis of all the information we have concluded that we can quantify an appropriate sum to close the account by reinsurance, and we are therefore proceeding to do so.

30 May 85

Financial Times: Agency chief sounds out Lloyd's on rescue

Mr Graham White, managing director of the stricken Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies company in the Lloyd's insurance market, has been taking soundings in quest of a possible market rescue of the 1,525 underwriting members who face £130m of losses.

A top level meeting took place last Thursday at Hambros Bank with various members of Lloyd's to discuss a course of action for the agency and its underwriting members, who face one of the worst series of trading and management problems to emerge in the market for years.

Present at the meeting were Mr Stephen Merrett, a leading Lloyd's underwriter; Mr Michael Wade of Horace Holman & Co. and a stop loss insurance specialist; Mr Bill Goodier of Willis Faber & Dumas (Agencies); Ms Heather Thomas of Willis Faber; Mr John Donner of Donner Underwriting Agencies, and Mr John Gordon of Bland Welch Underwriting.

The public attitude expressed so far by the Lloyd's authorities is that the underwriting members, nearly 300 of whom face losses of more than £100,000 each, will not receive financial assistance to help them meet those losses.

But last week's meeting is understood to have explored what the market itself might initiate or recommend to help underwriting members through their financial crisis.

Those who went to the meeting are understood to have felt there should be a rescue of some kind. But there was agreement that nothing should be done until the agency was provided with new management by Lloyd's and separated from its parent company, Minet Holdings, the large insurance broker.

Lloyd's has said it plans to form a new management company for the underwriting members following Minet's decision to close the agency by the end of the year.

The meeting explored the idea of arranging a letter of credit provided by a bank to help the underwriting members pass the Lloyd's solvency test by the July 31 deadline.

85

The Companies Act of 1985 receives Royal Assent. Section 310 of the 1985 Companies Act, forbids accountants from being able to contractually limit their liability.

0 Jun 85

Lloyd's of London Newsletter: United States next

Between May 28 and June 11 the Chairman will be touring the United States visiting Sea Island, Georgia, Frankfort, Kentucky, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston and Kansas City.

During the visit the Chairman will address the National Association of Insurance Brokers, the American Association of Managing General Agents, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. He will also be giving a series of press conferences and will appear on the Johnny Carson television show.

The Chairman will be accompanied by Lord Kimball for the visits to Georgia and Kentucky and by Mr. Michael Cockell elsewhere.

0 Jun 85

the Department of Trade and Industry issued a consultative document on Accounting and Audit Requirements for Small Firms. This stirred up a notable controversy.

0 Jun 85

Lloyd's of London Newsletter: Brokers code

The Council of Lloyd's has approved the preparation of a consultative document on the regulation of Lloyd's brokers. Four working groups have been set up which will deal with

(a) the financial requirements,

  1. an appropriate code of conduct, and
  2. the structure and operations of Lloyd's brokers.

The fourth group will co-ordinate activities and be responsible for producing the consultative document.

It is hoped that preliminary work, involving representatives of Lloyd's Insurance Brokers' Committee, will be completed in sufficient time to allow the consultative document to be issued in October, and that rules will be enacted in about twelve months time.

Current regulations predate the Lloyd's Act 1982 and details on the granting of permissions and undertakings vary according to the date of each broker's admission. The question of umbrella arrangements, at present under examination by a separate body, will not be dealt with in isolation but will be incorporated in any rules set up.

0 Jun 85

Lloyd's of London Newsletter: Richard Beckett losses

Losses estimated at £62 million have been announced by Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies (RBUA) for 1979-82 inclusive, affecting syndicates managed by the company. The losses resulted mainly from a deterioration in long term US liability business, notably asbestosis.

Announcing the losses to a meeting of some 400 Names held in the Royal Festival Hall on May 13, Mr. Graham White, managing director of RBUA, told members that it was a black day and that bad underwriting in the years before the Richard Beckett Agency assumed responsibility was, in part, to blame. The syndicates were formerly managed by the discredited PCW agency. Following the meeting, members of the syndicates affected formed a steering committee under the honorary chairmanship of Lord Goodman to consider plans for a legal campaign against the agency.

Speaking on BBC2's Newsnight programme the Chairman of Lloyd's, Mr. Peter Miller, did not think the RBUA affair would cause any loss of confidence in Lloyd's. He said: "In the year when the losses were made there were some 431 syndicates trading at Lloyd's. This is one syndicate. There are at the moment 26,050 members of Lloyd's. This syndicate involved 350 Names or thereabouts, so we must put that in context. Another thing I have to say is that the Council of Lloyd's has a regulatory function and its primary duty is towards the policyholder to see that the Lloyd's policy and its backing, its Names, are solvent at all times."

8 Jun 85

Daily Telegraph: ‘False accounting' at PCW claim members

AN INVESTIGATION of the books of the PCW syndicates at Lloyd's, which are facing £130 million of losses, has produced a picture "entirely consistent with a long-term and all-embracing fraud and with false accounting going back to the early 1970s," says the committee of members

"This has cast doubt over all underwriting accounts and results published during that period," it adds.

A report for members front accountants Price Waterhouse shows the figures were "manipulated to conceal serious overwriting" and the reinsurance programme was "wrongly implemented in a manner which is prejudicial to the interests of the non-marine syndicate," says the committee.

On top of that information has been withheld from members and "a large number of possible reinsurance recoveries on non-marine syndicates have not been claimed or credited to the syndicates accounts."

Members will discuss the report next week with Robert Alexander QC, reputedly Britain's highest paid barrister, to see if it gives grounds for litigation.

Keith Whitten, a member of the PCW 1985 Committee said the effect was that the accounts were "totally meaningless." If members had known last year that the syndicates were under-reserved by £36 million they might have wanted greater contributions from Minet Holdings and Alexander Howden Group before agreeing to the suggested rescue package.

The Price Waterhouse report suggests that money transferred in and out of the 1975-76 accounts concealed overwriting which might have been three times the permitted limit. It also looks as if non-marine syndicate was left uncovered because its catastrophe fund was used to help the marine syndicate.

The committee now questions "the right to demand any funds at all" from members to make good the losses, and the enforceability of last year's offer from Minet and Howden. It is also to see Sir Ian Morrow, who has just been nominated by Lloyd's to take over as independent manager of the syndicates.

17 Jun 85

The Syndicate Audit Arrangements (Amendment) Byelaw (No. 3 of 1985, 17 June 1985).

17 Jun 85

AC and S -v- Aetna, 764 F.29 968, 3rd Circuit. Court held exposure, exposure in residence and manifestation all trigger coverage (following Keene, 667 F.2d 1034) (triple-trigger).

19 Jun 85

SIGNING OF WELLINGTON AGREEMENT SETTING UP THE ASBESTOS CLAIMS FACILITY.

It is all the more interesting to record that the role of the leading negotiator on behalf of the insurance companies involved in the Wellington negotiations was assumed by Ray Stahl of the Travelers Insurance Company, whose reinsurance broker was Marsh MacLennan.

Stahl stated that the Travelers would not become a party to the Wellington agreement and, therefore, would not be paying claims under the compromised formula.

(Insurers never sought the approval of their reinsurers prior to accepting the conditions of the Wellington asbestos-related method of paying claims. The London market, specifically Lloyd's, has assumed responsibility for approximately 40% of the asbestos-related problem through its involvement in direct and reinsurance business. Investor Names are being required to pay claims, many of which would have been improperly paid under the original policy wordings and have assumed extra-contractual obligations and retrospective liability, specifically the gaps caused by insolvent insurers and reinsurers as well as the insurance coverage gaps, for which no agreement was sought from the reinsurers and no premium was paid. Names were never told.)

The following producers are reported to have conditionally subscribed:-

 

Producers

 

Insurers

1.

AC&S, Inc:

1.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co.;

2.

Amatex Corp.

2.

American Universal;

3.

Armstrong World Industries, Inc.;

3.

Argonaut Insurance Co.;

4.

Brinco Mining Co.

4.

Bituminous Casualty Corp.;

5.

Celotex Corp.;

5.

CIGNA Corp.;

6.

CertainTeed Corp.;

6.

CNA

7.

Dana Corp.;

7.

Continental Insurance Co.;

8.

Eagle -Picher Industries, Inc.;

8.

Crum & Forster;

9.

Eastern Refractories Co.;

9.

Employers of Wausau;

10.

Fibreboard Corp.;

10.

Fireman's Fund

11.

Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.;

11.

First State Insurance Co.;

12.

Lake Asbestos Corp. of Quebec;

12.

Hanover Insurance Co.;

13.

Manville Corp.;

13.

Harbor Insurance Co.;

14.

Maremount Corp.;

14.

Hartford Insurance Group;

15.

National Gypsum Co.;

15.

Highlands Insurance Group;

16.

National Services Industries;

16.

Home Insurance Co.;

17.

Owens -Corning Fiberglass Corp.;

17.

I.N.A.;

18.

Owens-Illinois, Inc.;

18.

Mutual Insurance Co.;

19.

Pittsburgh Corning Corp.;

19.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.;

20.

Porter Hayden Co.;

20.

Underwriters for Lloyds of London;

21.

Pacor, Inc.;

21.

Reliance Insurance Co.;

22.

Shock & Fletcher Co.;

22.

Royal Insurance Co.;

23.

Turner & Newall

23.

The St. Paul Cos., Inc.;

24.

 

24.

U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co.;

25.

   

Zurich Insurance Co.;

26.

     

27.

     

28.

     

29.

   

Late Joiners

30.

   

C.N.A.

31.

   

Home

32.

     

33.

     

34.

   

Non Joiners

     

A.I.G.;

     

American Mutual

     

Chubb

     

Commercial Union

     

Kemper

     

Northbrook

     

Midland

     

Travelers

       

(The "Agreement Concerning Asbestos-Related Claims" (Wellington Agreement), executed by Producers and Insurers as the Asbestos Claims Facility had been signed by 34 asbestos producers and 16 of their insurers. The gist of the facility was as follows :

A.

The Keene Exposure basis of coverage was to be adopted;

B.

The 34 producers participating in the ACF were to participate in all outstanding claims against all Facility Producers in a fixed share: (N.B. Not all producers joined);

C.

The assured could exhaust all earlier policy years before applying the less favourable coverage in later years;

D.

There was a cap on the liability of those policies which had no aggregate limit;

E.

There was to be a Central Claims Facility which would handle claims against the participating producers and establish liability and insurance shares

It was agreed that occurrence is triggered in the continuous exposure periods so that any policy concluded in the time span from first exposure to the asbestos containing product until the manifestation of the disease is liable for the loss. As Professor Wellington stated at a conference in 1986:

"A claim triggers all insurance policies within the block ... each policy that is triggered will respond to a claim in a pro rata fashion and when primary insurance for a particular year is exhausted excess insurance for that year will drop down for indemnity purposes."

and:

"Moreover when coverage from any year is exhausted, insurance from other years within the block will, in most cases, fill the gap, but the total limit of each insurance policy, of course, will not thereby be increased."

( Some 516 Lloyd's Syndicate bureau stamp signing numbers, not included as London Third-Party Defendants, confirmed acceptance to the Wellington Agreement, but only 384 Syndicates active in 1985. This re-affirms the notes of an auditor at the Lloyd's Panel Auditors' meeting held on 15 January 1982 which state inter alia "Asbestosis is a latent risk, but has spilled over into both the Marine and Aviation market. Some 33 Asbestos Producers and 22 Insurance Companies were party to the Wellington Agreement and the subsequent Asbestos Claims Facility, established to settle asbestos-related claims).

The Wellington Agreement was signed by approximately 50 companies being 33 asbestos producers , involving some 30 firms in the US asbestos industry and 22 insurance companies, comprising some 16 US insurers, Lloyd's (approximately 516 Lloyd's syndicate Bureau Signing Numbers) and London Market insurance companies. The Asbestos Claims Facility will start working as soon as the data of member firms which determine liability share and insurance coverage have been fed into the Facility's databank. When the Facility commenced operations , its opening inventory consisted of approximately 25,000 outstanding claims which were pending against the Producer membership. Only some 6,000 claims had been settled and paid. The Facility will handle claims at a headquarters to be set up in Boston and two regional locations, one in the East Coast and one on the West Coast staffed by trained professionals.

Jun 85

Toplis & Harding (Asbestos Services) Ltd sets up the Environmental Claims Group (ECG) as a separate department to monitor D.E.S. and Pollution, then estimated at between $100m - $100bn.

21 Jun 85

PCW 1985 Steering Committee letter to Members of Syndicates 918, 940 and 157 ("the Syndicates") managed by Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies Limited - formerly PCW Underwriting Agencies Limited - ("RBUA") for years of account 1979 onwards who have contributed to the funds of this Committee.

Dear Member,

This letter is the further letter which I promised in my letter to you of 11th June. It should be read in conjunction with that letter. My letter of 11th June should be treated as giving Names the more detailed analysis of the problems which we face and the areas which are being addressed by this Committee. This letter is intended to concentrate rather more upon drawing conclusions and upon ensuring that, so far as possible, Names act as a body in order to meet the common problems which we face.

1. Price Waterhouse Preliminary Report

This Committee has now received from Price Waterhouse their Preliminary Report and I enclose a copy for your use. The Report is clear and to the point and I strongly advise you to study it with your professional advisers. Without an understanding of the contents of the Report nobody is, in my view, in a proper position to understand, or make decisions concerning, the PCW affair. I also draw your attention to the warning which is set out at the top of the first page of the Report.

2. Legal Advice

Ashurst, Morris, Crisp & Co. and Counsel have now confirmed to us as follows:-

  1. Names have a good arguable case to refuse to meet the cash call made by RBUA in their letter of 6th June 1985.
  2. Names have a number of causes of action against RBUA (and others) arising from the manner in which their affairs have been managed between since 1968.
  3. The Price Waterhouse Report contains information in a number of areas, which was not made available to Names at the time of the 1984 Offer but which would have been material to any decision to accept that Offer. Much of that information was available to RBUA at the time that it made the Offer. In these circumstances, there is prima facie evidence on the basis of which Names who accepted the offer may be able to set their acceptance aside. Names who accepted the Offer on the basis of particular assurances or statements of RBUA, which have proved to be wrong, are in an even stronger position to set aside their acceptance of the offer.

(iv) Depending upon the form of the Underwriting Agency Agreement, Names, who have claims against RBUA and who have either not accepted the 1984 Offer or who succeed in setting aside their acceptance, may well be able to set off the amount of their claims against the cash call now being made by RBUA and any future claim for interest.

(v) As explained below and subject to any points arising from the Statutes of Limitation, there is no tactical advantage to Names in issuing proceedings immediately in respect of any of the above matters.

Ashurst, Morris regret that, without seeing each individual Names' Underwriting Agency Agreement and without hearing from each individual Name the special circumstances which apply to his or her case, they cannot give more specific advice. They are confident, however, that were RBUA to sue Names to recover the cash call, the issues involved would prevent RBUA obtaining a quick summary judgment and would require long and protracted proceedings in which Names would be able fully to put their case against RBUA.

3. Lloyd's Solvency Test and Names' Funds and Guarantees

In my last letter, I discussed in some detail what the passing of the Lloyd's Solvency Test entails and what would be the consequences of an inability or refusal to pass the Test. The following further points, however, may help clarify the position for Names:

( i ) Names who pass the Solvency Test by 31st July 1985 are likely, of course, to receive, in the future, further requests to deposit funds or guarantees to meet Lloyd's means or solvency tests. The Solvency Test has normally to be passed by Underwriting Names each May; the premium test each September/October; and a Name can at any time be demonstrate means.

(ii) Any assets placed with Lloyd's to meet solvency pass from the Name's control and increase the Name's funds to which Lloyd's may have recourse as outlined below.

(iii) A Name who does not wish to continue to underwrite and does not meet Solvency will face administrative suspension from further underwriting. Failure by a Name to meet the Solvency Test does not entitle Lloyd's immediately to seize or apply that Name's assets held at Lloyd's. His reserves and deposits with Lloyd's may be "earmarked" to meet future losses but they will not be applied other than to meet policy claims as they fall due and until this happens should continue to earn interest for the Name. We do not know at what rate policy claims will have to be met but RBUA estimate the current annual cash requirement of Syndicates 918, 940 and 157 to be between £7 and £8 million.

(iv) There are two forms of guarantee which some Names have given to Lloyd's: one as an alternative to having to deposit realisable assets to show means and one as security to meet Solvency. The exact wording of both forms of guarantee varies between different Names but the practice at Lloyd's is that such guarantees, whatever their wording, are only called to meet policy claims as they fall due and to the extent that they are not met out of the Name's reserves and deposits at Lloyd's. Defaulting of a Name and use of the Lloyd's Central Guarantee Trust Fund are the final remedies available to Lloyd's followed by a claim by Lloyd's against the Name for reimbursement of the Central Guarantee Trust Fund.

4. Underwriting Losses

The cash call currently being made by RBUA against Names in the open years of account 1979 to 1982 inclusive of some £60 million does not represent the underwriting losses which will have eventually to be met by those Names. It represents RBUA's current estimate of the cash which would be necessary, were it to be invested now, to meet underwriting losses as they fall due over the next 15 or 20 years. No exact figure for those eventual underwriting losses is available but a figure of some £130 million has been referred to by RBUA. Names should appreciate that, however carefully the current estimate of £60 million has been made, it is only an estimate and future calls may be necessary, in the event, to permit actual underwriting losses to be met. Nobody is guaranteeing that if Names meet the current cash call of some £60 million future cash calls will not be necessary in respect of the underwriting losses on the open years 1979 to 1982 of these three Syndicates. Equally, Names should appreciate that if the cash call is not met now underwriting losses will have to be met, at least, when they fall due. Whether they have to be met by those Names who are on the 1979 to 1982 open years of account is no doubt one of the issues which would be the subject of litigation.

5. Immediate Objective of this Committee

The first objective of this Committee was to obtain, for Names, as much information as possible in the time available for them to reach their individual decisions as to whether to meet the RBUA cash call by the end of June and whether to pass the Lloyd's Solvency Test by the end of July. The Price Waterhouse Report was commissioned to establish the facts. Ashurst, Morris and Counsel were consulted to advise on the major legal questions that arose. Between us, this Committee and our professional advisers hope that we have prepared the ground for Names to make their decisions. As Price Waterhouse make clear in their Report there is still much to be done.

We have also been aware of the need for Names' underwriting affairs, as members of the RBUA Syndicates, to be managed after the demise of RBUA. Whilst we have made no definitive progress in this respect, there may be grounds for some hope in the involvement of Sir Ian Morrow.

Our final and principal objective has been to seek an overall solution to the current problems satisfactory to Names. It seems to us that Lloyd's and Minet must be involved in any such solution. Lloyd's continue to maintain that they cannot become involved in the matter which they regard as a personal problem for Names. Equally, Minet continue to state publicly that they do not consider that they are involved in the problem which is one between their subsidiary RBUA and the Names. However, armed with the preliminary findings of Price Waterhouse and Ashurst, Morris we intend to pursue an overall solution.

This Committee does not regard, as one of its immediate objectives, the launching of litigation to bring claims against RBUA and third parties. If an overall solution cannot be reached by agreement then litigation will be necessary to obtain justice for the Names and this Committee would be happy to act as a leader and co-ordinating body in such litigation. At this stage, we believe that litigation to pursue such claims is a distraction from the more immediate problems of Names. It will be apparent to you all that litigation against all potential defendants properly co-ordinated between all affected Names, involving all the individual circumstances of those Names, will be a complex and lengthy operation.

6. Recommendations of the Committee

This Committee cannot guarantee that a united stance by all affected Names in refusing to meet the cash call and to pass solvency will produce a solution to our problems. It may still be necessary for Names to resort to long term litigation to obtain justice. This would be unfortunate but we fear that it may be the only solution to the problem. Names who do not meet the cash call, risk proceedings by RBUA and Names who do not pass solvency will almost certainly be suspended from underwriting.

However, notwithstanding all of the uncertainties and risks, this Committee believes that its own strength and the collective strength of the affected Names to produce a satisfactory solution to the current problem will be considerably greater were all Names:-

(i) to refuse to meet the cash call now made by RBUA; and

(ii) to refuse to pass the Lloyd's Solvency Test at the end of July.

If you intend not to meet the cash call and/or not to pass solvency, may I suggest that you write briefly to RBUA and/or Lloyd's, as soon as possible, telling them of your intentions and sending a copy of your letter to this Committee. RBUA and Lloyd's will thereby be made aware of the strength of feeling among Names in time for us to pursue possible solutions.

If you are considering not passing the Lloyd's Solvency Test you should discuss the matter with your Members Agent or with the Managing Agent of any other syndicates with which you are involved at Lloyd's since a suspension from underwriting would relate not only to the RBUA syndicates but to all syndicates at Lloyd's. If you intend to pass solvency then we suggest that you write to Lloyd's making clear that any steps which you may take to pass solvency are taken "without admission" and "without prejudice" to any claim which you may wish to make in the future relating to the validity of any statements of account on which the figures of solvency are based and generally to your underwriting affairs on the RBUA syndicates.

7. Funds of this Committee

As you will appreciate, the extent and complexity of the problems with which this Committee has been dealing and the speed with which we have had to ask our professional advisers to operate, have involved us in considerable expenditure. Our funds stand at some £90,000 and our liabilities are slightly in excess of that. If we are to continue our work, therefore, we must seek further funds from you. We believe that the next six weeks are likely to be a period of intense activity for ourselves and we must involve all our professional advisers activity. Also, we would wish Price Waterhouse to continue their work. To enable us to do so, we would be grateful if you would each send us a further contribution of £250 to add to the £250 which you have already contributed to our funds. We will use this further sum in the same manner and subject to the same restrictions that we used the first £250 and we will, of course, return any unused funds to you. We will also produce our accounts to any of you who request a copy. For those of you who have signed the undertaking which we distributed at the meeting at the Royal Festival Hall, this further contribution would count towards the undertaking which you have given us.

8. Meeting

Finally, we confirm that we have arranged a meeting of all affected Names to be held at the Captain's Room at Lloyd's, 52 Lime Street, London, EC3 at 4.30 p.m. on Friday, 28th June. This will enable us to discuss the position with affected Names and to give you a final report of any progress which we have made by then ahead of the 30th June deadline for meeting the cash call made by RBUA. We very much encourage Names to attend at that meeting.

We thank you all for your support and encourage you to continue with it. We have had a large number of letters from Names and we hope that those who have had no reply will understand that that is not from lack of interest but merely from lack of time and resources. We have taken account of your comments and suggestions and we hope that our letters and the Price Waterhouse Report answer your questions.

21 Jun 85

Daily Telegraph: Minet drops support for PCW Syndicates

Minet Holdings is withdrawing any further assistance from the PC W syndicates at Lloyd's rather than leave itself with a continuing commitment which could prejudice its own finances, Raymond Pettitt, Minet chairman, has told shareholders in a letter.

He had already decided to close down Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies, the subsidiary which run the syndicates at the end of this year but the troubles have continued to grow. "It is now apparent that the problems of a minority of RBUA's names have become so great that the protection of Minet's shareholders' funds is paramount ".

Mr Pettitt says Minet has no legal obligation to support or finance the syndicates yet it has set up £8.3 million provision to allow for the run down of the business.

"The board does not consider that the further provision of shareholder funds is justified beyond what is required to protect the company's interest".

As it is Minet has now made £16 million total provisions including legal costs, for its involvement with RBUA, Mr Pettitt tells shareholders. Now the prospect of new litigation "has been resurrected " despite Minet being advised it need not pay more.

The letter emphasises that Minet promised to leave the syndicate management undisturbed and so could not have known what fraud had been committed nor what deficiencies had occurred in the underwriting.

24 Jun 85

Lloyd's List. Asbestos pact will help cure litigation "epidemic".

Soaring legal fees in asbestos cases - already well past the $600,000,000 mark - at last look set to be reined in.. The London insurance market is expected to give formal backing to the establishment of the new Asbestos Claims Facility next month....

Support by 50 companies and affected interests, including all the Lloyd's syndicates involved, has nonetheless been greater a giant step forward in dealing with what must be the U.S.'s - and the world's - greatest occupational disease compensation problem. Mr. James Ayliffe of Merrett Syndicates, has been nominated London representative, with Mr. Keith Rayment of Sturge an alternate. The two men have been leading proponents of the Facility. Mr. Robin Jackson, chairman of the Asbestos Working Party set by the London market said it was clear that London representatives have committed greatly to the success of negotiations.

Jun 85

A Committee of Inquiry has been established by the Council of Lloyd's to investigate the administration of certain syndicates managed by Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies Ltd between December 1982 and June 1985. The Committee will report to the Council within six months and a copy of their report will be sent to the Secretary of State for Trade & Industry.

The Davis Committee of Inquiry:-

John Davis (Chmn)

Vice Chairman of Lloyd's Bank Plc and President of the Institute of Bankers.

Henry Chester

Chairman of underwriting agency H G Chester & Co Ltd

Alan Brookland

Partner with Accountants Coopers & Lybrand.

In the event of any matter arising outside the terms of reference of the Committee of Inquiry but which, in their view, warrants further investigation, the Committee have been specifically charged to bring this to the attention of the Council of Lloyd's so it can decide whether further investigation is appropriate. The report was submitted to the Council of Lloyd's in July 1986.

26 Jun 85

The members of the board of Additional Underwriting Agencies (No 3) were announced by the Chairman of Lloyd's. They are:-

Sir Ian Morrow FCA

Deputy Chairman of Hambro Plc. Chairman of UKO International Plc and the Laird Group Plc.

Jeremy Hardie FCA

Chairman of the National Provident Institution.

Charles Skey

Chairman of Edwards & Payne (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd. Director of Sturge Holdings Plc.

John Heynes

Partner of John Heynes & Co.; Pepper (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd.; KPH Underwriting Agencies Ltd; and C W Rome (Underwriting Agency) Ltd.

Eric Bruce

Chairman of Cunliffe-Fraser; Bruce & Co Ltd.; Peter F Wright & Co Ltd.; and Additional Underwriting Agencies Ltd

William Goodier

Director of Willis Faber

The Council of Lloyd's established AUA3 under the provisions of the Substitute Agents Byelaw on 6 June 1985. This followed the announcement by Minet Holdings Plc, the parent company of Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies Ltd (RBUA), of its intention to close down RBUA by the end of 1985. RBUA assumed the agency function of all syndicates previously managed by PCW Underwriting Agencies Ltd in December 1982.

26 Jun 85

Annual General Meeting of Members of Lloyd's: Statement by Mr Peter Miller, Chairman

I had hoped to be able to devote this speech to a glowing description of the progress of the new building, the esoteric mysteries of the latest byelaws and a detailed explanation of the new electronic wizardry involved in the business processing system. Events have led me to conclude that I should rather talk about less domestic matters and about the well publicised problems which face the world insurance industry in general and Lloyd's in particular.

Many leading underwriters and successive Chairmen of Lloyd's have spoken over the last few years forecasting depressing underwriting results. What is the reality with which we are now faced? The international insurance market has been, and to a great extent still is, going through a very severe crisis indeed. It is, I believe, not too dramatic to say that we face a storm rising to a whirlwind, which has destroyed, particularly in America, more than a few insurance institutions and which threatens to destroy, or at least severely to cripple, many more. The problem lies in the utterly disastrous results of large sections of the American casualty book. To many of you the scale of the losses is already well known. To others the figures may not be so familiar. For example, I note that the American property and casualty companies are estimated to have suffered an overall loss of $4 billion in 1984. In the same year, the ten top British composites made, on their non-life account and for the first time in many years, an overall loss. In Germany the Munich Reinsurance Company recorded losses of DM431 million on its reinsurance book in this class, while the Swiss Reinsurance Company of Zurich was reported as declaring that it would withdraw from US casualty business until not only rates improved but policy forms improved likewise. Wherever one goes in the world of insurance one hears, to a greater or lesser extent, the same tale of woe. Lloyd's is, of course, heavily involved in United States casualty business and our results in this class are therefore very relevant.

It is true that a handful of Lloyd's syndicates, out of the 431 trading in 1982, have reported heavy losses and some, very severe losses indeed. From this, some of the omniscient seers in our Society are reported as deducing that the market will make an overall loss for 1982 lying between £70 and £100 million. Further, it is alleged that somehow Lloyd's standing in the eyes of its clients and policyholders has been reduced. The effectiveness of our regulation of the underwriting agency system is called into question. The Council of Lloyd's is accused of sitting on its hands and failing to help the Names on the troubled syndicates.

These are the allegations. The facts are somewhat otherwise. Let me start by breaking with all precedent and anticipate, at least in outline, what would normally be said at the time of the publication of our detailed Global market results. Today I anticipate a market profit overall for 1982 in the region of £50 million. In the context of the world-wide results I have already referred to, I regard this as satisfactory. Moreover, the anticipated result accords with the cautious optimism which I expressed in September 1984 that we would, as a market, escape the worst results of our competitors. In passing, let us not forget that the contribution of Lloyd's and its brokers to the balance of payments today runs at approximately £1 billion per annum and that Lloyd's as a market has traded at an overall profit in every year since 1948 save for three. Not a bad track record!

May I now try to answer the three questions which arise from the allegations I have referred to. They are serious questions and they deserve a straight answer. Arguing from the particular to the general, they relate firstly to the Council's treatment of what I will call the troubled syndicates and I will take the Peter Cameron-Webb (PCW) syndicates as the example; secondly, to the general effectiveness of our regulatory system in relation to our underwriting agents and thirdly to the standing of Lloyd's in the world of insurance.

Before the autumn of 1982 the authorities at Lloyd's had no information which would have led them to suspect that anything was amiss in the PCW syndicates. They were regarded as a group of the most innovative and leading syndicates in the market with a dynamic underwriting team. Their audited accounts showed reasonable profits and the underwriters were widely used by many brokers for clients on a world-wide basis. My predecessor as Chairman carried out an investigation into a contract placed by PCW - the so-called Unimar investigation -and concluded that there had been no dishonesty. His findings have since been confirmed by the independent inquiry into PCW carried out by Mr Simon Tuckey QC in the following terms:

"I do not think that there was any attempt by the Chairman of Lloyd's to cover up anything either before or during the course of his informal enquiry. During the enquiry he asked all the right questions and concluded, rightly in my view, that there had been no dishonesty."

Mr Cameron-Webb himself retired in January 1982 and resigned as a member of the Society in 1983, at which time we had no byelaw to prevent him doing so. It is highly regrettable that we are therefore unable to take any action under our own disciplinary procedures. However, we have made the relevant authorities in this country fully aware of the results of our investigations into this matter. We are totally confident that the Director of Public Prosecutions will take the necessary action.

The events of the autumn of 1982 are a matter of record. Thereafter, the Lloyd's brokers Minets, the owners of PCW, introduced a successor agency and underwriting team, known as the Richard Beckett Underwriting Agency (RBUA). Under their aegis, an offer of restitution of the whole of the principal of the monies stolen from the Names was made by various parties, to the Names in June last year. Minets state that the Names on the non-marine syndicates were advantaged in the allocation of the monies and therefore received in addition to the principal a sum in excess of any reasonable calculation of interest. The Council neither promoted nor opposed the offer. The offer was, in fact, accepted by Names on commercial grounds, with the benefit of detailed professional advice from accountants and lawyers. I would emphasise that the offer did not involve any surrender of rights in respect of the years from 1982 inclusive onwards, wherein more than 60 per cent. of the current underwriting losses have actually occurred.

It was not until April of this year that, for the first time, the Council learned that there were further underwriting problems which had not been identified in 1984 and we were informed of a possible heavy loss. We made it clear that the determination of the appropriate reserve was the responsibility of the Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies board and insisted that they must inform the Names in detail as soon as possible. By the time that RBUA convened the meeting of Names at the Royal Festival Hall, it was becoming clear to us that the board of RBUA was losing the confidence of the Names and indeed, losing confidence in its own ability to sort out the affairs of the Names for which it is responsible. The Council therefore determined that we would organise the appointment of a substitute agency, free from the conflict of interest that troubled RBUA, to look after the run off of the Names' affairs. We were also concerned that the marine and aviation syndicates should be in a position to continue to trade. The marine syndicates have now been sold. This must be in the best interests of the many Names on those syndicates who wished to continue to support their underwriting team and who, unless they saw a continuation of trading, might have been left in a position of uncertainty with their syndicates being left open and subject to yet another run off situation.

Additional Underwriting Agencies (No. 3) Limited (AUA3) is now in a position of being able to look after the Names' interest for the run off of the syndicates. It is a free-standing company and will act independently of the Council of Lloyd's although the Society owns the shares. We shall not seek to influence its conduct one way or another. Sir Ian Morrow has agreed to act as chairman of the new agency and I have no doubt will show himself to be a vigorous and effective agent for the Names. I would remind you that Sir Ian was the person entrusted by the Government with the reconstruction of Rolls-Royce Limited. He is already considering how and in what form and in co-operation with whom, any legal remedies which are in the best interest of the Names should be pursued.

The provisional board of the company consists of Sir Ian Morrow as Chairman, aided by a very strong team consisting of:

Mr Jeremy Hardie

Mr Eric Bruce

Mr Charles Skey

Mr William Goodier

Mr John Heynes

 

Mr Graham White will make himself available in whatever capacity the board asks him to serve. This team will take over from about 1st August 1985.

We have the utmost confidence in AUA3 as currently constituted and we believe that this arrangement fulfils our duty of seeing that a competent agent should be in charge of the Names' affairs. Beyond this, the Council has decided upon certain further steps, as follows.

Firstly, that it would be appropriate for them, under their powers under Byelaw 3 of 1983 to appoint an independent committee of inquiry, with terms of reference requiring them to investigate the conduct of the management of the troubled syndicates whilst in the hands of the Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies. This team of inquiry has been established with the approval of Sir Ian Morrow. Since there is no evidence of malfeasance on the part of the directors, it is not of a "disciplinary" nature but is rather designed to assist AUA3 and the Names (to whom, together with the Secretary of State, the report will be published) to establish facts. It will be headed by Mr John Davis President of the Institute of Bankers, who will be assisted by Mr Henry Chester and Mr Alan Brookland, a senior accountant versed in Lloyd's matters.

Secondly, your Council is examining the position of various Names who purchased stop/loss policies. The facts are not yet clear and the position far from satisfactory. It appears that some forty-three Names purchased stop/loss policies through the PCW Underwriting Agency. Claims on these policies have not yet been presented to underwriters for payment; as soon as the underwriters' reply has been ascertained I shall use every endeavour to ensure that the brokers, agents and underwriters involved respond properly to the situation.

Finally, we shall ensure that any costs of the run off beyond normal syndicate expenses will not fall upon the Names. I am anticipating that Minets will meet their obligations in this respect. In addition to this, I have an undertaking from Minets that no decision as to the liquidation of RBUA will be taken without further consultation with Lloyd's.

In the whole of this matter I believe that the Council has pursued a course entirely consistent with what I said to the Society at the General Meeting in June 1984, when I outlined the action which any Council should take if a syndicate experienced difficulties with its managing underwriting agent. At the same time, I made it clear then that the hard fact remains that the incompetent or even wrong-doing agent is still the agent of the Name.

In addition to the fundamental duty of seeing that a competent agent should be in charge of the Names' affairs, the Council can and does give help in a variety of ways. Through the Corporation staff we give advice to Names on their position under the solvency requirements; through our investigation and disciplinary committees we deal firmly, if laboriously, with those who have transgressed the rules of our Society. We established a Names' Advisory Committee, which is performing a valuable service as a further body to which Names can bring their troubles. Any member is, of course, welcome to discuss problems with the Chairman of Lloyd's and I have invited representatives from the 1985 PCW Names Committee to discuss with me the letter which they have recently sent to the Names on the afflicted syndicates, a draft of which I have now seen. Generally, the Council is constantly engaged in discussions with parties to the problems, in an effort to seek reasonable solutions advantageous to the Names' interest. The one thing the Council cannot do is to provide some sort of so-called financial lifeboat and thus depart from the principle that we each individually have to respond for our share of losses if, unhappily, they occur.

At the end of the day the Council has an inescapable duty placed upon it under the Insurance Companies Act of 1982. This is to ensure that every member of Lloyd's obtains a solvency certificate, valid as at the previous 31st December. This statutory certificate does not distinguish between open and closed years; they are of equal importance in terms of solvency; nor does it distinguish between actual underwriting losses which need immediately to be met, and outstanding claims which must be met at a later time. It is a report in a form laid down by statute, signed by an approved accountant that the Name has sufficient assets to meet all his underwriting liabilities. In the absence of such a certificate, we cannot allow the Name to continue trading as a member of Lloyd's and we must see that any deficiency in solvency is covered. Any person who wishes to continue to trade as an underwriter must arrange their affairs so as to ‘pass the Lloyd's solvency test. Money, or other securities, may be deposited for this purpose with either the members' agent or with Lloyd's itself, as an alternative to the managing agent.

We have extended the deadline for some syndicates as far as we are logistically able to do. If any Name fails to pass the solvency test we have, and I stress this, no option but to suspend that Name from further underwriting at Lloyd's until the position is rectified and to earmark Central Fund monies to cover any deficiency. Lloyd's as a whole will continue to trade and valid claims on its policies will continue to be met. The question as to what we do thereafter with regard to the recovery of those monies from the individual Name will be one for the Council. We shall use all legal remedies to ensure proper discharge of responsibilities. However, I repeat what I have said before, that it would be no part of the Council's policy to drive any person finally into bankruptcy who makes a genuine attempt to meet his full obligations.

It is very important to keep these current problems in context. They relate to events prior to the coming into force of the 1982 Act with its new and extensive powers and only a relatively small number of Names is affected - somewhat less than 400. The Council has had the hard and unenviable task of balancing its duties to the assured and to the Society as a whole, against its responsibility to these individual Names.

I have described the actions of the Council in relation to the PCW syndicates in some detail. There is one other agency matter which, although presenting a lesser problem, I should mention. It appears likely that the Council may have to appoint another substitute agency to look after the affairs of Syndicate 895 if it becomes apparent that Spicer and White can no longer competently handle the affairs of the members of that syndicate.

Before I finally leave the affairs of the PCW syndicates, may I repeat on behalf of us all, that we share the outrage of the members upon whom a theft of £40m was perpetrated - an outrage not only of personal loss, but also of the abuse of the trust which so many of us placed in certain persons running those syndicates. But it is not correct to argue from the particular to the general and to stigmatise Lloyd's as an institution that cannot be trusted. That would be totally to ignore the dedicated hard work of the thousands of people who work in our Society to the great benefit of our country and the members of our Society.

I now return to the general question which I have posed as to whether a member or prospective member of Lloyd's can trust the system which now regulates the market in which they participate - or, to put it more bluntly: "Could it happen to me?"

At once I must start by saying that, trading as we do on the basis of individual and unlimited liability, there will always be, as there always has been, a possibility of financial disaster from underwriting losses. But surely at Lloyd's we deal in the risk of probabilities, rather than the risk of possibilities. Everyday life is not so different. It may be that the next cross-channel ferry upon which anyone of us travels is in collision with another ship, killing some aboard. Yes, it is possible. But given the fact that there are very strict rules concerning not only the seaworthiness of the vessel itself, but also the competence of the captain and pilot and further detailed rules for the prevention of collisions at sea, it is most improbable that we shall receive a fatal injury in this way.

I believe that the Council of Lloyd's has now evolved a regulatory system which is both appropriate to the modern day world and is also one in which the current members of Lloyd's and those seeking membership can fully place their trust. I do not suggest that it is there to remove all possibility of financial disaster - no system could do that -but rather to reduce the possibility so far as is practicable.

The 1982 Act gives us new and sufficient powers, so what is it that we have achieved by passing all these byelaws in relation to the underwriting agency system?

Firstly, we are insisting upon improvements in the auditing of syndicate accounts and in the reporting thereof. This will ensure that any improper behaviour or other problems are identified and therefore dealt with much more rapidly.

Secondly, by insisting upon very full disclosure, we have highlighted the accountability enshrined in the law of agency, which requires the agent to respond to his principal for his care over the principal's interest. A central file of syndicate results is now available for inspection.

Thirdly, we have introduced a new standard agency agreement which must be used throughout the market from 1st January 1987. Logistically it was not possible to bring it in with effect from 1st January 1986, much as I would personally have liked that.

Fourthly, we have codified and immensely strengthened our processes for the approval of underwriting agents. I believe that the impact and importance of the "fit and proper" test for directors and underwriters cannot be over-estimated.

Next, we are insisting that each managing agent has a system to monitor his premium income and we review the results produced.

In all these matters, I consider it is important to realise the essential difference between regulators like the Council of Lloyd's, or the Department of Trade and Industry for that matter, and a monitor. There is and must be a limit to what regulators can do. Neither the Department of Trade nor Lloyd's monitors the day-to-day activities of the market. A regulator generally works on a post-facto basis. The objective of good regulation must surely be to try to ensure that the right controls are in place and functioning correctly and to see that, as far as possible, the individual syndicates and their managing agents are run by fit and proper people who are fully accountable to the members for whom they are underwriting.

These measures I have listed and many other reforms add up, in my view, to a modern and efficient system of regulation in which Names may readily put their trust. The events of the past few months will have affected some people's decision to become members of Lloyd's. The current turn in the market and , however, will be seen by many as compelling reasons for participating in this market. Indeed, it seems that this is how many perceive the matter. The latest figures show that new applications for membership for 1986 continue to run at 120 per cent of the numbers for 1985. At the same time, about 9,000 existing members are asking to increase their premium income limits for next year. It is almost impossible to speak of the "right" time to join the market; that said, I believe that this is one of those times.

Before I turn back to the point I started with, namely the position of Lloyd's in the world insurance market, there is one matter which must be mentioned.

The relationship of Lloyd's with our own Inland Revenue continues on a number of points to give cause for concern. However, we are in active discussion on these points with the Revenue, both as they affect the past and will affect the future. I hope for a positive response from them to any suggestions which we may put forward to end the present difficulties. I would have liked to have been able to go into these matters fully today, but the time is not yet ripe.

But to return to the state of the market. It is true that there has been, and still is, a severe crisis in the world insurance market. This has led, at long last, to a very sharp upturn in market conditions, particularly in the most difficult areas. It is now spreading out from those areas. I do not, however, wish to overstate the improved position of the market. There is at the moment only an impression of hardening in the marine market, where - as elsewhere - the risks that are difficult to place are the liability risks and not so much the physical damage risks. In the aviation market the hardening rates in 1984 have been maintained into 1985, but there are possible signs that further advances may be difficult. The area of greatest immediate potential profit is probably the non-marine market, particularly in the liability section; however, it is not only a matter of rates. Two other essentials have to be mentioned, namely that underwriters can no longer afford, in some critical areas of liability business, to underwrite on an "occurrence" form but rather on a "claims made" form and at the same time a measure of tort reform is needed and indeed is long overdue in the American legal system. Without improvements in both these areas, it is likely that some classes of insurance will become literally uninsurable.

The collapse of the world insurance market as a provider of insurance in these areas is leading to a great strain upon the capacity at Lloyd's. Demand is so great that sometimes Lloyd's is accused of losing capacity. This suggestion is quite unjustified. Lloyd's in 1985 compared to 1984, attracted an increase in its capital base, partly from existing members and partly from new, of 29 per cent expressed in sterling terms, or perhaps 15 per cent when account is taken of the strengthening of the dollar against the pound. The membership figures I have referred to show that a further substantial increase in our capacity will take place in 1986. On the sparse figures available in relation to world non-life insurance premiums, it seems that Lloyd's is increasing its overall market share and at the right time. Again, I am certain that the Council was right when, in the early months of the year, it decided not to interfere in some artificial way in an effort immediately to develop more capacity. The market in this, as so many things, should be left to deal with the matter itself and it does so with remarkable efficiency.

I have been very privileged to have travelled widely on Lloyd's behalf in the last nine months. I have visited South Korea, Japan, China, including Hong Kong, Canada, the United States on two occasions, and Brussels. Nobody who has done so can possibly be pessimistic about the future for Lloyd's in the world insurance market. As an insurance institution, Lloyd's continues to command respect and admiration and to be a place where the potential clients of Lloyd's are happy to place their business. This is because three things are, I believe, perceived. Firstly, Lloyd's continues to offer one of the strongest policies of insurance in the world, at a time when financial institutions in the insurance world are being shaken to the foundations by terrible losses. The maintenance of a sound policy is of fundamental importance to our continued trading success. Secondly, the concentration of underwriting talent at Lloyd's enables us to be innovative, flexible and quick in our response to the insurance needs of our clients. Thirdly, we continue, due to the size of our market and to our continuing ability to attract capital, to provide the continuity that people are looking for at a realistic price.

In each of the countries I have visited on behalf of the Society I have been made aware of the esteem in which Lloyd's is held and the fact that our customers continue to look to Lloyd's, as they have always done, to provide a lead in insurance matters. That reputation for leadership is, I believe, intact and I have every confidence that this important quality will continue to be provided by our underwriters, our brokers, our agents and by your Council. This and the great and evident successes of our Society are what must be set against the much publicised problems with which we have had to deal.

It is my firm opinion that Lloyd's has an unparalleled opportunity to prosper and I believe that it will do so.

27 Jun 85

Financial Times: John Moor reports on yesterday's meeting of underwriters - Lloyd's members find little comfort

In the Lloyd's insurance market yesterday trading was halted in the underwriting room for 70 minutes. It was no ordinary occasion. Lloyd's was holding a general meeting of members and near the top of the agenda was the controversial PCW affair, one of London's business community's worst financial scandals.

Underwriting members all listened as Mr Miller, the market's chairman, addressed them in front of the famous Lutine Bell. During the tense meeting Mr Miller outlined Lloyd's policy on the PCW case.

His message did not offer much comfort to the 1,525 underwriting members whose affairs are managed by the PCW agency, which is now known as Richard Beckett Underwriting Association.

The underwriting members are facing £130m of underwriting losses in addition to £40m of their funds which have been misappropriated by two of the agency's former managers.

"May I repeat on behalf of us all, that we share the outrage of the members upon whom a theft of £40m was perpetrated - an outrage not only of trust which so many of us placed in certain persons running those syndicates (into which the 1,525 members were grouped)." Mr Miller said.

"But it is not correct to argue from the particular to the general and to stigmatise Lloyd's as an institution that cannot be trusted. That would be totally to ignore the dedicated hard work of thousands of people who work in our Society to the great benefit of our country and the members of our Society."

But he stressed that " the hard fact remains that the incompetent or even wrong-doing agent is still the agent of the name (the underwriting member)."

Would Lloyd's mount a rescue for the stricken underwriting members? That was the question uppermost in the minds of those present. Already in the rule-making council chamber of Lloyd's the question of a rescue is causing anxiety.

In Lloyd's recent history there are several instances of underwriting members being helped by the market after the discovery of irregularities in their affairs.

No rescue deal was forthcoming. "The one thing the council cannot do is to provide some sort of so-called financial life-boat and depart from the principle that we each individually have to respond for our share of losses if, unhappily, they occur," Mr Miller said.

He sought to support the principle of unlimited liability in the market, in which underwriting members were responsible to the full extent of their wealth for any losses.

He mapped out Lloyd's further course of action over the PCW affair. A fact-finding inquiry team would be appointed to examine how the members' affairs have been looked after by the Richard Beckett agency since the scandal broke in 1982. The affairs of the members are to be looked after by an independent underwriting agency headed by Sir Ian Morrow. Other directors of the new agency, Additional Underwriting Agencies (Number 3), are Mr Jeremy Hardie of the discount house Alexanders, and four other working members of the Lloyd's market.

Announcing the inquiry into the affairs of Richard Beckett Mr Miller said that there was "no evidence of malfeasance on the part of the directors." The inquiry was designed to establish facts and would report within six months.

Lloyd's is also softening its line on the solvency test for the underwriting members. Each year they have to show that they have enough personal wealth to meet their insurance liabilities. The deadline for the solvency test requirements is July 31. Mr Miller said that unless the underwriting members met its requirements Lloyd's would have no option but to suspend them from underwriting. Funds would be earmarked from the central fund, designed to protect policyholders in the event of defaults by underwriting members. But Lloyd's would not "drive any person finally into bankruptcy," if they made a genuine attempt to meet their obligations. Lloyd's may give the members time to protect their interests and take further action before they are finally asked to pay up.

"Any person who wishes to continue to trade as an underwriter must arrange their affairs so as to pass the Lloyd's solvency test," Mr Miller said.

Underwriting members leaving the meeting were puzzled about its significance. The Department of Trade and Industry has been investigating the PCW affair for nearly three years. The City of London Police Fraud Squad has also been investigating it, Lloyd's has held two inquiries, the Inland Revenue was looking at the matter, there has been at least five firms of leading accountants which had examined the issue. "Will this new inquiry do any good?" one member wondered.

27 Jun 85

Times: Underwriting losses will cut 1982 Lloyd's profit to £50m

Lloyd's insurance market will make a sharply-reduced overall profit of at least £50 million for the 1982 year of underwriting, Mr. Peter Miller, chairman of Lloyd's, announced at yesterday's annual meeting of members.

The figure compares with a profit of £154 million for 1981 and record profits of £263.8 million in 1980.

Although no breakdown was given, the overall profit will contain a large underwriting loss, which will be more than covered by investment income. Last year an underwriting loss of £43.5 million was announced for 1981, the first such loss for 14 years.

Mr. Miller said that the anticipated result indicated that Lloyd's would escape the worst results of its competitors.

Speaking on the losses at the Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies, Mr. Miller reiterated Lloyd's ruling council's position that there would be no financial lifeboat for names, who face losses of £130 million.

He did not regard the Sasse case, in which there was a market rescue for stricken names in the late 1970s as a precedent.

Mr. Miller defended the record of Lloyd's ruling body, saying that before the autumn of 1982 the authorities had no information which would have led them to suspect anything was amiss at the PCW syndicates, since renamed Richard Beckett.

Mr. Miller made public for the first time, the findings of an inquiry into PCW carried out by Mr. Simon Tuckey QC, which cleared Sir Peter Green, former chairman of Lloyd's of a cover-up in his personal investigation into PCW.

"Sir Peter asked the right questions and concluded, rightly in my view, that there had been no dishonesty," Mr. Tuckey wrote. It was later discovered that former managers of the agency had misappropriated £40 million.

Mr. Miller also announced the appointment of a committee of inquiry into the handling of the troubled syndicates by RBUA since new management was put in at the end of 1982.

The steering committee of names representing 350 of the worst hit names on RBUA syndicates was not impressed with Mr. Miller's statement.

It said the measures announced were unsatisfactory and provided no solution to the affair. The evidence showed a history of misconduct and mismanagement at the agency between 1968 and 1982 and an inquiry into events from 1982 would not satisfy those names who are not prepared to pay their losses until they see that the money is properly due.

Mr. Miller said yesterday he saw very little substance and a great deal of confusion in some of the things the steering committee was saying.

The names are claiming on the basis of a report by Price Waterhouse, the accountants, commissioned by them that not only was there misappropriation, but serious overwriting of business and manipulation of accounts in the mid 1970s.

Mr. Miller yesterday denied there was evidence of overwriting on the basis of Lloyd's rules at the time. (Paragraph 4 a whopper. At any point of time Lloyd's published global figures are three years in arrears.)

27 Jun 85

Times: Hogg rise

Hogg Robinson, the insurance broking and transport group, reported pre-tax profits for the year to March 31 of £14.2 million, up from £11.0 million.

27 Jun 85

Financial Times: Lloyd's rules out help with losses

A SERIOUS row is developing between the authorities of the Lloyd's insurance market and 1,525 underwriting members faced with up to £130m of losses.

Relations have deteriorated between a steering committee representing 360 of the underwriting members and Lloyd's after Mr. Peter Miller, chairman of Lloyd's told a meeting yesterday that no "so-called financial lifeboat" could be provided to help the underwriting members meet their losses.

Mr. Miller, at a morning meeting of underwriting members, revealed that Lloyd's is to launch a new inquiry into how the underwriting members' affairs have been managed since 1982.

The inquiry is to be led by Mr. John Davis, president of the Institute of Bankers. He will be assisted by Mr. Henry Chester, a leading Lloyd's underwriter, and Mr. Alan Brookland, an accountant who has specialised in Lloyd's affairs.

The steering committee of underwriting members said last night that Lloyd's moves were unsatisfactory and provides no prospect of a solution to the affair.

The committee led by Lord Goodman, said all the available evidence pointed to misconduct and mismanagement of the underwriting members affairs during the period 1968 to 1982 and particularly in the mid-1970s. "The proposed inquiry into events since 1982, when new management took over, will not satisfy those members who intend not to pay money without first being satisfied that the deficits are properly due and are not related to fraud and malpractice of earlier years."

Underwriting members are angry that they are faced with up to £130m of losses after £40m of their funds was misappropriated by two former managers of the agency now living abroad. Mr. Miller said yesterday: "We share the outrage of the members upon whom a theft of £40m was perpetrated."

The underwriting members had been looking to Lloyd's to mount a rescue operation but Mr. Miller ruled that out yesterday. The one thing the ruling council could not do, he said, was to provide some sort of "so-called financial lifeboat" and thus depart from the principle for his share of the losses if, unhappily, they occur.

During the course of the meeting Mr. Miller revealed that Lloyd's investigators had confirmed the decision by Sir Peter Green, former chairman of Lloyd's, to close his personal inquiry into the PCW underwriting agency just six months before the scandal erupted in 1982.

Investigators said there was no attempt by the chairman of Lloyd's to cover up anything either before or during the course of his informal inquiry. "During the inquiry he asked all the right questions."

Mr. Simon Tuckey, QC, heading the investigation into the affair said Sir Peter concluded, rightly in his view, that there had been no dishonesty. Sir Peter had been studying the way in which an insurance contract had been arranged with Unimar Company in Monte Carlo.

Mr. Miller indicated yesterday that profits at Lloyd's for the last completed underwriting account will be "in the region of £50m," a sharp fall on the previous underwriting profits of £153m.

29 Jun 85

The Economist: Lloyd's, Sedgwick and the Chiltern millions

The role of two companies at the centre of the infamous PCW affair warrants fuller investigation by Lloyd's of London. One is Chiltern Reinsurance, a Bermudan-registered company which was used as a conduit for cash allegedly misappropriated from Lloyd's syndicates run by the PCW managing agency. The other company is Sedgwick, Chiltern's owner between 1975 and 1981. Sedgwick is the biggest Lloyd's broker. Transamerica Corporation, an American conglomerate, now has 39% of Sedgwick's equity and a 29% share of its votes.

Over a 10-year period, roughly £40m was allegedly plundered from the 1,500 or so names on the PCW syndicates by their two underwriters, Mr Peter Cameron-Webb, Mr Peter Dixon and a handful of co-conspirators. Last year. the Lloyd's broker Minet, which owned the PCW managing agency, repaid £40m to the names: £26m of it came from various bolt-holes found in Gibraltar.

The money was returned to the names provided they gave up their rights to sue anybody involved in the fraud. They complain they were also led to believe that future losses for their syndicates would be small. Earlier this year. they were told that another £60m of losses had been clocked up on various claims in America. The bulk of the losses fell on non-marine syndicates 918 and 940. In theory, these syndicates should have had reinsurance cover through Chiltern. In fact they had virtually none at all.

Chiltern was incorporated in Bermuda in December, 1975. Under Bermudan law, locals must outnumber foreign directors. Between 1975 and 1981, there were eight nominal local directors, including representatives of Conyers, Dill and Pearman, a law firm. Six Sedgwick men served on Chiltern's board between 1976 and 1981, including Mr Brian John Brennan, now a non-executive director of Sedgwick. Between 1981 and 1983, Mr Brennan was a deputy chairman of Lloyd's .

Sedgwick says that Chiltern only became "active" in 1978. From that moment, Chiltern was run as a giant rollover ("roller") fund for syndicates managed by PCW and its 40% affiliate, the WMD agency. Rollover funds. which are common in the Lloyd's market, work like this: in a good year, when syndicates are minting money, cash is moved to an offshore reinsurer via a reinsurance contract. When the lean years come, the cash is then repatriated to the syndicates. In the case of PCW, Chiltern was one of many such offshore companies. Between 1978 and 1981, Sedgwick was the sole broker for the two-way flow to Chiltern of premiums and claims. During that period, Chiltern's gross premium income was over $80m. ‘The PCW syndicates, however, could never take out more money than they had put in. Chiltern, like many other rollover funds, did not have the resources to meet any catastrophe presented to it.

Dealings between PCW and Chiltern had the appearance of arm's-length transactions, but that was a sham. Chiltern had no clients other than PCW and its affiliate WMD. While it was owned by Sedgwick, Chiltern's day-to-day management (accepting premiums and paying claims) was conducted by Sedgwick, while the cash in Chiltern was managed by an investment company owned by PCW. Chiltern's sole source of premium income was money from the PCW syndicates. Although legally owned by Sedgwick, Chiltern had the appearance of a PCW animal.

How did Sedgwick see its role in the rollover? According to the report commissioned from Price Waterhouse, an accountancy firm, by 300 or so disaffected names, Sedgwick said "the main duty of the broker is considered to be to see that the claims and premiums appear to be in accordance with the terms of the policy". Price Waterhouse "wonders whether such a view is valid".

But Chiltern was something more than a straightforward rollover fund. It was used to siphon £6.7m into the Gibraltar piggy banks of Mr Cameron-Webb and Mr Dixon. This was achieved through a retrocession (i.e., Chiltern reinsured some of its reinsurance) with Marine Excess of Gibraltar and Marine Guernsey, both set up in 1980. The retrocession covered the years 1977 to 1982 and the original broker to the retrocession was Sedgwick.

Sedgwick says that it had no idea of these financial doings of Mr Cameron-Webb and Mr Dixon. Sedgwick had been instructed by Mr Dixon to arrange the retrocession with Marine Excess and Marine Guernsey, and was assured by him that the companies were owned by a trust whose beneficial owners were the PCW names. Sedgwick says that "the arrangement was unusual but the substance of the transaction was not". However unusual, Sedgwick took the word of Mr Dixon and went ahead with the retrocession.

Chiltern was finally sold in l981, says Sedgwick, on the instruction of its client (PCW) to the Hong Kong-registered Citadel Insurance for $350,000. Citadel, a reinsurance company which is 49'% owned by Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, was also used by Mr Cameron-Webb and Mr Dixon as a conduit for money flowing into Gibraltar.

The Chiltern affair raises two issues which Lloyd's should address. First, it should be illegal for any Lloyd's management agency to place its outward reinsurance with any company in which it has a beneficial interest. In this case PCW managed Chiltern's investments. Second, Lloyd's should ban the operation of such captive rollovers as Chiltern, where the legal owners appear to be owners in name only. It was only because Chiltern was the creature of PCW that the two underwriters were able to siphon cash from syndicates through the company to Gibraltar. The affair should also he a salutary lesson to brokers who operate captive insurance companies on behalf of syndicates and simply see their role as broadly complying with the instructions of their clients and, apparently, accepting them without question.

29 Jun 85

Daily Telegraph: Call to probe Sedgwick group

SEDGWICK GROUP, Britain's largest insurance broker, closed 17p down yesterday at 353p following a call that it too should be investigated for its connection with the PCW syndicates, at Lloyd's from which some £40 million is alleged to have been stolen by former directors of the syndicate management.

Sedgwick had operated the Bermuda-based c o m p a n y through which the money was channelled into companies and private directors' accounts. But as Frank Hitchman, Sedgwick secretary explained, it had been told the companies into which the money went were owned by the whole of the syndicate, and since PCW manager at the time were thought reputable there was no reason to question that.

29 Jun 85

The Economist: More suits than Liberance

Accountants are feeling persecuted. The Bank of England's decision to sue Arthur Young, auditor to Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB), is the latest in a long string of suits against accountancy firms (see table). The suits are already hurting. Indemnity insurance premiums for accounting firms have increased by two to three times in the past year, and many firms are finding it impossible to get full cover.

In America, suits against accountants are running at around one a day. Arthur Andersen, the biggest accounting firm, made 16 payouts worth $137m between September 1980, and February, 1985. Litigious America's lead is being followed elsewhere in the English-speaking world. In Australia, A $145m ($97m) -way above the firm's insurance cover - was awarded earlier this year for negligent auditing against Fell and Starkey, a firm with 29 partners. Suits against British accountants have tripled in the past 10 years, but no case has gone to court in recent times. Accountants are half hoping for a big landmark case (as long as it does not involve their firm) that would set down clear rules.

Many of the suits involve the auditors of financial service companies that have got into trouble (e.g. Continental Illinois, ESM, and Drysdale as well as JMB). Not only are more financial firms going bust than for half a century, but auditors seem uncertain how to judge the risks and the speed of change in new-fangled financial businesses.

The crux of most of the cases lies in defining the accountant's responsibility. Accountants claim that there is a big gap between what is expected of them and how comprehensive their audits can be. Critics say that firms are now too interested in diversifying into management consultancy and other activities. Basic auditing has become a second-class business. In America, Mr John Dingell, chairman of the house of representatives' energy and commerce committee, is holding hearings on regulating auditors. Britain's Institute of Chartered Accountants has undertaken its own study.

Accountants want to find a way to limit the unlimited liability of partners in firms. One suggestion is for legislation to set a multiple of the fees paid as a limit for claims. Several American states have passed laws based on this principle to protect doctors. However, most accountants say it is "moonbeam" thinking - it would give them protection that far exceeds that granted to other businesses. A more realistic lobby wants accountancy firms (most of them partnerships) to be allowed to become limited companies. This would not make the auditors' responsibilities any clearer, but it would protect the partners from personal bankruptcy.

Big suits pending

Case

Firm

Country of suit

Amount

Alexander Howden

Arthur Young

UK

£167m

Baldwin United

Peat Marwick

USA

Unspecified

Continental Illinois

Ernst & Whinney

USA

At least $220m

De Lorean

Arthur Andersen

USA and UK

$260m and £100m

Drysdale

Arthur Andersen

USA

$17m

ESM Govt Securities

Alexander Grant

USA

$1 billion

Finance Corp. of America

Arthur Andersen

USA

Unspecified

Home State S&L

Arthur Andersen

USA

$115m

Insurance Corp. of Ireland

Ernst & Whinney

Ireland

I. £90m

Johnson Matthey Bankers

Arthur Young

UK

Unspecified

Media General

Touche Ross

USA

$75m

Penn Square

Peat Marwick

USA

$395m

Republic Finance Corp.

Peat Marwick

USA

$72m

Saxon Industries

Fox & Co.

USA

$108m

Securitibank

Coopers & Lybrand

New Zealand

NZ $6m

Winnipeg Mortgage

Deloitte Haskins & Sells

Canada

C $5.8m

29 Jun 85

The Economist: No stop to losses

At this week's annual gathering of Lloyd's names - wealthy folk who back this insurance market with their fortunes - Lloyd's chairman, Mr Peter Miller, told members that it is the fundamental duty of Lloyd's to see that "a competent agent should he in charge of the names' affairs". And an honest one? That question was uppermost in the minds of the 1,500 or so names on the PCW syndicates (now called the RBUA syndicates) who had £40m allegedly stolen from them by their underwriters, and who now stand to suffer losses of £130m from bad underwriting and worse. Many have refused to pay and are contemplating legal action against Minet, the broker which owns PCW/RBUA, as well as Lloyd's (possibly) and others.

Mr Miller has offered a couple of sops to the 350 PCW names on whom most of the losses will fall. Lloyd's has plumped for the classic delaying tactic: it has appointed a committee of inquiry to look into the running of RBUA since 1982. By the time it reports, many PCW names could be in Carey Street. A few might be lucky. The stop-loss policies purchased by 30 of them through the PCW agency, which turned out to be duff, might now (it seems) be honoured.

But these. at most, will cover a meagre £2m. Mr Miller is adamant that there will be no ‘‘financial lifeboat" for PCW names.

How those names must wish they were in the same boat as the members of the Sasse syndicate, which almost went bankrupt in 1979 when an American crook, Mr Jack Goepfert, skimmed money rightfully belonging to names. The names threatened to sue Lloyd's, which promptly bailed them out. So what s different now? In 1979, Lloyd's did not have legal immunity from damages for breach of trust or negligence. That vas conferred on it by the 1982 Lloyd's Act.

30 Jun 85

Sunday Telegraph: Lloyd's names go to court

AS a new Lloyd's row threatens to erupt over losses at syndicates run by the Oakeley Vaughan group (see page 28), hard-pressed members of the former PCW syndicates are this weekend planning to extend their legal action far beyond the Corporation of Lloyd's itself. They face total losses of £130 million.

At a meeting on Friday night members of syndicates. 918, 940 and 157 unanimously resolved to start proceedings both in Britain and America to "reclaim losses caused by fraud and mismanagement."

The PCW members are considering legal action against the Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies (which took over from the PCW Agencies), Minet (parent company of PCW and Richard Beckett), other members' agents, the Corporation of Lloyd's and the dynamic duo of Peter Cameron-Webb and Peter Dixon, who originally managed the syndicates.

The m e m b e r s ‘ solicitor Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, hopes to co-ordinate action in Britain with legal moves in America, where many of the names have social security numbers and so believe they are entitled to sue from there. With its contingency fees and mega - settlements, America is attractive suing territory (as Lloyd's underwriters already know to their costs).

0 Jul 85

Best's Review: Back to Saner Paths. (The remarks below are excerpted from an address by Sir Peter Miller, chairman of Lloyd's of London, to the summer meeting of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in Kansas City)

There is a crisis in the world insurance industry, and the dimensions of the problem in monetary terms are well known. The area of concern is pre-eminently the casualty market in the United States. In 1984, U.S. property/casualty companies had a loss overall of $4 billion. The top 10 UK composites lost money overall for the first time in many years. In Germany, the Munich Re had a loss on its U.S. reinsurance portfolio of DM 431 million. The Swiss Re is said to have withdrawn from the casualty market until there is a revision of policy form. At Lloyd's some syndicates particularly engaged in that market also have had heavy losses, although only about 1% of our Names have been seriously affected.

The effect on the world insurance industry of these continuing losses is very severe indeed and is leading to a lack of capacity which should cause great concern to all legislators, state and federal, as well as to regulators, because consumers will shortly be deprived of insurance coverage which they need.

There are, in fact, three components to the crisis of capacity, none of which can be taken alone if w e are to find a solution. First, the crisis is one of inadequate rating. The long honeymoon of the soft market has enabled policyholders to enjoy, and led them to expect, a rating structure wholly inadequate in relation to the risks the insurer is asked to bear. The losses brought about by inadequate rates have so enfeebled the underwriting industry that they cannot absorb the risks at the right rate without a new influx of capital. That won't come overnight, nor will it come at all unless the providers of the capital can look for a long-term stable return.

Second, it is no longer possible for large sections of the liability book to be written on the occurrence form. The claims-made form is no panacea by itself and can easily be abused (or may even, through use of an extended discovery clause, not improve the insurers' position at all). Nevertheless, I believe that it is the only policy form upon which large parts of the casualty book can in the future be written, and then only if there is an overall limit, including legal costs.

Third, the present legal system in the United States makes it impossible for the liability or casualty insurer to operate, certainly to the extent necessary to satisfy the insuring needs of the public. The reason for this is the total uncertainty facing an insurer as to how the US courts w ill interpret various policy wordings.

We need reform in so many areas: in limiting the abuse of discovery procedures; in a reform of the contingency fee system; in a limit upon pain and suffering damages; in the elimination of punitive damages - to name but a few of the reforms which are necessary. These w ill be incredibly difficult to achieve, but the problem of capacity will not go away until they are. I believe that we can no longer live with the uncertainty engendered by the vagaries of the American legal system as it stands today.

All of this is said, not in any spirit of hostile criticism, but from and on behalf of a Society - Lloyd's - which is most deeply committed to a healthy insurance market in the United States. The members of the NAIC have a great responsibility in this matter to lead us back to saner paths where the insurance industry can give to the public the services it needs, while ourselves making a proper financial return for the risks which we run. I do not think that you will shirk that responsibility.

1 Jul 85

Letter from Outhwaite to Names. Following the publication of our accounts we have discussed with many agents the implications of the qualified audit report. We have reconsidered the matter and have decided to leave the 1982 year open.

2 Jul 85

A seminar give by Jim Ayliffe and Keith Rayment in Cologne on "asbestos related claims". [This document has a covering memo from JM Dowlen submitting it as a first draft to CJ Ayliffe and K Rayment for them to change as they wished. The first five out of sixty-seven pages have been corrected (by CJ Ayliffe)]

(Asbestos was seen as giving rise to the US's and the world's greatest occupational disease compensation problem. In July, August and October 1985 Mr. Ayliffe, the Merrett Agency claims director, said in the course of the seminars held in Europe (addressed by Mr. Ayliffe and Mr. Rayment of Sturge):-

"Exposure to asbestos and consequent litigation involve potentially enormous personal and economic stakes. Approximately 24,000 people have filed products liability law suits claiming asbestos-related injury as of March 1983. Many times that number have been exposed to asbestos. The severity of the asbestos problem is such that the Chairman of the Asbestos Working Party in London has identified it as the most serious problem ever to be encountered by the insurance industry... It did not take long for the Unions to recognise that there was now a way of getting compensation for their members which did not require them to go through the workman's compensation route and get minimum compensation even if they qualified... They started in a small way... For the past 3 or 4 years we have seen those actions running at a level of approximately 500 new law suits per month. Over the past year, that rate has increased to approximately 750 new law suits per month. We have at the present time no real feeling how long it will be before we have seen a peaking of the legal activity that has been gradually developing, but we now have had filed approximately 45,000 separate actions by individuals. The problem that asbestos produced from the injury aspect, was obviously the latency period. The time from the first exposure of the individual to an environment that has asbestos dust in the air, to the point when the individual can show a physical disability arising from the accumulation of that dust or fibre, can range between 20 and 40 years... If we therefore assume say a 30 year exposure, it is likely to be the end of the century before we see a major fall off in claims being filed in regard to asbestos exposure. Not all claims arise from individuals exposed in their work place... Family members who have been exposed... we have claims from persons who live near existing plants that use asbestos... The decisions on coverage interpretation coming from the US Courts have been, from the insurers' point of view, ever increasing and broad in their findings and in the context of the asbestos problem, I think you have to recognise that nearly every decision that has come down has, to an extent, been insured orientated. ...so the present situation is that we are now forced to accept that the Keene situation is not an aberration, it is a fact of life with which we have to live.... There are not a few insurers who have equal concerns about their ability to remain financially solvent due to problems that have been gradually developing in the asbestos matter... The Facility as it is now becoming a much stronger voice (it's one voice speaking for 55% of all defendants in the asbestos scene), can now produce much more meaningful statistics that all of us badly need, to get a handle as to where we stand in regard to our potential exposure, whether we are direct writers, reinsurers or involved on retrocessions. ... We have in formation the ability to contain the extreme wastage of money on legal costs that we had in the past... The big difficulty is none of us know how long it will be before evidence comes through that the asbestos issue appears to be fully under control..."

Mr. Rayment, the Sturge Agency claims director, who accompanied Mr. Ayliffe to the seminars referred to above, described "asbestos property damage claims . ... perhaps a greater liability, certainly more difficult to evaluate at this stage, is asbestos property damage. Reports say that it could be much larger than the bodily injury claims that we are seeing to date. We fear that ultimately there may be claims from utility companies, even house owners which have got insulation in their roofs or wherever. Certain examinations have been done just of small areas of private house owners and over 60% have got asbestos contained within their houses. The claims alone against Johns-Manville (who currently still reside in chapter 11 of the bankruptcy laws) exceed $50 billion... The unique thing about the Johns-Manville bankruptcy was that there was another creditor group, the future plaintiffs group. This body represented those out there who have a cause of action in the future but at the moment do not know this. So there is a committee set up to protect those claimants as well ..."

The state of the US authorities is set out in the many Attorneys reports and paralleled in the court judgements. Mr. Ayliffe referred in Europe to the experience of insurers before the US courts in the context of the asbestos problem. The attitude of the US courts to the proposed defences to pollution claims was at best uncertain).

Jim Ayliffe:

Keith Rayment and I have been intimately involved with the subject of our discussion this morning. ... We have been

involved in dealing with problems relating to asbestos claims since the end of the 1970's ... Keith and I have participated in the London Asbestos Working Party . . .

(171 ) Before I deal with the development of the products law in the USA, I would like to quote to you the opening paragraph in a publication which was put out in 1983, and an additional publication in 1984, by the Institute of Civil Justice in the USA. The reasons why that body, a totally independent organisation became involved in the asbestos problem was the recognition at that time that vast sums of money were being expended in paying lawyers but... The Institute did an analysis. ... I think the opening statement in that study puts the whole matter into some sort of perspective: "Exposure to asbestos and consequent litigation involve potentially enormous personal and economic stakes. Approximately 24,000 people have filed products liability law suits Painting asbestos-related injury as of March 1983 . Many times that number have been exposed to asbestos." ... The severity of the asbestos problem is such that the Chairman of the Asbestos Working Party in London has identified it as the most serious problem ever to be encountered by the insurance industry. From a financial impact point of view there is no question that that overview is perfectly correct. To address this problem we have worked diligently over the past few years to find a way of containing the problem, a way in which we can handle the tort litigation and more particularly, a way in which we can use the available funds in a manner which addresses claims and does not enrich lawyers...

(175) In the 1970's, there was a case brought by ... a man called Borel, who had suffered work place exposures from the asbestos products supplied to his firm by a number of asbestos suppliers ... Now that was really the start of our asbestos problem that we know today ... It did not take long for the Unions to recognise that there was now a way of getting compensation for their members which did not require them to go through the workman's compensation route and get minimum compensation even if they qualified.... They started in a small way ... For the past three or four years we have seen those actions running at a level of approximately 500 new law suits per month. Over the past year, that rate has increased to approximately 750 new law suits per month. We have at the present time no real feeling how long it will be before we have seen a peeking of the legal activity that has been gradually developing, but we now have had filed approximately 45,000 separate actions by individuals. The problem that asbestos produced from the injury aspects was obviously the latency period. The time from the first exposure of the individual to an environment that has asbestos dust in the air, to the point when the individual can show a physical disability arising from the accumulation of that dust or fibre, can range between 20 and 40 years.... If we therefore assume say a thirty year exposure, it is likely to be the end of the century before we see a major fall off in claims being filed in regard to asbestos exposure. Not all claims arise from individuals exposed in their work place ... Family members who have been exposed ... We have claims from persons who live near existing plants that use asbestos ...

(180) A review of the USA Court decisions on insurance policy coverage ...

(183) The decisions on coverage interpretation coming from the US Courts have been, from the insurers' point of view, ever increasing and broad in their findings and in the context of the asbestos problem, I think you have to recognise that nearly every decision that has come down has, to an extent, been insured orientated ...

( 184) What we were seeking was equity in the way of our contracts were interpreted. Unfortunately as is typical in the USA, we have not received equity. We have received punitive treatment and our contracts have been expanded far beyond anything that was ever intended when they were written so the present situation is that we are now forced to accept that the Keene situation is not an aberration, it is a fact of life with which we have to live ...

(186) The concerns facing producers, Plaintiffs, insurers and judiciary, regarding the asbestos problem ...

(187) Asbestos litigation is slowly clogging up the whole operation of justice within the USA ...

(188) From the insurers' point of view ... the coverage litigation has occupied a tremendous amount of time, effort and expense on the part of the insurance industry. Dare I say, that not only are the producers concerned about their financial ability to respond to asbestos claims. There are not a few insurers who have equal concerns about their ability to remain financially solvent due to problems that have been gradually developing in the asbestos matter.... Many insurers can address Asbestos providing it is phased out in the manner in which it has its impact on us. None of us could pay the total cost of asbestos today because we would all be bankrupt. That was the big fear that we had, that unless as an industry we could find a solution, we had be threat of a solution being imposed upon us.

(189) That is the background of the problems that all the different parties involved in asbestos claims were facing ... Let me give you some figures. These come again from the Rand study. The Rand people are an independently financed prestigious body in the USA. They operate under the name of the Institute of Civil Justice... Dealing with the total expenditure, the amount expended overall in a similar time-frame in addressing asbestos-related matters, was just in excess of $1 billion...

Keith Rayment:

(190) The formation of the Asbestos Claims Facility. I would like to take up from about half way through Jim Ayliffe's talk this morning. The Keene decision came down in about October 1981. I think from London's standpoint, we saw the writing on the wall in that the Court's main objective was to maximise insurance coverage for the insured and that whatever we did, the Judge would be looking at what was best for the asbestos producer. ... We felt that we should probably try and make contact with the American domestic insurance companies and the Asbestos producers themselves to see if there was a way we could try and resolve our differences without relying upon the American judiciary. In May 1982, there was a Defence Research Institute seminar on asbestos in Florida which a number of people from London attended including Jim Ayliffe and myself... We left that meeting in May 1982, somewhat despondent ... But in October 1982, Jim Ayliffe and myself were invited by the major direct insurers in America to join a committee of insurers at that stage, to endeavour to find alternative solutions to the asbestos problems.

(195) How the facility intends to resolve the problem issues ...

(201) Asbestos property damage claims. Unfortunately, this is only half the story. Perhaps a greater liability, certainly more difficult to evaluate at this stage, is asbestos property damage. Reports say that it could be much larger than the bodily injury claims that we are seeing to date. ... We fear that ultimately there may be claims from utility companies, even house owners which have got insulation in their roofs or wherever. Certain examinations have been done just of small areas of private house owners and over 60% have got asbestos contained within their houses. The claims alone against Johns-Manville (who currently still reside in chapter 11 of the bankruptcy laws) exceed $50 billion....

(203) The Johns-Manville bankruptcy ... The unique thing about the Johns-Manville bankruptcy was that there was another creditor group, the future Plaintiffs group. This body represented those out there who have a cause of action in the future but at the moment do not know this. So there is a committee set up to protect those claimants as well and the Court employed Leon Silvermann to act as their representative...

(208) Jim Ayliffe: Asbestos related claims: reinsurance issues.

(213) Reserving for asbestos insurance and reinsurance claims.... That was the professional reinsurers' approach so far as the USA is concerned. It has, I think, produced a degree of comfort to direct writers, it has brought out of the discussion a meaningful relationship on all the parties knowing exactly where they stand. There are a number of spin-off benefits that actually evolve out of this which, if anything, benefit the reinsurance industry more than most. One is the area of reserving. The Facility as it is now becoming a much stronger voice (it's one voice speaking for 55% of all defendants in the Asbestos scene), can now produce much more meaningful statistics that all of us badly need, to get a handle as to where we stand in regard to our potential exposures, whether we are direct writers, reinsurers or involved on retrocessions...

(220) ... All the problems are capable of discussion, but they need to be aired, to be considered, on a commercially sensible basis so that we all know exactly where we stand. We th